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> But abstract things can supervene on the physical. Information, for example, is abstract, but it supervenes on some physical stuff. Granted, information is no
by danielam 6y ago
> But abstract things can supervene on the physical. Information, for example, is abstract, but it supervenes on some physical stuff. Granted, information is not identical to any particular instantiation, but the abstract pattern can be manifested by a particular physical instantiation. You're welcome to call information immaterial if you like, but it presents no metaphysical difficulties for physicalism.
Example? The world "information" is often used in a magical way. Patterns need not be immaterial, and I never argued for that, but I really don't know what you mean by "information". (FWIW, "supervene" is another one of those terms.)
> Why are non-materialists so fucking angry? Incivility doesn't help your cause. If your arguments were good they would stand on their own without embellishment.
Pot to kettle? Looks, there's a history there that maybe you're not privy to. Eliminativists and other materialists have consistency refused to address these fundamental problems while simultaneously ridiculing and dismissing anyone who doesn't agree with them. So you'll have to forgive me for being "uncivil". After a while, it's hard not to conclude that we're dealing with willful ignorance or intellectual dishonesty.
- hackinthebochs 6y agoInformation is state or configuration of one system that tells you something about another system. The pixels on your screen contain information about the state of my brain because the particular pattern of lights communicates the thoughts in my head. Information is abstract because it is independent of the medium: the pixels on the screen, pressure waves in the air, marks on paper, etc, can all be used to carry the same information. Supervene means something is constituted by the configuration of some substance. Or the more common definition: A supervenes on B if there can be no change in A without a corresponding change in B. >Eliminativists and other materialists have consistency refused to address these fundamental problems I admit that people have reason to be frustrated with certain materialists, Dennett chief among them. I have my share of frustrations with him as well. But there's this trend I see with non-materialists (online and professionals) showing active disdain for materialism/physicalism that is entirely unhelpful. Ultimately we're all just trying to solve one of the hardest problems of all. Genuine efforts to move the conversation forward should be welcomed. Intractable disagreement just points towards the need for better arguments.
- danielam 6y agoOkay, so intentionality is essential to information. Let's take your example of the pixels on your screen. There is nothing intrinsic to those pixels or that arrangement of pixels that points to the state of your brain. That doesn't mean there isn't a causal history the effect of which are those physical pixel states. It is, however, entirely a matter of convention how those pixels are arranged by the designers and how they must be interpreted in conformity with the intended convention. You must bring with you the hermeneutic baggage, so to speak, that allows you to interpret those pixels in the manner intended by the designers. Those same pixels will signify something else within a different context and it is the observer that needs to have the contextual information to be able to interpret them in conformity with the designer's intentions. Furthermore, the designers of the program could have chosen to cause different pixels to light up to convey the same information. They could have instead caused those pixels to resemble, in aggregate, English language sentences that, when interpreted, describe the image of the state in your brain. But there is nothing about those pixels qua pixels that can tell you anything about your brain state. The meaning of each pixel is just that it is a pixel in a particular state, and the meaning of the aggregate of pixels is that they are an aggregate of pixels, each in a particular state. You can call that supervenience in that the meaning of the aggregate follows from the meanings of individual constituting pixels, but none of that changes the fact that the pixel states as such, whether individually or in aggregate, do not intrinsically mean your brain state. This is analogous to written text. A human actor with some meaning in mind causes blobs of ink to be arranged in some way on paper in accordance with some convention. Those blobs of ink are just blobs of ink no matter how many there are or how they're arranged. The reader, which is to say the interpreter, must bring with him a mental dictionary of conventions (a grammar) that relates symbols and arrangements of symbols to meanings to be able to reconstruct the meaning intended by the author. The meaning (or information) is in no way in the text even if it influences what meaning the interpreter attaches to it. As Feser notes[0], Searle calls this derived intentionality which is different from intrinsic intentionality (thoughts are one example of the latter). So I do not agree that anything abstract is happening in your panel of flashing lightbulbs. [0] https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/fodors-trinity.html https://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/08/fodors-trinity.html
- 6y ago
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]