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One thing you missed here: In most of these designs the Relying Party (a web site in these cases) has to store secrets and we know bad guys steal secrets and t
by tialaramex 6y ago
One thing you missed here:
In most of these designs the Relying Party (a web site in these cases) has to store secrets and we know bad guys steal secrets and the site won't always find about it immediately or sometimes at all.
For a password we somewhat mitigate this using password hashing. If the site uses a halfway decent password hash and you use a halfway decent truly random password then this is enough to protect both of you. But if you use a bad password or the site does a less than great job protecting it then game over.
For SMS the site stores your phone number (not terrible but not great for bad guys to learn) and maybe a temporary code (bad guys may be able to use this by learning it before you do but that's typically a small time window)
But for TOTP and similar "One time" codes the site stores the generator value. Bad guys who have this value can make any number of fresh codes at any time.
What jumps out here for WebAuthn is that the site stores nothing of value. A random-looking identifier that's useless for anyone other than the Relying Party, and a Public Key that's useless for anything at all other than confirming signatures made with the corresponding Private Key.
I've published the actual database contents for some of my own WebAuthn credentials on HN before, because they don't matter, unlike even an Argon2id password hash they are designed to be utterly useless to bad guys.
That's a huge benefit because there are fewer people trying to break in because what you have ain't worth stealing any more.