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> GCP does not have root access to the customers VMs I mean, they have physical access to the hypervisor host machines, where they could do anything they like
by derefr 6y ago
> GCP does not have root access to the customers VMs
I mean, they have physical access to the hypervisor host machines, where they could do anything they like to them, e.g. tap the JTAG pins of the CPU.
Insofar as you assume that the attack here is “the NSA compels Google to gather evidence against you”, the lack of just being able to log into the VM doesn’t really change much.
- asah 6y agoThis protects against remote rogue employees and intruders. As for physical attacks, Google is ultra paranoid about physical access to DCs, and I think we can quickly agree that rogue employees and outsiders would have little chance of successful attack given the outrageous (and secret) methods that Google employs. Remember, this is one of the most-attacked organizations in the world, they've had decades (plural) to enact defenses and test them, and a successful attack would cost them over $10 billion - there's a virtually unlimited budget for physical defense. Circa 2020, I'd put Google's physical intrusion defenses up against most military installations.
- nitrogen 6y agoIs there something special that happens when a legit remote cloud user logs in that doesn't happen when a rogue remote Google admin logs in? Something that prevents a modified web client from stealing the creds during a user's web console session?
- theevilsharpie 6y agoSEV protects against physical attacks. A rogue admin logging in through a management console would have to go through whatever controls and auditing the console's access control functionality provides.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- frandroid 6y ago> decades (plural) Namely, two at most.
- Kye 6y agoIs there a point of diminishing returns on experience for security? Two might be enough.
- remus 6y ago> Insofar as you assume that the attack here is “the NSA compels Google to gather evidence against you”, the lack of just being able to log into the VM doesn’t really change much. For most people (and especially businesses) this is a totally unrealistic security aim. If what you're worried about is the government using it's legal ability to compel people and businesses to provide evidence then there's ~no product or service from that country that you could realistically use.
- superkuh 6y agoRight. And now that this is a realistic and regular worry for normal businesses doing normal things the value proposition of the cloud is looking worse.
- redblacktree 6y agoAre you suggesting that US companies should fear the US government may... steal their IP? I'm not being facetious, I just don't understand what the "realistic and regular worries" you cite are supposed to be.
- derefr 6y agoI mean, yes, there's no service where the security/privacy is contractual, that is safe from the state overriding the contract. But the promise of things like homeomorphic encryption, is that you can do a computation on a truly untrusted substrate, i.e. you can trust computations performed by an untrusted adversary, and also know that they didn't learn anything about those computations. It's a technical solution to security/privacy, not a contractual one. The ideal that everyone's hoping for, is that there's a way to get that same kind of technical guarantee from cloud compute providers, without needing a layer of maths that makes Monte Carlo quantum simulation look fast.
- Spooky23 6y agoAll commercial activities are at the core protected by contractural protections and good faith. Cloud is not as different as you may think. Any other expectation of protection from the state are a limited based on probability, seriousness of the matter, and your potential culpability. Your employees, service providers and others can be required to provide information without informing you. In extreme cases, agents will pose as utility, security or building management.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]