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> As far as I know, nobody ever verifies the signatures in a systematic way. I systematically check the signatures on the jars of my dependencies. See e.g. htt
by lmm 6y ago
> As far as I know, nobody ever verifies the signatures in a systematic way.
I systematically check the signatures on the jars of my dependencies. See e.g. https://github.com/m50d/tierney/blob/master/free/keys.properties https://github.com/m50d/tierney/blob/master/free/keys.proper... . If these artifacts were signed with different keys, I would notice (my CI builds would fail). There are still points of failure (e.g. if you could subvert the maven-pgpverify-plugin itself), but security is about increasing the cost of attacks.
> It’s hard to find the public keys for the library maintainers. Sometimes they upload them on the keyservers, sometimes not.
> There’s no established way of communicating that which public keys should be trusted. If there’s a new release and it has been made with a new key, your best bet is to e-mail the maintainer and ask what is up.
> It’s hard to get any security benefits from the signatures in practice.
This is making perfect the enemy of good. Any solution to this problem would have to start with a signature mechanism. The signatures that currently exist make it a little bit harder to fake a library. If you want to make it harder, check signatures on jars you depend on, ask maintainers to publish their keys to keyservers and communicate which keys should be trusted, demand explanations when keys change.
Better to light a candle than curse the darkness. "x is incomplete, therefore it should be replaced by a completely new thing" is a total fallacy - and, strangely, seems to be used only when attacking PGP.