5 ms·
In before someone suggests storing encrypted messages in a public blockchain. This is a really good overview of the challenges with these messaging systems. Sto
by IgorPartola 6y ago
In before someone suggests storing encrypted messages in a public blockchain. This is a really good overview of the challenges with these messaging systems. Store and forward has been our MO since email and Usenet were invented because always on always connected devices that aren’t restricted by some network obstacle are not really feasible or even desirable most of the time. I do wonder what alternatives we have to something like a trusted online service to store and forward messages or a public blockchain. Some kind of crypto based system where nobody but the owner of a private key can even locate the message? A decentralized system where multiple copies of multiple fragments of your message are stored so nobody can piece together your (encrypted) message without controlling the majority of the nodes?
- raspyberr 6y agoDo you have an opinion on Skype like centralised coordinator that then sets up P2P connections?
- IgorPartola 6y agoThis really isn’t my field, I am more of a full stack developer who mostly works on web apps with a heavy interest in networking. So definitely not an authority on the subject. I think that’s basically the sort of system that most places employ. It’s nice because it’s easy to set up but you really need to trust Skype. Say they actually try to use end to end encryption. How does that work? Well, you could say “I am Alice and I want to establish a connection to Bob. Here is my public key he can use to send me messages and I’d like his public key so I can send him his.” That of course would need to happen in addition to establishing a network connection. So no if Skype is a good actor they will pass my public key to Bob, get his and send it to me as well as coordinate us establishing a direct connection. But what if Skype is a bad actor? Well they could take my public key and send Bob one of their own. Then they could also send me their own. Now they can listen in on my conversation. They can also in a similar fashion make it seem like I’m connected directly to Bob’s networked device but really just relay the connection through their servers. Neither Bob nor I would have any way of knowing that without having exchanged public keys prior and having verified them. So this system is basically insecure against Skype wanting to listen to my conversations or being compelled to do so by a state actor.
- aaravchen 6y agoIt seems like this might be the eventual intent of the Scuttlebutt protocol, and so far that's also the furthest along in approaching such a solution.
- fiddlerwoaroof 6y agoIsn’t matrix basically all that’s needed? It even has out-of-band verification of your friend’s keys.
- maqp 6y agoIf only the ecosystem had been built to use E2EE by default, always. They fucked up with the design allowing bridges and bots, left E2EE for later, and now they're in the vicious circle of downgrade attacks until all major clients switch to E2EE with no insecure fall-back option.
- Arathorn 6y agothere aren't downgrade attacks. we turned on E2EE by default in May for private rooms, and there's no negotiation involved. if you're on a client that supports E2EE (i.e. almost all major ones, now) and you try to DM someone, they simply won't be able to read you unless they support E2EE. i.e. they can't downgrade the convo.
- fiddlerwoaroof 6y agoYeah, I really like the ability to have an unencrypted channel: easy bots and bridges are one of the main advantages for me of matrix vs. IRC. My only big issue is that the iOS client doesn’t support multiple simultaneous identities.
- fiddlerwoaroof 6y agoI should have said “easy bots and bridges are one of the main advantages for me of matrix as a successor to IRC”