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I guess we're a bit off topic at this point but I think the only glaring structural issue is the winner takes all voting. > electoral collage I'd disagree tha

• int_19h 6y ago
  EC made sense historically solely because that was the only way the Constitution was getting ratified by small states and slave states. As it was, small states wanted to retain the Articles of Confederation approach (one vote per state); and slave states wanted to count the entirety of their population for the purposes of representation, without letting slaves vote. EC was what they hammered out as a compromise, because, on one hand, it threw the small states a bone by counting their senators, and on the other hand, neatly incorporated the already-agreed-upon Three Fifths Compromise from the House, while retaining the general principle of proportional representation. But something being a compromise doesn't mean that it was sensible - only that it was the best they could do. Furthermore, that particular compromise was hammered out by a very different group of states, and in the context of a very different distribution of powers between the federal and the state governments. Today, we have a much more powerful federal government, we have no slavers to appease, and we have so many small states that, taken together, they can amend the Constitution (via convention) while representing less than 1/4 of the country's population. In this situation, EC becomes a tyranny of the minority, and the majority is not going to tolerate that forever.
  • Reelin 6y ago
    Due to the nature of HN I have no idea if you'll actually see a response at this point, but ... You said it yourself. Smaller states can amend the constitution while representing a minority of the population. (I didn't do the math on that but it sounds about right.) So why would they ever agree to directly proportional representation? It's not in their best interests! Even today, proportional representation is bound to dissatisfy the less populous states whose interests would end up dwarfed by the majority of the population. Meanwhile the more populous states would hardly take well to a fixed number of votes per state. Applying one method to the house and the other to the senate makes perfect sense since bills have to pass both. The problem is that it's not clear how to apply such an arrangement to an election (the obvious schemes would be far too cumbersome). The electoral college seems like a reasonable compromise to me. (Of course the house is no longer adjusted IIRC, so it's not really proportional representation either. Arguably the states should wield far more power and the feds far less - that would shift attention much closer to home for the majority of issues.)
    • int_19h 6y ago
      You should ask yourself the opposite question: why should the large states tolerate lack of proportional representation indefinitely, given that it's not in their best interests? And the thing is, if large states find that the present arrangement stymies their interests too much (which is increasingly the case due to polarization on the federal level), and there's no legal way out of that bind, they can set legalities aside. By virtue of their sheer size, if they choose to openly conflict with the smaller states over this, the latter would lose. That's why it's really up to the smaller states to continuously ensure that the compromise doesn't become too unreasonable - if it breaks down, they will be entirely at the mercy of large states, with the latter having no particular reason to feel merciful. The Founders warned about this, by the way. This particular bit from the Federalist Papers (#22) was explaining why keeping the Articles of Confederation as they were was no longer tenable. But it's equally applicable to the Senate and EC as they exist today. "Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to Deleware an equal voice in the national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. But this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this majority of States is a small minority of the people of America; and two thirds of the people of America could not long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration."