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Apple Notes are not end to end encrypted. Thanks to programs like PRISM, US military intelligence has realtime access to the plaintext contents of much of the
by sneak 6y ago
Apple Notes are not end to end encrypted. Thanks to programs like PRISM, US military intelligence has realtime access to the plaintext contents of much of the information you store in iCloud (including notes and photos), without a court order.
That, for me, makes it a nonstarter.
- fargo 6y agoGoverning's harder
- criddell 6y agoAre you saying that the connection to Apple servers that hold the backups are not encrypted? That can't be... I'm almost certain they use TLS.
- sneak 6y agoNo, I'm saying that the notes are not encrypted from endpoint to endpoint. They are encrypted with TLS keys known to Apple in transit, and they are encrypted with storage keys known to Apple at rest in your iCloud account. This means that Apple has the ability to decrypt them at all times without your knowledge or involvement, and can and does so via the PRISM program for US military intelligence to access the plaintext data, the same as they do for the CCP in iCloud users in China. End to end encryption is not the same thing as transit encryption. For the record: PRISM is not "sniffing" or any other type of bulk surveillance program that would be thwarted by TLS. It's an API/app-driven program, run by and within large tech companies, that permits the US military intelligence organizations to pull the decrypted contents of the account of anyone on the service, directly from the storage systems of those tech companies. The majority of the data that the IC processes is the result of PRISM. I encourage you to read Bart Gellman's book Dark Mirror for more information and specifics.
- criddell 6y agoOkay, that makes more sense. When I'm backing up to an Apple server, I think of the two ends in the end-to-end encryption scheme as my computer and Apple's computer.
- sneak 6y agoNo, the ends are the device from which the backup is being taken, and the device to which the backup is restored: the start and the endpoints of the entire journey of the data. When done properly, the places the data sits/transits in-between have no ability to read or decrypt the information; it's indistinguishable from random data to those intermediate storage/relay services or nodes, because they never have access to the keys to decrypt it.
- Lammy 6y agohttps://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusive/exclusive-apple-dropped-plan-for-encrypting-backups-after-fbi-complained-sources-idUSKBN1ZK1CT https://www.reuters.com/article/us-apple-fbi-icloud-exclusiv...
- kawfey 6y agoYou must have some very interesting notes. I think for most of us, the US government wouldn't be particularly interested in our musings, but what do you suggest?
- sneak 6y agoMy notes do not have to be interesting for me to desire, or deserve, personal privacy.
- Lammy 6y agoIt's amazing that people can witness POTUS 44→45 and still make "well I have nothing to hide" arguments :/
- sneak 6y agoRegardless of any political situation, it's a rather stark lack of imagination when one can not realize that there are people who are doing things entirely legal and reasonable that absolutely require privacy from the state for their own safety and success, such as labor leaders, political organizers, civil rights leaders, reporters researching state corruption, war crimes, or human rights abuses by the state itself, et c.
- csydas 6y agoYes, but let's not conflate this specific use case with every day usage. I'm a gigantic privacy advocate and probably senselessly cautious about tons of technologies, but that's the result of a conscious choice. Set and forget encryption, or programs that advertise they can skip the first step, are dangerous in my opinion/experience. It can give the wrong impression about security and lead to dangerous decisions/actions or lack thereof. The concept behind thoughtless encryption is noble, but for all encryption models/schemes I know of, it has to be a concentrated and intentional decision else you end up with: - Lost data due to key mismanagement (not a bad thing, but extremely inconvenient) - Incomplete or ineffective encryption - Vehicles for intentional deception that allow bad actors to get you to share sensitive/personal data under the impression that it's protected and much much more. Steve Yegge said it best when he said that Security and Usability are constantly at odds, and from my perspective, this is a good thing to some degree. With so many FUD apps that promise security, for the time being is a very convenient litmus test for laypersons to know "how much should I trust this app?" I know that it's popular on HN to shit on Telegram, but in my current country of residence, Telegram is the most popular messenger program...for normal non-secretive messaging. It is extremely well known not to trust TG for secret conversations, illegal purchases or any other illegal activities, and so on. Not even on the basis of the security model of secret chats, but the discoverability of them. Basically the thought is "If you could find it without being a member of some ring of trust, so can the police". It's one reason why the conversations that frequently happen on HN about Telegram feel so misguided to me -- those who have conversations that may put themselves at risk __aren't using the app for such conversations__. They're not using any such apps, and either doing disposable communications (burner phones, pen and paper convos, etc), or they're arranging meetings in other ways. Encryption/security has been commoditized by app and platform creators and packaged into a marketing tool. I wouldn't trust Telegram or Signal any more than I'd trust WhatsApp, Messenger, Messages, or whatever Google's monthly name for their chat app is to have such conversations in most countries. To wrap it back to the GP's comment, I get the complaint about Apple Notes not being E2E encrypted -- but, if you've got sensitive data that needs to be recorded, why are you cloud-syncing it in the first place with a company that has frequently been investigated/prodded by the US Government, and even more frequently probed/violated by data exfiltration companies that work directly with the aforementioned government?
- diebeforei485 6y agoFair enough, but this applies to essentially any service that you can access on the web (you can use Notes on iCloud.com)