3 ms·
With all of that being said, were these software engineers (probably subcontractors) even given access to actual MCAS readouts or, more likely, virtualizations
by UnpossibleJim 6y ago
With all of that being said, were these software engineers (probably subcontractors) even given access to actual MCAS readouts or, more likely, virtualizations of expected readouts. These people probably didn't account for this type of faulty readout because the virtual machine never put out that type of fault.
Most types of development in these large companies is so compartmentalized that it's next to impossible to see the whole structure from a software engineers prospective. You need to be at a management level to understand how most of the pieces really come together, which is the only place where one of these "oaths" might make an influence. At that point, however, the selection is so goal oriented, I have a doubt as to whether or not people would take that oath.
- bumby 6y agoGenerally, there is somebody (typically in software assurance or systems engineering) who is supposed to ensure the fidelity of the simulator. Additionally, the hazard analysis or failure modes effects analysis should trace to specific test cases. Of course, there’s all kinds of pressures that make these fall through the cracks. I vaguely remember an article stating some of these documents in the case of MCAS were not up to date