4 ms·
The paper "A Retrospective on the VAX VMM Security Kernel" (1991) presents a summary of analysing timing sidechannels in things like hard drive arm movements as
by formerly_proven 6y ago
The paper "A Retrospective on the VAX VMM Security Kernel" (1991) presents a summary of analysing timing sidechannels in things like hard drive arm movements as prior art from 1977 in section VI.E, while explicitly addressing more usual timing side channels with various references to 1991 papers. One of their solutions to address timing side channels was fuzzy time (seem familiar?).
- morelisp 6y agoInteresting! I have always seen timing attacks cited as originating in Kocher (1994), but I suppose this is some bias towards the current Unix / PC / crypto world away from mainframe development. The 1991 paper is quite clear, though the 1977 paper it cites just kind of punts on the issue (end of section 3.6): > Hence, it will not be possible to transmit information over a covert communication channel at a high enough bandwidth to make such attempts worthwhile. Skimming the citations though, I'm not 100% sure it's the same thing as Kocher (1994) which has a more direct line to Meltdown/Spectre. The idea that intervals of high-precision clocks could carry information is the same, but especially the KVM/370 paper seems concerned with it being used for unmonitored communication between two malicious actors, or as a tool to learn something generally about what other users of the system are doing, not exfiltration of the the stored data itself across a security boundary with an oblivious user. The 1991 paper seems to sit somewhere in the middle.
- jnwatson 6y agoImportantly, fuzzy time was referenced in the Light Pink Book [1] from the DoD Rainbow Series. The problems of timing attacks in shared resource systems were well understood well before the Spectre mess. 1. https://fas.org/irp/nsa/rainbow/tg030.htm#5.0 https://fas.org/irp/nsa/rainbow/tg030.htm#5.0