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> Not exactly. You don't want someone sneaking in and misappropriating the HSM to authorize something bad. I think we're talking about exactly the same thing :
by close04 6y ago
> Not exactly. You don't want someone sneaking in and misappropriating the HSM to authorize something bad.
I think we're talking about exactly the same thing :). That's what I meant by "even they rely on being stored in a physically secure room and protected from theft". Despite all the hardening that is applied to the device, it must always be kept secure and supervised. As an example, this is what Safenet considers the intended installation environment should be [0].
This can't be effectively applied to a personal computer.
[0] http://cloudhsm-safenet-docs-5.3.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/007-011136-006_lunasa_5-3_webhelp_rev-c/Content/administration/physical_security_guidance.htm http://cloudhsm-safenet-docs-5.3.s3-website-us-east-1.amazon...
- hinkley 6y agoAs I was trying to say, there are ways to make that less of an issue by moving other factors off-site. You can configure (some) HSM cards not to be available on boot, requiring a human to come in and reactivate them with a password or a fob that they bring with them, and leaves with them. Then your biggest problem is people thinking that stealing the cards will get them anything. Which, they're not entirely wrong, because those things are damned expensive. So you need a 'kinda' secure facility. Again, the issue is that any hardware that will start up for you without any action on your part will likely start up for anybody else, too. Your laziness will probably win out...