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I know, but most of these "hacks" are identified by internal scans already. The pentest doesn't add much value then. The issue is more internal resistance to ch
by GekkePrutser 6y ago
I know, but most of these "hacks" are identified by internal scans already. The pentest doesn't add much value then. The issue is more internal resistance to change in the management team.
Like I said I know most companies already fail at the basics. But these are normally well known already, just not fixed due to political pressure. Having the security team's management be better at influencing would pre-empt these issues. Pentests serve to bring these known issues under discussion again, but they often don't bring any unknown issues to light.
Also, they tend to be too artificial. In one example: In a recent pentest I know of, they sent some remote access malware to the admins, which they all ignored and reported. However as they couldn't continue they called one admin's manager and asked him to tell the admin to click on the link so that they could proceed. The outcome of the pentest was that if a malicious actor sent a malicious remote access malware and if it was clicked on, they would have remote access. Well duh.
Of course this could be mitigated by having separate workstations for email and admin activity, which was an issue that was already understood and a mitigation in progress. This is what I mean by pentesting not raising new issues. Another example: The company in question already test new web apps for known attacks, and is quite successful (in fact I've never seen a new app come through the certification process in the first round). What I'd expect from a pentest is to tell us something we don't know :) It's an interesting second-opinion but it's not the amazing X-ray it's promised to be.
> What you're suggesting is everyone has to be willing and able to write fresh exploitation on the spot when they're testing a client's network
Which is exactly what a serious adversary would be doing in a targeted hack!
- OminousWeapons 6y ago> I know, but most of these "hacks" are identified by internal scans already. The pentest doesn't add much value then. The issue is more internal resistance to change in the management team. This sounds like management's fault for using a service they don't need yet. If there are glaring, obvious vulns that are repeatedly pointed out but aren't getting fixed then how useful is it to point out additional more subtle vulns? I understand the point you are trying to make about pentests telling you data you already know, but how many people are going to take the time to enumerate subtle vulns when there are basic ones that can be hit to great effect? > Which is exactly what a serious adversary would be doing in a targeted hack! I don't think it makes sense to worry about what a serious adversary could do when a moderately skilled one can already wreck you with known exploits.
- GekkePrutser 6y agoWell, the issue is that these vulnerabilities can't be hit to great effect, because they're usually well understood and mitigated by other means (see the admins being very conscious of email malware). In many cases the pentesters cheat by asking for special permissions or for someone to click something they wouldn't normally have done. Just so they can be seen to 'have found something'. I think a targeted adversary is more worrying because they usually are driven by high gains, which means something that's a big risk to the company. Like strategic information that can cripple the company. Whereas a more moderate adversary will usually trigger a ransomware campaign on some low-secured laptops or something which can be mitigated in a day or 2 by restoring backups. Big interruption yes. Company-killer no. Also an advanced adversary will usually operate unseen altogether and penetrate the highest levels of security. A ransomware attack is much more obvious. I would view them as different things altogether. An advanced adversary might use the same techniques for their initial access but due to the many layers of security this won't be enough to reach the most critical information.
- Izmaki 6y agoSo your point is "bad pentests are bad and provide no value". Yes. You are correct.
- GekkePrutser 6y agoWhich is exactly why I was saying pentesters should be more inventive :) The level of external pentesters I've seen, has not exceeded the "scriptkiddie" level.
- q3k 6y ago> The level of external pentesters I've seen, has not exceeded the "scriptkiddie" level. You get what you pay for. I've taken part in security audits that delivered 0days - but they weren't cheap.
- GekkePrutser 6y agoGood point. I'm not sure how much we pay for these as they're not commissioned by me. But knowing the company it's not going to be too much :)
- secgoon 6y agoMost pentesters / offensive security professionals have to operate with their hands tied behind their backs. Management generally has no interest in a real report of what happens if someone actually tried to break in. Generally speaking pentests are often so limited in scope and what is allowed to be engaged that you might have a group of people perfectly capable of robbing you unable to show you how because the company doesn’t want to know the truth.
- GekkePrutser 6y agoIndeed, what you describe sounds very typical! Especially pre-Wannacry, since then things have improved somewhat, when top management woke up to the thought that these things do in fact actually happen.
- watwut 6y ago> But these are normally well known already, just not fixed due to political pressure. This is just not true. Plenty of developers don't really know much about these. Juniors are basically glad they done the task or tend to focus on like two risks they know. And from experience, many seniors sorta kinda vaguely heard about these. The fault is absolutely not just in management. And even management that is at fault is often acting on advice or with validation of developers who don't care about these much. Many companies don't know how to even run internal scans. Even when they have interest in it.
- movedx 6y ago> I know, but most of these "hacks" are identified by internal scans already. The pentest doesn't add much value then. As I said above in to another comment: pentesting isn't the job in the field and the article wasn't specifically aimed at pentesters. > Which is exactly what a serious adversary would be doing in a targeted hack! Sure, and that's when you bring in someone who can do the same for you but ahead of time before the bad guys get there. But to say someone who can't do that isn't in a cybersecurity position or has no value is wrong :)
- GekkePrutser 6y agoI didn't say that! If you see my first post, I agree with you that in many 'cyber'security jobs other skills (like politics/influencing) are much more important and unfortunately often lacking in key people. I actually don't like the strong focus on the CEH/OCSP certs as most HR depts seem to apply them to all areas of security. Not just pentesting and auditing. And especially for pentesters, I'd want them to have more initiative than just running through some standard textbook operations. At least that's what I've seen. But as another poster mentioned, what they do at this company is more like an audit, just under the flag of a pentest which sounds cooler.