4 ms·

A murderer is breaking the negative right of the victim not to be aggressed against. That would be a violation of the non-aggression principle. Also, they are

by _0ffh 6y ago

A murderer is breaking the negative right of the victim not to be aggressed against. That would be a violation of the non-aggression principle. Also, they are doing property damage to the victim's body. (Yes, I'm being a bit whimsical here, but this would technically be a valid charge in this case, as far as I can tell.) From that point on out they are guilty of a crime for which they may be tried and punished. I don't see where the problem is, frankly.

mjburgess 6y ago
The problem is that everything in your comment refers to a moral principle. So moral principles are prior to a discussion of freedom. The meaning of "negative freedom" isn't freedom as such. As in everyone can do anything (the Hobbesian state of nature). Rather it is freedom after a choice of certain moral principles. The comment i'm responding to thinks that there's a logical contradiction between "freedom" and "redistribution" but there is none, because "freedom" has very little content. It is always "freedom" after morality. And the diagreement therefore lies in "what we owe to each other", eg., here, you assert the non-aggression principle.
- _0ffh 6y ago
  So let's handle it as a moral question. The classical liberal claim is then that the moral right that certain things should not be done to you beats the moral right of others that you should do certain things for them. Which is exactly the distinction between negative and positive rights. And furthermore, that these will unavoidably conflict, wherefore the enforcement of positive rights must lead to morally inferior outcomes.
  - mjburgess 6y ago
    I'm not sure that is the distinction. In a system of negative freedom contracts entail a duty to honor them, ie., are the source of obligations to others. So a system of negative freedom is really just one where only you can obligate your future self to be duty bound to do something for someone else. The libertarian still regards this as a duty, so it is a seemingly arbitrary one and contrary to "freedom as such". The question "who decides what my duties are?" isnt even, in libertariaism, "only you". Because the duty to honor a contract is prior, ie., you are bound to it. So the libertarian arbitrarily ringfenses a small number of principles to be prior to the question of freedom: NAP, contracts, etc. The redistributionist can likewise ringfense some principles and claim to maximise freedom and hence to "morally superior outcomes".
    - _0ffh 6y ago
      To the best of my knowledge, it is. As to the point of obligating your future self to honour any contract that you have agreed to, the point is that you yourself chose to enter said contract voluntarily. The strength of the whole philosophy is that it seeks to deal with potential sources of conflict by presenting a minimal set of clear-cut rules and leave the rest up to the participants. As you cannot choose to be a participant, because the mere fact of your existence forces you to be one, it simultaneously tries to maximise your freedom of choice from there on out. Many words have been spilled about the "social contract" as legitimisation for the state. Yet how convincing do they really sound in the face of Spooner's pithy rejoinder that "I didn't sign any contract, so I'm not bound by your laws and regulations."? BTW, I don't think you will have an easy time to argue that any other set of a priory rules does a better job of maximising freedom. The toughest critique of libertarianism that I know of rather seeks to dispense of a priory morality altogether in favour of a consequentialist point of view. Scott Alexander Potter has done so in his anti-libertarian FAQ, just in case you haven't already read it (not saying you didn't, just mentioning it).
      - mjburgess 6y ago
        I have read it, and I agree: the fatal critique is the failure to solve collective-action problems. My point here is just the contingency of the starting point: many do not regard "their word" as obligating. It's a rather magical sort of perspective: that "an oath", "binds", etc. The reason we find promises of this kind even intuitively plausible is social: we immediately intuite that there is reputational damage associated with breaking a vow. Libertarianism thus trades on social instincts in its set up, strangely prioritising just a few of them (aggression, vows, etc.). This is disguised by a language of "freedom and reason", but really it's just a very old-fashioned communtarianism -- that as with most -- works in a near pre-social small-tribe environment, but fails to generalize. When you cannot track people's reputation because you live in a civilization of millions/billions, "contracts" alone aren't a plausible to conduct business. The "social contract" is not something "to be signed", but a recognition of the folly of "signing" (oath giving) in a society where no one hears your oaths.

by _0ffh 6y ago

mjburgess 6y ago

The problem is that everything in your comment refers to a moral principle. So moral principles are prior to a discussion of freedom. The meaning of "negative freedom" isn't freedom as such. As in everyone can do anything (the Hobbesian state of nature). Rather it is freedom after a choice of certain moral principles. The comment i'm responding to thinks that there's a logical contradiction between "freedom" and "redistribution" but there is none, because "freedom" has very little content. It is always "freedom" after morality. And the diagreement therefore lies in "what we owe to each other", eg., here, you assert the non-aggression principle.

_0ffh 6y ago
So let's handle it as a moral question. The classical liberal claim is then that the moral right that certain things should not be done to you beats the moral right of others that you should do certain things for them. Which is exactly the distinction between negative and positive rights. And furthermore, that these will unavoidably conflict, wherefore the enforcement of positive rights must lead to morally inferior outcomes.
- mjburgess 6y ago
  I'm not sure that is the distinction. In a system of negative freedom contracts entail a duty to honor them, ie., are the source of obligations to others. So a system of negative freedom is really just one where only you can obligate your future self to be duty bound to do something for someone else. The libertarian still regards this as a duty, so it is a seemingly arbitrary one and contrary to "freedom as such". The question "who decides what my duties are?" isnt even, in libertariaism, "only you". Because the duty to honor a contract is prior, ie., you are bound to it. So the libertarian arbitrarily ringfenses a small number of principles to be prior to the question of freedom: NAP, contracts, etc. The redistributionist can likewise ringfense some principles and claim to maximise freedom and hence to "morally superior outcomes".
  - _0ffh 6y ago
    To the best of my knowledge, it is. As to the point of obligating your future self to honour any contract that you have agreed to, the point is that you yourself chose to enter said contract voluntarily. The strength of the whole philosophy is that it seeks to deal with potential sources of conflict by presenting a minimal set of clear-cut rules and leave the rest up to the participants. As you cannot choose to be a participant, because the mere fact of your existence forces you to be one, it simultaneously tries to maximise your freedom of choice from there on out. Many words have been spilled about the "social contract" as legitimisation for the state. Yet how convincing do they really sound in the face of Spooner's pithy rejoinder that "I didn't sign any contract, so I'm not bound by your laws and regulations."? BTW, I don't think you will have an easy time to argue that any other set of a priory rules does a better job of maximising freedom. The toughest critique of libertarianism that I know of rather seeks to dispense of a priory morality altogether in favour of a consequentialist point of view. Scott Alexander Potter has done so in his anti-libertarian FAQ, just in case you haven't already read it (not saying you didn't, just mentioning it).
    - mjburgess 6y ago
      I have read it, and I agree: the fatal critique is the failure to solve collective-action problems. My point here is just the contingency of the starting point: many do not regard "their word" as obligating. It's a rather magical sort of perspective: that "an oath", "binds", etc. The reason we find promises of this kind even intuitively plausible is social: we immediately intuite that there is reputational damage associated with breaking a vow. Libertarianism thus trades on social instincts in its set up, strangely prioritising just a few of them (aggression, vows, etc.). This is disguised by a language of "freedom and reason", but really it's just a very old-fashioned communtarianism -- that as with most -- works in a near pre-social small-tribe environment, but fails to generalize. When you cannot track people's reputation because you live in a civilization of millions/billions, "contracts" alone aren't a plausible to conduct business. The "social contract" is not something "to be signed", but a recognition of the folly of "signing" (oath giving) in a society where no one hears your oaths.