Indeed. > 1. Germany isn't on the Eastern Front. Poland actually borders Russia (the exclave on the Baltic.) The Kaliningrad exclave is quite small, but it po

Indeed. > 1. Germany isn't on the Eastern Front. Poland actually borders Russia (the exclave on the Baltic.) The Kaliningrad exclave is quite small, but it poses a real danger when the Suwalki Gap is taken into account. Given Belarus' friendly ties with Russia, there is only a small band of land that needs to be cut off to trap the Baltic states. It's important to secure that stretch. Ideally, Belarus would serve as a buffer, but that's a very difficult thing to achieve. Also good would be the ceding of Kaliningrad to Poland and Lithuania (historically, that region was a vassal of the Polish Crown). Perhaps in exchange for recognition of Russia's annexation of Crimea. Good luck with that, I guess. Ideally, the Central European states east of Germany can play the US, Germany/EU, and Russia off each other to guarantee that the region is free from hegemonic dominance. Historically until the late 18th century, Polish dominance guaranteed stability and peace in the region. As both historical heir and as the largest country of the block, it is important the Poland resume its historical and geopolitically necessary role if Poland and the other states represented in the Three Seas Initiative are to remain free and prosperous. The stability offered would also benefit European stability by creating a bulwark against both Western and Eastern imperial ambitions.