3 ms·
Frege did not in general reject intuition. The rules of what became first-order logic are accepted on the grounds that they are intuitively undeniable and provi
by guerrilla 6y ago
Frege did not in general reject intuition. The rules of what became first-order logic are accepted on the grounds that they are intuitively undeniable and provide the results we need. That's the actual lesson of Russel's paradox in response to Basic Law V: that blatantly obvious things can be problematic.
For anyone interested in the semantic analysis of the verb "to be", I recommend Andrea Moro's book "A Brief History of the Verb To Be."
Also note that analytic philosophy is the philosophical tradition the author is referring to, not rationalism [2]. This is an ahistorical use of the latter word. They did define their terms in the glossary but that won't help you in searching.
[1]. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analytic_philosophy
[2]. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/ https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/