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The only threat model this would actually address is a threat from the user himself. Hashing on the client side means the user probably doesn't know his own pas
by thaumasiotes 6y ago
The only threat model this would actually address is a threat from the user himself. Hashing on the client side means the user probably doesn't know his own password. But he still knows how to log in, so the password he accidentally discloses to someone else is trivially convertible to his actual password.
(The threat model has to involve an accident, because if the user wants to know his password, he can just look at it when he logs in.)
The strategy is called "passing the hash", and it will be flagged as a low-priority problem if you get a security review. It doesn't introduce a weakness, but it's a sign that you don't know what you're doing.
(The more classical form is that you _only_ do the hashing on the client side, in which case you've also introduced the issue that your database stores everyone's password in plaintext.)
- rl3 6y ago>The only threat model this would actually address is a threat from the user himself. Incorrect. Please refer to other comments in reply to you.[0][1] >It doesn't introduce a weakness, but it's a sign that you don't know what you're doing. How's the old proverb go? "Those who live in glass houses should not throw stones" [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24026585 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24026585 [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24026954 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=24026954