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From a fundamental information theory perspective, if there is still enough information in the image such that we can identify the person, but we cannot identif
by bob1029 6y ago
From a fundamental information theory perspective, if there is still enough information in the image such that we can identify the person, but we cannot identify any delta between 'cloaked' & 'uncloaked' images, then we are just talking about some arbitrary amount of noise that can effectively be ignored.
If a fixed number of bytes can be interpreted visually by a human as a specific human on a reliable basis, there is zero reason a computer cannot accomplish the same. At worst, we are talking about some minor deficit in the current ML libraries that were tested, likely somewhere in pre-filtering of training data. As mentioned in other posts, a low-pass filter is exactly what you would use to side-step this sort of thing.
From a much more sinister perspective, this is potentially even more dangerous than not applying this cloaking process at all. Presumably, there is some way to detect that this process has been applied and that it has certain hallmarks. Assuming it is resilient enough to survive JPEG and other typical compression schemes, I would wonder if perhaps this is a tool to positively identify those who would otherwise want to hide from authorities.
- woah 6y agoYour analysis has the error that you are comparing something that can recognize a face from among a few thousand (a human) with something that is designed to recognize a face from among many millions (a facial recognition algorithm). Also, they addressed low pass filters and other image degradation techniques in the article, and almost every adversarial example paper addresses them, and works in spite of them. You're not the first person to think of that.