7 ms·

Is there proof that secure boot actually prevented an attack?

• wbkang 6y ago
  A huge number of devices today (mobile or not) have their disk encryption keys protected by secure boot or similar mechanism where the TPM vends the keys only when securely booted, and they are not breakable trivially. So I'd say the answer is yes.
• Wowfunhappy 6y ago
  I don't know, but if you don't think secure boot isn't valuable and/or worth the trade-off, you should turn it off on your machine. Anyone who does so will not be affected by this update. I know there are some environments that don't allow turning off secure boot, but this really isn't the OS vendor's fault.
• g_p 6y ago
  Secure boot has, for the most part, prevented the underlying system from being compromised by malware that can run before boot (and therefore hide itself from the OS). I don't think we can really prove a negative here, but it means no more "boot sector" viruses, either on the HDD itself, or on external bootable media. That certainly is a good first step to preventing foot canon incidents, and giving the OS a decent chance at preventing malware running before the OS has control of the system. Couple in, as another post said, a tpm which only releases the decryption key if the system is in a valid state with secure boot running, it helps a lot with basic cold boot protection. TPM is far from perfect, but it is arguably better than a user not encrypting their disk at all, and this prevents attacks like replacing the utilman.exe with cmd.exe etc.
  • deleted 6y ago
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