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It's easy to look back with the benefit of hindsight to say that doctrine needed to change faster, but the realities of the war made that a challenge. The less

It's easy to look back with the benefit of hindsight to say that doctrine needed to change faster, but the realities of the war made that a challenge. The lessons of 1940 should have been "build long-range escort fighters ASAP!", but it's also understandable that USAAF planners looked at the weak defensive armament, lower altitudes, and poor formation planning of Luftwaffe and RAF bombing operations and thought their equipment and tactics would perform differently. There is also the "what else can we do?" aspect to this strategy - 1943 was too early to mount an invasion of western Europe, the campaign in Italy beginning to stall - and the US and UK were left with few means of tying down German resources to prevent them from being sent to the eastern front. There was definitely some sunk-cost fallacy "we've spent all the time and resources building the 8th Air Force, so we're going to use it", but on a strategic level there weren't a lot of clearly better options prior to 1944. The strategic bombing offensive didn't really get up to full strength until 1943, and by later that year it was finally clear that unescorted bombers would suffer unsustainable losses. Long-range escort fighters simply didn't exist in-theater in quantity until late 1943/early 1944. Once those fighters were available, tactics absolutely changed, first with close escort of bomber formations, and then by freeing the fighters to range ahead of the bombers to strike air defense targets and break up approaching fighter formations.

jabl 6y ago
Sure, it's easy to play armchair general after the fact. With that caveat out of the way, as an alternative history if the generals had realized the great cost of unescorted bombing raids and the generally poor effectiveness of WWII strategic bombing: Generally, scale back the size of the heavy bomber force and spend the resources on other things. E.g. Bomber Command consumed up to 50% of the total British war effort, a staggeringly high number. On a bad night, BC lost more aircrew than Fighter Command during the entire Battle of Britain. And then they just shrugged and did it again a week later. And all this mostly for firebombing civilians with very low military effect to boot. So what else to spend resources on. E.g. - Win the Battle of the Atlantic faster. E.g. more destroyers (and later escort carriers). Large four engine planes equipped with radar and depth charges made life very sour for u-boats. - Spend more resources in the Mediterranean front to push faster into Italy. Maybe even make an effort to retake Crete and Greece. - Use the (reduced size) heavy bomber fleet for attacking targets close enough that they could be escorted by fighters. Say, any German military presence in Northern France; airfields, ports, transportation infrastructure like bridges or railway yards, fuel depots. All in all, if the Allies had played all their cards better, maybe they could have done D-day already late summer '43? Of course, similarly, had the Germans played their cards better they could, if not win the war outright, at least prolong it. Or they could have played their cards even better and not let those Nazi thugs take power in the first place, ideally avoiding the entire war.
- cpgxiii 6y ago
  There are a number of interesting what ifs to consider. Generally, scale back the size of the heavy bomber force and spend the resources on other things Absolutely, at least for the RAF. Coastal Command was denied long-range bombers for far too long, and these aircraft were absolutely critical for winning the battle of the Atlantic. Spend more resources in the Mediterranean front to push faster into Italy. Maybe even make an effort to retake Crete and Greece Churchill was enamored with these ideas (US leaders deeply opposed to what was perceived as an attempt at protecting spheres of influence rather than winning the war), but I don't think more resources in the Mediterranean would have necessarily achieved much more. Italy is just terrible ground to fight over, with numerous mountain ranges that allow small defensive forces to delay an invader. Much of the most painful parts of the campaign (ex Salerno, Anzio) had to be conducted without the kind air superiority that would be present later in the war, since the Mediterranean theater is just a difficult place from an aviation standpoint: far enough to be difficult to maintain fighter coverage, near enough to be in easy bomber range, and not quite big enough for carrier groups at the time to fight effectively. There also were often simply not enough resources to pursue both a broader Mediterranean strategy and an invasion of western Europe. Use the (reduced size) heavy bomber fleet for attacking targets close enough that they could be escorted by fighters. Say, any German military presence in Northern France; airfields, ports, transportation infrastructure like bridges or railway yards, fuel depots While the large daylight attacks over Germany tend to overshadow everything else, plenty of 8th Air Force missions were over closer targets in France, as well all of the 9th "tactical" Air Force missions that were necessary to strike smaller tactical targets (airfields, RADAR stations, bridges, rail yards). In light of postwar surveys, using strategic bombers to strike small targets was a gamble, so it's not clear that much more would have been achieved. In addition, targets across all of France and the low countries needed to be struck to reduce German strength and reserves while also not disclosing the specific target of D-day. All in all, if the Allies had played all their cards better, maybe they could have done D-day already late summer '43? The US army really wanted to an invasion in 1943, and had to be restrained from it by practical constraints. Logistics of a massive assault on defended beaches with no hope of quickly capturing a usable port just weren't ready until 1944. Even with all the preparation, the Allied advance in summer/fall of 1944 was severely hamstrung by logistics.

jabl 6y ago

Sure, it's easy to play armchair general after the fact. With that caveat out of the way, as an alternative history if the generals had realized the great cost of unescorted bombing raids and the generally poor effectiveness of WWII strategic bombing: Generally, scale back the size of the heavy bomber force and spend the resources on other things. E.g. Bomber Command consumed up to 50% of the total British war effort, a staggeringly high number. On a bad night, BC lost more aircrew than Fighter Command during the entire Battle of Britain. And then they just shrugged and did it again a week later. And all this mostly for firebombing civilians with very low military effect to boot. So what else to spend resources on. E.g. - Win the Battle of the Atlantic faster. E.g. more destroyers (and later escort carriers). Large four engine planes equipped with radar and depth charges made life very sour for u-boats. - Spend more resources in the Mediterranean front to push faster into Italy. Maybe even make an effort to retake Crete and Greece. - Use the (reduced size) heavy bomber fleet for attacking targets close enough that they could be escorted by fighters. Say, any German military presence in Northern France; airfields, ports, transportation infrastructure like bridges or railway yards, fuel depots. All in all, if the Allies had played all their cards better, maybe they could have done D-day already late summer '43? Of course, similarly, had the Germans played their cards better they could, if not win the war outright, at least prolong it. Or they could have played their cards even better and not let those Nazi thugs take power in the first place, ideally avoiding the entire war.

cpgxiii 6y ago
There are a number of interesting what ifs to consider. Generally, scale back the size of the heavy bomber force and spend the resources on other things Absolutely, at least for the RAF. Coastal Command was denied long-range bombers for far too long, and these aircraft were absolutely critical for winning the battle of the Atlantic. Spend more resources in the Mediterranean front to push faster into Italy. Maybe even make an effort to retake Crete and Greece Churchill was enamored with these ideas (US leaders deeply opposed to what was perceived as an attempt at protecting spheres of influence rather than winning the war), but I don't think more resources in the Mediterranean would have necessarily achieved much more. Italy is just terrible ground to fight over, with numerous mountain ranges that allow small defensive forces to delay an invader. Much of the most painful parts of the campaign (ex Salerno, Anzio) had to be conducted without the kind air superiority that would be present later in the war, since the Mediterranean theater is just a difficult place from an aviation standpoint: far enough to be difficult to maintain fighter coverage, near enough to be in easy bomber range, and not quite big enough for carrier groups at the time to fight effectively. There also were often simply not enough resources to pursue both a broader Mediterranean strategy and an invasion of western Europe. Use the (reduced size) heavy bomber fleet for attacking targets close enough that they could be escorted by fighters. Say, any German military presence in Northern France; airfields, ports, transportation infrastructure like bridges or railway yards, fuel depots While the large daylight attacks over Germany tend to overshadow everything else, plenty of 8th Air Force missions were over closer targets in France, as well all of the 9th "tactical" Air Force missions that were necessary to strike smaller tactical targets (airfields, RADAR stations, bridges, rail yards). In light of postwar surveys, using strategic bombers to strike small targets was a gamble, so it's not clear that much more would have been achieved. In addition, targets across all of France and the low countries needed to be struck to reduce German strength and reserves while also not disclosing the specific target of D-day. All in all, if the Allies had played all their cards better, maybe they could have done D-day already late summer '43? The US army really wanted to an invasion in 1943, and had to be restrained from it by practical constraints. Logistics of a massive assault on defended beaches with no hope of quickly capturing a usable port just weren't ready until 1944. Even with all the preparation, the Allied advance in summer/fall of 1944 was severely hamstrung by logistics.