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That's only in a dysfunctional market (as housing is in the US). The solution is to fix the housing market by disabling NIMBYism and other such things that caus
by fastball 6y ago
That's only in a dysfunctional market (as housing is in the US). The solution is to fix the housing market by disabling NIMBYism and other such things that cause the housing market to be wholly dysfunctional.
But yes, we should probably fix that before we implement UBI.
- ethanbond 6y agoI reckon if you fix that, with say the LVT proposed by Henry George in SF during a similar explosion in wealth (and accompanying inequality), you’ll find UBI likely unnecessary. If it is still necessary, you’ll have overflowing public coffers to pay it out with, AND it won’t be eaten by landlords.
- HPsquared 6y agoSomewhere like SF, a land value tax would simply be another incentive to developers / landlords to build more units. The problem is not caused by a lack of incentives, as evidenced by the sky-high rents - landlords already have huge incentives to build more houses. Why aren't they? I would have to guess, restrictive planning laws are limiting the supply of new housing.
- ethanbond 6y agoRestrictive planning is one, but another reason you’d not build is speculation. LVT eliminates speculation.
- mac01021 6y agoI'm dense. Can you explain "another reason you’d not build is speculation"?
- ethanbond 6y agoYou have land and are choosing not to utilize it (rent it out or sell it) in the belief that you will get a higher price for that same land tomorrow. Today, your tax liability is tiny when you do this. This incentivizes landlords in hot markets to keep their land off the market, thus making the market hotter, this further incentivizing speculation, etc. This is why you see empty storefronts or empty lots in incredibly expensive areas. The owner can sustain the cash flow loss today in exchange for higher prices tomorrow. LVT would mean your tax burden is the same (moderate to high) whether you rent it out or do not rent it out, thus making it infeasible to sit and wait for a higher price tomorrow. This would bring more units onto the market and more efficient uses, thus bringing prices down. Since LVT is often proposed as replacing other forms of taxation (or at least dramatically reducing them), the cost of actually building a dwelling or storefront also goes down — thus further incentivizing non-speculative behavior.
- fastball 6y agoYep, I'm definitely a supporter of LVT. My only issue is that you end up making the govt more of an arbiter of what "value" is than it already is, which can end up causing issues.
- ethanbond 6y agoIndeed! A few points just so people who haven’t heard of LVT before don’t walk with easily addressed misconceptions: 1. The government today assesses land value. It also must assess the value of far, far more nebulous things that can be hidden, transfigured, created/destroyed, or moved offshore. Yes more importance would be tied to this singular assessment, but this assessment is singularly easy to assess! 2. The price/value itself would be set by the market. The assessment of that value, of course, would be by the government and you are correct there is risk of differential here (though mitigated by point 1) 3. Lastly, because land cannot be created, destroyed, or moved, a tax upon it is uniquely unable to either incur inefficiencies (deadweight loss) or to be passed onto tenants/consumers. This is contrast to every other form of taxation, which incur inefficiencies then get passed onto the consumer in the form of price increases anyway.
- 6y ago
- HPsquared 6y agoSpeculation affects housing prices only because of development restrictions. Because only a small fraction of land can legally be developed, it's possible to corner the market for new development. If all property can be developed, there would be orders of magnitude more competitors in the development space, and impossible for an individual or cartel to control.