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I think the cybersecurity (I hate the term cyber btw as it's usually used by people who don't know what they're talking about), is very focused on the 'think li
by GekkePrutser 6y ago
I think the cybersecurity (I hate the term cyber btw as it's usually used by people who don't know what they're talking about), is very focused on the 'think like a hacker' skillset right now.
While I do agree this is important in various roles in the security realm, there are also many jobs where this doesn't really add value. A lot of work is about implementing things like MFA, role-based-access etc where knowledge of the platform used (e.g. Microsoft) and internal processes are more important. After all, most companies already fail at the 'fix the obvious' stage, it's not necessary to go looking for clever ways in when there are many doors left open.
Just to elaborate: A lot of discussions go like this. A pentest or random scan finds obvious issue. Ticket is raised to the security team. They go like "WTF why do we still have Windows 95?? Kill it.". Then their boss goes like "Sorry, Bill the manufacturing VP lobbied with the CEO, we have to leave that one alone". Of course when it actually gets hacked, Bill is nowhere to be found. This is why internal influencing skills are so important in real everyday security jobs.
Of course in the pentesting role this kind of thinking is absolutely necessary. However even there the kind of training given right now is too much in the realm of 'scriptkiddie'ism. Hacking is about inventing and true mastery of technology, not about using the tools everyone uses. Being able to run metasploit and wireshark does not make one a hacker. By doing this, pentesters test for yesterday's hacks, not tomorrow's.
- movedx 6y ago> Being able to run metasploit and wireshark does not make one a hacker. By doing this, pentesters test for yesterday's hacks, not tomorrow's. Be careful here. This is bordering on elitism. Having someone come into a business and check for "yesterday's hacks" is better than no one doing any checks at all, therefore such skills are still valuable and worthwhile. In learning how networking works; how operating systems are designed and implemented; why and how the OWASP Top Ten work; and knowing solutions to these problems is still a valuable skill set. What you're suggesting is everyone has to be willing and able to write fresh exploitation on the spot when they're testing a client's network when in fact there's a lot that can be discovered (and resolved) with basic scans and simple questions based off of Security+ grade knowledge.
- GekkePrutser 6y agoI know, but most of these "hacks" are identified by internal scans already. The pentest doesn't add much value then. The issue is more internal resistance to change in the management team. Like I said I know most companies already fail at the basics. But these are normally well known already, just not fixed due to political pressure. Having the security team's management be better at influencing would pre-empt these issues. Pentests serve to bring these known issues under discussion again, but they often don't bring any unknown issues to light. Also, they tend to be too artificial. In one example: In a recent pentest I know of, they sent some remote access malware to the admins, which they all ignored and reported. However as they couldn't continue they called one admin's manager and asked him to tell the admin to click on the link so that they could proceed. The outcome of the pentest was that if a malicious actor sent a malicious remote access malware and if it was clicked on, they would have remote access. Well duh. Of course this could be mitigated by having separate workstations for email and admin activity, which was an issue that was already understood and a mitigation in progress. This is what I mean by pentesting not raising new issues. Another example: The company in question already test new web apps for known attacks, and is quite successful (in fact I've never seen a new app come through the certification process in the first round). What I'd expect from a pentest is to tell us something we don't know :) It's an interesting second-opinion but it's not the amazing X-ray it's promised to be. > What you're suggesting is everyone has to be willing and able to write fresh exploitation on the spot when they're testing a client's network Which is exactly what a serious adversary would be doing in a targeted hack!
- OminousWeapons 6y ago> I know, but most of these "hacks" are identified by internal scans already. The pentest doesn't add much value then. The issue is more internal resistance to change in the management team. This sounds like management's fault for using a service they don't need yet. If there are glaring, obvious vulns that are repeatedly pointed out but aren't getting fixed then how useful is it to point out additional more subtle vulns? I understand the point you are trying to make about pentests telling you data you already know, but how many people are going to take the time to enumerate subtle vulns when there are basic ones that can be hit to great effect? > Which is exactly what a serious adversary would be doing in a targeted hack! I don't think it makes sense to worry about what a serious adversary could do when a moderately skilled one can already wreck you with known exploits.
- 7174n6 6y agoThe term "cyber" has been part of the information security lexicon and if you work in the industry you accept it as reality. Especially if you work for government or a government contractor. Claiming that people who use the word cyber don't know what they are talking about is just ignorance at this point.
- ta17711771 6y ago> has been part That seems to be the issue for me - many people using "cyber" are noticeably out of touch.
- all_blue_chucks 6y agoIt's called "infosec" in the private sector and "cybersecurity" in the public sector (and adjacent). "Cyber" can have negative connotations in the private sector only because, well, the best people in this business would never pass a security clearance so the public sector can only hire the leavings...
- Kalium 6y ago> Being able to run metasploit and wireshark does not make one a hacker. By doing this, pentesters test for yesterday's hacks, not tomorrow's. Funny enough, this thought process shows a failure to understand process and internal influencing. Quite often, the things found by a basic pen-test are known internally. Research will reveal long, boring discussions that end with someone like Bill dismissing things as not important and the risk acceptable. What the paid-for report does it makes the risk visible, documented, and something the company may have to show to customers or partners. Now it's gone from something that can be shrugged off to something expensive and embarrassing. Bill has to explain why his opinion should matter more than those of the biggest customers. Now it's something that is much easier to prioritize. Big management often doesn't value unpleasant or critical feedback from below. Once it's advice that's been paid for, its value jumps. After all, if you're not going to listen then why did the company pay the big bucks for it?
- gruez 6y ago>What the paid-for report does it makes the risk visible, documented, and something the company may have to show to customers or partners. Only if there's a lawsuit and it shows up on discovery. Otherwise there isn't really anything preventing it from being buried.
- Kalium 6y agoSometimes it crops up in vendor review or similar. I've definitely found myself reviewing pen-test reports for exactly that reason without a lawsuit or discovery. Needless to say, having a bad pen-test report and then burying it would look extremely bad.
- GekkePrutser 6y agoThis is a really good point. I have actually seen that happen. I just wish we could get our own point across (at a level higher than myself) sometimes without having to do this :)
- Kalium 6y ago
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]