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Tell me how anything can be done about encryption (especially E2E encryption) that won't be abused. US considered encryption arms less than 30 years ago. We're

Tell me how anything can be done about encryption (especially E2E encryption) that won't be abused. US considered encryption arms less than 30 years ago. We're living in the best possible time for it. Genuine open-source end-to-end encryption, that can only be seen by your recipient. No one can do anything about it. In the current world where privacy feels like it's non-existent, you have these islands of hope and even these are being eroded. Yes, I agree you should always read first-hand rather than second-hand reports but is there literally anything the government would do that I would want them to do to the current state of encryption?

VLM 6y ago
"can only be seen by your recipient" Both endpoints are DRM'd and controlled and recorded by big brother, you don't have root on either although uncountable exploits and viruses do, and often at least one of the endpoints is big brother himself so obtaining logs will be quite easy.
- bjelkeman-again 6y ago
  But, isn’t the argument that access this way is cumbersome and only available economically to priority targets? Also, if you need you can run Linux as end points.
  - Reelin 6y ago
    Run Linux ... on a device whose CPU has an unauditable security coprocessor? A CPU whose microcode is implemented in encrypted firmware? A device whose physical hardware can't be meaningfully audited without state actor level resources? I don't really think such approaches are used or even viable currently. But if it ever were a concern, "run Linux" doesn't even begin to address it. (Anyway you can't run Linux if your endpoint is a phone with a locked bootloader.)
    - Mirioron 6y ago
      The only way that I can see this being actually safe is if you make the hardware to encrypt and decrypt the data yourself.