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Due to the nature of HN I have no idea if you'll actually see a response at this point, but ... You said it yourself. Smaller states can amend the constitution

• int_19h 6y ago
  You should ask yourself the opposite question: why should the large states tolerate lack of proportional representation indefinitely, given that it's not in their best interests? And the thing is, if large states find that the present arrangement stymies their interests too much (which is increasingly the case due to polarization on the federal level), and there's no legal way out of that bind, they can set legalities aside. By virtue of their sheer size, if they choose to openly conflict with the smaller states over this, the latter would lose. That's why it's really up to the smaller states to continuously ensure that the compromise doesn't become too unreasonable - if it breaks down, they will be entirely at the mercy of large states, with the latter having no particular reason to feel merciful. The Founders warned about this, by the way. This particular bit from the Federalist Papers (#22) was explaining why keeping the Articles of Confederation as they were was no longer tenable. But it's equally applicable to the Senate and EC as they exist today. "Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Deleware an equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America; and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration."
  • Reelin 6y ago
    I agree that equal representation isn't in the best interests of the more populous states. The problem is that there's a fundamental tension here. Regardless of differences in population size, it's not reasonable for the legal system in a less populous state (say Idaho) to be dominated by the interests of those in a more populous one (say California). Neither is the reverse acceptable (for Idaho's interests to dominate California's). Short of somehow enforcing an equal population distribution across all the states a simple solution just doesn't exist. To that end, the original intent behind the house and senate is an elegant compromise. As a matter of principle government should be as local as possible so as to minimize such concerns. Even without bringing population size into it, it doesn't seem reasonable to be subject to the whims of others across such vast distances. Too much is done at the federal level; states such as California, Texas, and Alaska are already far too large from a governance perspective. > The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration. This is the one line of argument that I do buy, but I think it will always be a fairly subjective balancing act at the federal level. Honestly I strongly suspect that eliminating the interstate commerce clause and outright banning simple plurality voting schemes in political contexts at all levels would resolve most of the currently perceived political dysfunctions.
    • int_19h 6y ago
      The Commerce Clause is quite useful, which is why it was there in the first place. We don't want states to impose tariffs on other states' goods, for example. That it was appropriated to justify the massive expansion of federal power is another matter, but, well... given how absurd Wickard was, I'm pretty sure that if it weren't the Commerce Clause, it would have been something else. As for majority voting, all alternatives are strictly worse. The problem, rather, is that there's no meaningful democracy at federal or even state level, because there's no meaningful representation at that scale - the "representatives" are anything but. I'm not sure there's such a thing at any scale, actually - for all the purported benefits of representative democracy wrt preventing mob rule, history has plenty of counter-examples, including US here and now (it's a minority mob rule, which is even worse). I'd rather have direct democracy, but only so long as it's truly deliberative (i.e. not just people voting on a list of yes/no questions put in front of them, like referendums - think more along the lines of, say, how the Constitutional Convention worked). And scaling that requires some form of council democracy, with enough levels that meaningful deliberation remains possible on every one of them, all the way to the top.