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The allies had already started to resort to obliterating whole cities and their inhabitants before Hiroshima (see Dresden, Tokyo). IMHO, this was not the resul
by mytailorisrich 6y ago
The allies had already started to resort to obliterating whole cities and their inhabitants before Hiroshima (see Dresden, Tokyo).
IMHO, this was not the result of how "evil" the German and Japanese regimes were (which seems to me to be a rationalization) but the result of 5 years of total war. I think that at some point people came to accept doing whatever it took to win and end the war.
In the context of what was going on I think dropping atomic bombs to precipitate the end of the war and send a message to the Soviets was perhaps not considered as big a deal as we might think because, as said, the result was already accepted looking at the conventional bombing raids that had taken place.
War is hell and total war means total hell.
- willis936 6y ago>IMHO, this was not the result of how "evil" the German and Japanese regimes were (which seems to me to be a rationalization) More than ten million killed in war crimes by Japan alone in less than 15 years. These weren’t some secret at the time. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_war_crimes https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_war_crimes
- gen220 6y agoFWIW, the goal of the allied bombing campaign was always to cripple the adversary nation by bombing industrial infrastructure; the doctrine pre-dated the outbreak of WW II. The invention of radar-assisted targeting thwarted this mission in the early phases of the war in Europe, and it took a tech arms race to get past it. In the Pacific, the US’s primary objective was to secure an air base within strategic bombing range of Japan. It pursued this by capturing islands and investing in aeronautics (extending the range and carrying capacity of bombers). Once within range of Japan, the Air Force tried strategic bombing at first, but found themselves unable to hit their targets. They had to fly above flak, and aim through the previously-undiscovered jet stream. They eventually gave up and turned from strategic bombing to recently-invented (demonstrated in 1942/3, mass produced in 1944) napalm. They knew it was awful, but considered it a trade of X lives now for 10x lives later. All this to say, I don’t believe that war weariness significantly influenced the decision to use napalm and atomic weapons, in Europe or Japan. If the allied powers had encountered the opportunity to use them within the first year of the war, their military doctrine would have dictated their use.