2 ms·
I think the main advantage here is less about tampering (if we assume neither of these bootloaders have bugs then a GRUB2 password should be as secure as its sy
by Nextgrid 6y ago
I think the main advantage here is less about tampering (if we assume neither of these bootloaders have bugs then a GRUB2 password should be as secure as its systemd-boot equivalent) but more about the fact that systemd-boot doesn't have decades of legacy cruft accumulated that's irrelevant for UEFI and thus is less prone to having disastrous bugs.
- g_p 6y agoTotally agreed on the reduced cruft - when I was modifying the codebase I felt quite comfortable with the code and it's readability. Despite it being someone else's code, it was understandable and intuitive and I felt at home with it. I could see what to patch and edit, and it worked as expected without surprises. Important for something as critical as a bootloader to use principle of least astonishment. I only picked up on tamper resistance based on the GP as I was wondering if I missed something and ended up patching unnecessarily or was misunderstanding something. It's also possible I'm using a stricter definition of tampering, as in my project I considered removing the SSD and modifying the ESP as being "in scope". I recognise for many that's not in scope, and where you fall back to relying on FDE to prevent booting the system anyway.