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There was a story on HN last night from Debian where they laid out this issue, and basically stated "Yes, this security update is going to render some systems
by Wowfunhappy 6y ago
There was a story on HN last night from Debian where they laid out this issue, and basically stated "Yes, this security update is going to render some systems unbootable, here is why we're doing it anyway."
https://www.debian.org/security/2020-GRUB-UEFI-SecureBoot/ https://www.debian.org/security/2020-GRUB-UEFI-SecureBoot/
Stability is important, especially when it comes to unbootable machines—but I don't quite know what anyone was supposed to do here. If a user has secure boot enabled, the OS has to assume that the user wants/needs security at that level of the chain—and it is therefor responsible for ensuring the chain's integrity. In this case, there was no way to do that without some machines (temporarily) failing to boot.
What would have been a better way to handle this?
- RedShift1 6y agoIs there proof that secure boot actually prevented an attack?
- wbkang 6y agoA huge number of devices today (mobile or not) have their disk encryption keys protected by secure boot or similar mechanism where the TPM vends the keys only when securely booted, and they are not breakable trivially. So I'd say the answer is yes.
- Wowfunhappy 6y agoI don't know, but if you don't think secure boot isn't valuable and/or worth the trade-off, you should turn it off on your machine. Anyone who does so will not be affected by this update. I know there are some environments that don't allow turning off secure boot, but this really isn't the OS vendor's fault.
- g_p 6y agoSecure boot has, for the most part, prevented the underlying system from being compromised by malware that can run before boot (and therefore hide itself from the OS). I don't think we can really prove a negative here, but it means no more "boot sector" viruses, either on the HDD itself, or on external bootable media. That certainly is a good first step to preventing foot canon incidents, and giving the OS a decent chance at preventing malware running before the OS has control of the system. Couple in, as another post said, a tpm which only releases the decryption key if the system is in a valid state with secure boot running, it helps a lot with basic cold boot protection. TPM is far from perfect, but it is arguably better than a user not encrypting their disk at all, and this prevents attacks like replacing the utilman.exe with cmd.exe etc.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- ploxiln 6y agoThere are other problems with the grub configuration and install, as a result of these changes, it seems. I had a few AWS EC2 instances, running an ubuntu-20.04 AMI, not come back after a reboot this morning, due to this brand new issue: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2/+bug/1889509 https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/grub2/+bug/1889509
- einpoklum 6y ago"here is why we're doing it anyway.": 1. Because if you even use SecureBoot then not booting is a better alternative than your security being compromised. 2. Because you can do a rescue boot and update other relevant software. 3. Because if you really want to, you can just disable SecureBoot.