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In my experience, the hardest thing about this whole space is the number of developers who don't understand what the problem is until it is costing them $80 mil
by shadowgovt 6y ago
In my experience, the hardest thing about this whole space is the number of developers who don't understand what the problem is until it is costing them $80 million dollars.
Limiting blast radius, for example. Why does your threat model include the possibility of one of your applications being compromised and using its credentials to do desired things to other applications? That implies your programs are buggy. And clearly, your programs aren't buggy; you're using best practices. How could they be?
Even in professional development in big name companies, this is a surprisingly pervasive default attitude. Appropriate level of paranoia is something that I think has to be taught.
- scarface74 6y agoIt’s not always about even being malicious. At my last company I was an admin. But I locked myself down so I wouldn’t make a stupid mistake. In the past, both Apple and Google made mistakes in their installers that if anyone else did it, people would assume it was malicious. There was a bug in the iTunes installer that erased files on people’s hard disk if there was a space in the name. There was also a bug in the Chrome installer that made your hard drive unbootable if you had system integrity protection turned off.
- lmm 6y ago> Limiting blast radius, for example. Why does your threat model include the possibility of one of your applications being compromised and using its credentials to do desired things to other applications? That implies your programs are buggy. And clearly, your programs aren't buggy; you're using best practices. How could they be? I find that a lot these "defence in depth" style policies end up muddling where the actually important boundaries are. You get people slapping on a "security" layer everywhere because "it can't hurt", but then people don't worry about bypassing those layers either because "that part is just in case, it doesn't have to be 100% secure" and then the holes in your Swiss cheese line up and you get hacked. Realistically you have a budget for how much effort people are willing to put into understanding your security systems and you need to spend it where it will do the most good. For most organisations that means a clear, centralised access control model that the rest of your systems trust to do its job, and no ad-hoc mitigation measures.