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We are conscious because it is critical for moving in our environment. You'll noticed that sleeping and anethstetized patients don't do that very well. The brai

We are conscious because it is critical for moving in our environment. You'll noticed that sleeping and anethstetized patients don't do that very well. The brain is for moving. Abstraction and self-consciousness presumably have similar explanations in terms of survival advantages.

mrmonkeyman 6y ago
Notice you did not explain why there needs to be subjective experience. Why do I see the color red? Why am I not some elaborate clockwork that I supposedly am, without inner sensation. I could have none and just describe one to you, but I assure you I actually have one. (Or you are a sollipsist, which is fine) I find that people either understand this immediately or they don't.
MaxBarraclough 6y ago
> We are conscious because it is critical for moving in our environment. Why? It's clear that intelligence is advantageous, but why consciousness? You've noted that consciousness arises from normal brain activity, similar to how our intelligence does. How? Why? Much of what happens in the brain is unconscious, so why should there be consciousness at all? (As an aside, someone who is asleep is not unconscious in the sense that matters here. If they are dreaming, they are experiencing, i.e. having conscious experiences divorced from the physical world.) Does consciousness arise because of our general intelligence, and our sense of self (both of which make obvious evolutionary sense)? If so, could computers be conscious? Could they suffer? Where's the threshold? Is there any way we could know? Does Rice's theorem apply here? These aren't easy questions. It's an interesting time for philosophy of mind. They aren't solved problems. Anyone who thinks they are, needs to do some reading. For a starting point, the work of David Chalmers is one of the usual recommendations.
- sjwright 6y ago
  I see no reason why consciousness cannot be nothing more than a fully self-contained illusion instantiated by physical brains operating in a physical universe, an emergent consequence of sufficient complexity of processing. Our consciousness seems profound and inexplicable to us, but that’s only because we’re completely blocked from introspection of the runtime environment. We’re aware of almost nothing of what the brain is doing, including the process in which new thoughts are queued up into our consciousness.
  - MaxBarraclough 6y ago
    I don't see that this is a sustainable account of consciousness. If you write off consciousness as illusory, don't you have to write off suffering as illusory? The screams of the suffering aren't merely status reports from sophisticated replication-machines having detected the occurrence of something untoward. Suffering is real, because consciousness is real. If you make the move of dismissing consciousness as an illusion, I don't see any way out from concluding that suffering is inconsequential; the equivalent of a red LED on a computer. This is plainly absurd. A better account of consciousness would be to explain how it arises from physical processes. Saying there's nothing of interest to explain, doesn't seem like a proper answer. (This is David Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness [0]) > we’re completely blocked from introspection of the runtime environment We aren't. We have various avenues of introspection into consciousness, from neuroscience to psychology to meditation. Do you think greater introspection abilities would cause consciousness to dissolve away? > We’re aware of almost nothing of what the brain is doing, including the process in which new thoughts are queued up into our consciousness. So what? The question isn't How does the brain form new thoughts?, the question is Why is there consciousness? The question of how thoughts arise is what Chalmers calls an 'easy problem of consciousness', a question about detail rather than about the fundamental question of why and how there is consciousness at all. [0] (Chalmers was of course being flippant in his choice of words, he didn't really mean that the entire field of neuroscience is 'easy'.) [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
    - sjwright 6y ago
      > If you write off consciousness as illusory, don't you have to write off suffering as illusory? Just because it’s illusory doesn’t mean you can or should write it off. Illusion is not a synonym for unimportant, so please do not put those words in my mouth. I certainly don't "write off" the suffering of living beings in any way. We are entitled to care, and in fact justified in caring, about these illusions. > Saying there's nothing of interest to explain I didn't say that. You are again putting words in my mouth. This isn’t a healthy form of discourse. > We have various avenues of introspection into consciousness Externally, sure. But if it’s external then it doesn’t qualify as introspection from my understanding of the word. I don’t like semantic disagreements so I apologise for not being clearer. > Do you think greater introspection abilities would cause consciousness to dissolve away? Taking your question as charitably as possible, the answer is yes, I think that is likely. I believe that if we had greater powers of introspection, the illusion would be shattered. Our lack of introspection seems essential for the illusion to work, at least it seems to me. Similarly and alternatively: I could imagine a hypothetical future where we create an artificial intelligence that does everything a human brain does, including an equally effective illusion of consciousness, but be unable to validate the instantiation of the illusion. > the question is Why is there consciousness. I don’t agree: that formulation of words can’t be answered without begging the question. A better question is “why do humans seem to agree that we have this sensation of self awareness?” This whole subject reminds me of the famous quote by Arthur C. Clarke — ” Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”
- jdmichal 6y ago
  GP is potentially not wrong. There's a theory called attention schema wherein consciousness emerges from an advancing capability to create models of both the external and internal world. One level of that is obviously physical modeling and planning. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/opinion/sunday/are-we-really-conscious.html https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/opinion/sunday/are-we-rea... https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/06/how-consciousness-evolved/485558/ https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/06/how-cons...
- guerrilla 6y ago
  Those other processes don't require awareness of the environment. Yes, I know Chalmers, Dennett and Searle. I got the idea that the brain is for moving from Eric Kandel by the way. No, there's a lot of work to do but I think I've answered the why: It benefits animals to be aware of their environments to navigate them. All you're seeing is a map of what's going on. It's like a UI in the words of Donald Hoffman. Plants can do it without all this, but not as well. Regarding sense of self: https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/6/27/eaay8301 https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/6/27/eaay8301
  - antonvs 6y ago
    Do you think that robots that can navigate autonomously are conscious? If you say no, it undermines your rationale for consciousness. Also, "why" isn't really part of the hard problem. The real problem is how.
    - guerrilla 6y ago
      Self-replication can be done without DNA as well. C1 causing E doesn't mean there isn't a C2 that can cause E. > Also, "why" isn't really part of the hard problem. The real problem is how. I agree, which is why that wasn't part of my claims.
tsimionescu 6y ago
And yet most living things manage to move in their environmenta without needing consciousness. We can argue whether dogs or fish are conscious, maybe even insects, but I doubt you would argue that jellyfish and plant roots are consciou, or that our intestines and hearts and white blood cells, mitochondria and other organelles are conscious - and yet all of these move and interact with their environments very happily.
- MaxBarraclough 6y ago
  Forgive what might be a bit of a nitpick: there's really no question whether dogs are conscious. Like us, they have brains, show every sign of being capable of joy and suffering, and respond to anaesthetics. You'd have to do a lot of acrobatics to make a case for dogs not being conscious. We all know this, it's why we answer the question of Is it acceptable to torture dogs? with No, of course not. Someone who believes dogs lack consciousness would presumably answer not with Yes, but with What do you mean, 'torture' a dog? You can no more torture a dog than you can torture a glass of water! From what I've read, Descartes and his disciples held exactly that view (I don't have an ironclad source for this). They mistreated dogs awfully, saying that the dog might appear to be suffering, but that it wasn't truly capable of suffering on account of it not being a human.
  - tsimionescu 6y ago
    Well, given that we don't have a complete 'technical' definition of consciousness, I don't think it's unfair to say that it can still be argued whether dogs have consciousness in the same sense that humans do, even though no one would argue that it's OK to torture a dog. For example, even some of the simplest animals show recognizable signs of suffering when hurt (writhing, certain stress hormones, avoidance, etc.). Even plants show some signs of stress when hurt, and avoidance of the area where that happened. Should we conclude from that plants and all animals are conscious in the same sense that we are? If they are not, how should we interpret these signs? Is there a spectrum of consciousness? Or are there 2 separate properties, 1 related to certain complex analyses of stimuli that is essentially the same at least in all animals, from nematodes to humans, and 2 that is specific to humans, that has to do with constructing an entire mental world that is a model of the external world, or with something else entirely?

mrmonkeyman 6y ago

Notice you did not explain why there needs to be subjective experience. Why do I see the color red? Why am I not some elaborate clockwork that I supposedly am, without inner sensation. I could have none and just describe one to you, but I assure you I actually have one. (Or you are a sollipsist, which is fine) I find that people either understand this immediately or they don't.

MaxBarraclough 6y ago

> We are conscious because it is critical for moving in our environment. Why? It's clear that intelligence is advantageous, but why consciousness? You've noted that consciousness arises from normal brain activity, similar to how our intelligence does. How? Why? Much of what happens in the brain is unconscious, so why should there be consciousness at all? (As an aside, someone who is asleep is not unconscious in the sense that matters here. If they are dreaming, they are experiencing, i.e. having conscious experiences divorced from the physical world.) Does consciousness arise because of our general intelligence, and our sense of self (both of which make obvious evolutionary sense)? If so, could computers be conscious? Could they suffer? Where's the threshold? Is there any way we could know? Does Rice's theorem apply here? These aren't easy questions. It's an interesting time for philosophy of mind. They aren't solved problems. Anyone who thinks they are, needs to do some reading. For a starting point, the work of David Chalmers is one of the usual recommendations.

sjwright 6y ago
I see no reason why consciousness cannot be nothing more than a fully self-contained illusion instantiated by physical brains operating in a physical universe, an emergent consequence of sufficient complexity of processing. Our consciousness seems profound and inexplicable to us, but that’s only because we’re completely blocked from introspection of the runtime environment. We’re aware of almost nothing of what the brain is doing, including the process in which new thoughts are queued up into our consciousness.
- MaxBarraclough 6y ago
  I don't see that this is a sustainable account of consciousness. If you write off consciousness as illusory, don't you have to write off suffering as illusory? The screams of the suffering aren't merely status reports from sophisticated replication-machines having detected the occurrence of something untoward. Suffering is real, because consciousness is real. If you make the move of dismissing consciousness as an illusion, I don't see any way out from concluding that suffering is inconsequential; the equivalent of a red LED on a computer. This is plainly absurd. A better account of consciousness would be to explain how it arises from physical processes. Saying there's nothing of interest to explain, doesn't seem like a proper answer. (This is David Chalmers' hard problem of consciousness [0]) > we’re completely blocked from introspection of the runtime environment We aren't. We have various avenues of introspection into consciousness, from neuroscience to psychology to meditation. Do you think greater introspection abilities would cause consciousness to dissolve away? > We’re aware of almost nothing of what the brain is doing, including the process in which new thoughts are queued up into our consciousness. So what? The question isn't How does the brain form new thoughts?, the question is Why is there consciousness? The question of how thoughts arise is what Chalmers calls an 'easy problem of consciousness', a question about detail rather than about the fundamental question of why and how there is consciousness at all. [0] (Chalmers was of course being flippant in his choice of words, he didn't really mean that the entire field of neuroscience is 'easy'.) [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
  - sjwright 6y ago
    > If you write off consciousness as illusory, don't you have to write off suffering as illusory? Just because it’s illusory doesn’t mean you can or should write it off. Illusion is not a synonym for unimportant, so please do not put those words in my mouth. I certainly don't "write off" the suffering of living beings in any way. We are entitled to care, and in fact justified in caring, about these illusions. > Saying there's nothing of interest to explain I didn't say that. You are again putting words in my mouth. This isn’t a healthy form of discourse. > We have various avenues of introspection into consciousness Externally, sure. But if it’s external then it doesn’t qualify as introspection from my understanding of the word. I don’t like semantic disagreements so I apologise for not being clearer. > Do you think greater introspection abilities would cause consciousness to dissolve away? Taking your question as charitably as possible, the answer is yes, I think that is likely. I believe that if we had greater powers of introspection, the illusion would be shattered. Our lack of introspection seems essential for the illusion to work, at least it seems to me. Similarly and alternatively: I could imagine a hypothetical future where we create an artificial intelligence that does everything a human brain does, including an equally effective illusion of consciousness, but be unable to validate the instantiation of the illusion. > the question is Why is there consciousness. I don’t agree: that formulation of words can’t be answered without begging the question. A better question is “why do humans seem to agree that we have this sensation of self awareness?” This whole subject reminds me of the famous quote by Arthur C. Clarke — ” Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.”
jdmichal 6y ago
GP is potentially not wrong. There's a theory called attention schema wherein consciousness emerges from an advancing capability to create models of both the external and internal world. One level of that is obviously physical modeling and planning. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/opinion/sunday/are-we-really-conscious.html https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/12/opinion/sunday/are-we-rea... https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/06/how-consciousness-evolved/485558/ https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/06/how-cons...
guerrilla 6y ago
Those other processes don't require awareness of the environment. Yes, I know Chalmers, Dennett and Searle. I got the idea that the brain is for moving from Eric Kandel by the way. No, there's a lot of work to do but I think I've answered the why: It benefits animals to be aware of their environments to navigate them. All you're seeing is a map of what's going on. It's like a UI in the words of Donald Hoffman. Plants can do it without all this, but not as well. Regarding sense of self: https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/6/27/eaay8301 https://advances.sciencemag.org/content/6/27/eaay8301
- antonvs 6y ago
  Do you think that robots that can navigate autonomously are conscious? If you say no, it undermines your rationale for consciousness. Also, "why" isn't really part of the hard problem. The real problem is how.
  - guerrilla 6y ago
    Self-replication can be done without DNA as well. C1 causing E doesn't mean there isn't a C2 that can cause E. > Also, "why" isn't really part of the hard problem. The real problem is how. I agree, which is why that wasn't part of my claims.

tsimionescu 6y ago

And yet most living things manage to move in their environmenta without needing consciousness. We can argue whether dogs or fish are conscious, maybe even insects, but I doubt you would argue that jellyfish and plant roots are consciou, or that our intestines and hearts and white blood cells, mitochondria and other organelles are conscious - and yet all of these move and interact with their environments very happily.

MaxBarraclough 6y ago
Forgive what might be a bit of a nitpick: there's really no question whether dogs are conscious. Like us, they have brains, show every sign of being capable of joy and suffering, and respond to anaesthetics. You'd have to do a lot of acrobatics to make a case for dogs not being conscious. We all know this, it's why we answer the question of Is it acceptable to torture dogs? with No, of course not. Someone who believes dogs lack consciousness would presumably answer not with Yes, but with What do you mean, 'torture' a dog? You can no more torture a dog than you can torture a glass of water! From what I've read, Descartes and his disciples held exactly that view (I don't have an ironclad source for this). They mistreated dogs awfully, saying that the dog might appear to be suffering, but that it wasn't truly capable of suffering on account of it not being a human.
- tsimionescu 6y ago
  Well, given that we don't have a complete 'technical' definition of consciousness, I don't think it's unfair to say that it can still be argued whether dogs have consciousness in the same sense that humans do, even though no one would argue that it's OK to torture a dog. For example, even some of the simplest animals show recognizable signs of suffering when hurt (writhing, certain stress hormones, avoidance, etc.). Even plants show some signs of stress when hurt, and avoidance of the area where that happened. Should we conclude from that plants and all animals are conscious in the same sense that we are? If they are not, how should we interpret these signs? Is there a spectrum of consciousness? Or are there 2 separate properties, 1 related to certain complex analyses of stimuli that is essentially the same at least in all animals, from nematodes to humans, and 2 that is specific to humans, that has to do with constructing an entire mental world that is a model of the external world, or with something else entirely?