4 ms·

Facial recognition use by South Wales Police 'unlawful'

2 points by asplake 6y ago

DanBC 6y ago
This isn't a particularly good result. Here's a press summary: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1058.image.pdf https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1058.image.pdf Here's the case: https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1058.html&query=(facial)+AND+(recognition) https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA... Have a look at the claims. > The appeal succeeded on Ground 1, that the DC erred in concluding that SWP’s interference with Mr Bridges’s Article 8(1) rights was “in accordance with the law” for the purposes of Article 8(2). The Court held that although the legal framework comprised primary legislation (DPA 2018), secondary legislation (The Surveillance Camera Code of Practice), and local policies promulgated by SWP, there was no clear guidance on where AFR Locate could be used and who could be put on a watchlist. The Court held that this was too broad a discretion to afford to the police officers to meet the standard required by Article 8(2). This isn't saying "don't do it", it's saying "draw up a code of practice and some guidance documents before you do it". > The appeal succeeded on Ground 3, that the DC was wrong to hold that SWP provided an adequate “data protection impact assessment” (“DPIA”) as required by section 64 of the DPA 2018. The Court found that, as the DPIA was written on the basis that Article 8 was not infringed, the DPIA was deficient. To me this feels like they're saying a better DPIA would have avoided the problem. > The appeal succeeded on Ground 5, that the DC was wrong to hold that SWP complied with the PSED [public sector equality duty]. The Court held that the purpose of the PSED was to ensure that public authorities give thought to whether a policy will have a discriminatory potential impact. SWP erred by not taking reasonable steps to make enquiries about whether the AFR Locate software had bias on racial or sex grounds. The Court did note, however, that there was no clear evidence that AFR Locate software was in fact biased on the grounds of race and/ or sex. Again, this doesn't feel like they're saying this is a critical flaw of AFR. It feels like they're saying that a better impact assessment for the PSED would avoid legal problems. Importantly the appeal failed this claim: > The appeal failed on Ground 2, that the DC erred in determining that SWP’s use of AFR was a proportionate interference with Article 8 rights under Article 8(2). The Court held that the DC had correctly conducted a weighing exercise with one side being the actual and anticipated benefits of AFR Locate and the other side being the impact of AFR deployment on Mr Bridges.The benefits were potentially great, and the impact on Mr Bridges was minor, and so the use of AFR was proportionate under Article 8(2) This is the court saying they don't have a problem with the principle of AFR. Privacy campaigners have a lot more work to do if they want to see AFR banned.

2 points by asplake 6y ago

This isn't a particularly good result. Here's a press summary: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1058.image.pdf https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1058.image.pdf Here's the case: https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1058.html&query=(facial)+AND+(recognition) https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/format.cgi?doc=/ew/cases/EWCA... Have a look at the claims. > The appeal succeeded on Ground 1, that the DC erred in concluding that SWP’s interference with Mr Bridges’s Article 8(1) rights was “in accordance with the law” for the purposes of Article 8(2). The Court held that although the legal framework comprised primary legislation (DPA 2018), secondary legislation (The Surveillance Camera Code of Practice), and local policies promulgated by SWP, there was no clear guidance on where AFR Locate could be used and who could be put on a watchlist. The Court held that this was too broad a discretion to afford to the police officers to meet the standard required by Article 8(2). This isn't saying "don't do it", it's saying "draw up a code of practice and some guidance documents before you do it". > The appeal succeeded on Ground 3, that the DC was wrong to hold that SWP provided an adequate “data protection impact assessment” (“DPIA”) as required by section 64 of the DPA 2018. The Court found that, as the DPIA was written on the basis that Article 8 was not infringed, the DPIA was deficient. To me this feels like they're saying a better DPIA would have avoided the problem. > The appeal succeeded on Ground 5, that the DC was wrong to hold that SWP complied with the PSED [public sector equality duty]. The Court held that the purpose of the PSED was to ensure that public authorities give thought to whether a policy will have a discriminatory potential impact. SWP erred by not taking reasonable steps to make enquiries about whether the AFR Locate software had bias on racial or sex grounds. The Court did note, however, that there was no clear evidence that AFR Locate software was in fact biased on the grounds of race and/ or sex. Again, this doesn't feel like they're saying this is a critical flaw of AFR. It feels like they're saying that a better impact assessment for the PSED would avoid legal problems. Importantly the appeal failed this claim: > The appeal failed on Ground 2, that the DC erred in determining that SWP’s use of AFR was a proportionate interference with Article 8 rights under Article 8(2). The Court held that the DC had correctly conducted a weighing exercise with one side being the actual and anticipated benefits of AFR Locate and the other side being the impact of AFR deployment on Mr Bridges.The benefits were potentially great, and the impact on Mr Bridges was minor, and so the use of AFR was proportionate under Article 8(2) This is the court saying they don't have a problem with the principle of AFR. Privacy campaigners have a lot more work to do if they want to see AFR banned.