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To have something taken which you owe is not an infringement on freedom. "What we owe to others" is not settled by the question of freedom, and therefore it is

To have something taken which you owe is not an infringement on freedom. "What we owe to others" is not settled by the question of freedom, and therefore it is perfectly logically consistent to be a libertarian proponent of redistribution.

AdrianB1 6y ago
You don't "owe to others". This kind of entitlement is a fallacy.
- mjburgess 6y ago
  Which "entitlement"? The one expressed in the idea that you owe nothing to others, or the one where others should expect something of you? Why is one "entitlement" and not the other? In either case, there is no logical fallacy present. And the question is independent to the question of freedom which is secondary to the question of moral constraint. Ie., establishing what is moral in our interactions with others (murder, theft, etc.) is prior to the question of freedom -- freedom is whatever remains to be maximised when moral constraints are in place. The cause of "freedom" is therefore often rather a meaningless one. Everyone is pro-freedom except the "freedom to do what is immoral". And so the question is only ever really, "what is moral?" Ie., what we owe to others, and what they owe us supersedes any particular political programme.
  - _0ffh 6y ago
    That comes down to a question of negative vs positive rights. To quote Bastiat: >> M. de Lamartine wrote me one day: "Your doctrine is only the half of my program; you have stopped at liberty; I go on to fraternity." I answered him: "The second half of your program will destroy the first half." And, in fact, it is quite impossible for me to separate the word "fraternity" from the word "voluntary." It is quite impossible for me to conceive of fraternity as legally enforced, without liberty being legally destroyed, and justice being legally trampled underfoot. <<
    - mjburgess 6y ago
      Does it? Does "negative freedom" include "freedom from reprisals for murder" ? Ie., in a society which maximises "negative freedom", is there no system of redress for murder? I do not think a libertarian believe so. Rather they have a prior morality in which certain actions "deserve" a redress -- ie., you are owed punishment, or you owe a victim (of, say, theft) what you have stolen from them. So everyone in this conversation both wishes to maximise negative and positive freedom. The only variable is the moral constraints we place on that maximum. In the case of leftwing thought, one benefits from society in a way which creates obligations that are not fully "internalized" in market transactions. The positive externality of society is not accounted for: you owe something by being in society which, unpaid, would be theft.
      - _0ffh 6y ago
        A murderer is breaking the negative right of the victim not to be aggressed against. That would be a violation of the non-aggression principle. Also, they are doing property damage to the victim's body. (Yes, I'm being a bit whimsical here, but this would technically be a valid charge in this case, as far as I can tell.) From that point on out they are guilty of a crime for which they may be tried and punished. I don't see where the problem is, frankly.
        mjburgess 6y ago
        The problem is that everything in your comment refers to a moral principle. So moral principles are prior to a discussion of freedom. The meaning of "negative freedom" isn't freedom as such. As in everyone can do anything (the Hobbesian state of nature). Rather it is freedom after a choice of certain moral principles. The comment i'm responding to thinks that there's a logical contradiction between "freedom" and "redistribution" but there is none, because "freedom" has very little content. It is always "freedom" after morality. And the diagreement therefore lies in "what we owe to each other", eg., here, you assert the non-aggression principle.
        _0ffh 6y ago

AdrianB1 6y ago

You don't "owe to others". This kind of entitlement is a fallacy.

mjburgess 6y ago
Which "entitlement"? The one expressed in the idea that you owe nothing to others, or the one where others should expect something of you? Why is one "entitlement" and not the other? In either case, there is no logical fallacy present. And the question is independent to the question of freedom which is secondary to the question of moral constraint. Ie., establishing what is moral in our interactions with others (murder, theft, etc.) is prior to the question of freedom -- freedom is whatever remains to be maximised when moral constraints are in place. The cause of "freedom" is therefore often rather a meaningless one. Everyone is pro-freedom except the "freedom to do what is immoral". And so the question is only ever really, "what is moral?" Ie., what we owe to others, and what they owe us supersedes any particular political programme.
- _0ffh 6y ago
  That comes down to a question of negative vs positive rights. To quote Bastiat: >> M. de Lamartine wrote me one day: "Your doctrine is only the half of my program; you have stopped at liberty; I go on to fraternity." I answered him: "The second half of your program will destroy the first half." And, in fact, it is quite impossible for me to separate the word "fraternity" from the word "voluntary." It is quite impossible for me to conceive of fraternity as legally enforced, without liberty being legally destroyed, and justice being legally trampled underfoot. <<
  - mjburgess 6y ago
    Does it? Does "negative freedom" include "freedom from reprisals for murder" ? Ie., in a society which maximises "negative freedom", is there no system of redress for murder? I do not think a libertarian believe so. Rather they have a prior morality in which certain actions "deserve" a redress -- ie., you are owed punishment, or you owe a victim (of, say, theft) what you have stolen from them. So everyone in this conversation both wishes to maximise negative and positive freedom. The only variable is the moral constraints we place on that maximum. In the case of leftwing thought, one benefits from society in a way which creates obligations that are not fully "internalized" in market transactions. The positive externality of society is not accounted for: you owe something by being in society which, unpaid, would be theft.
    - _0ffh 6y ago
      A murderer is breaking the negative right of the victim not to be aggressed against. That would be a violation of the non-aggression principle. Also, they are doing property damage to the victim's body. (Yes, I'm being a bit whimsical here, but this would technically be a valid charge in this case, as far as I can tell.) From that point on out they are guilty of a crime for which they may be tried and punished. I don't see where the problem is, frankly.
      - mjburgess 6y ago
        The problem is that everything in your comment refers to a moral principle. So moral principles are prior to a discussion of freedom. The meaning of "negative freedom" isn't freedom as such. As in everyone can do anything (the Hobbesian state of nature). Rather it is freedom after a choice of certain moral principles. The comment i'm responding to thinks that there's a logical contradiction between "freedom" and "redistribution" but there is none, because "freedom" has very little content. It is always "freedom" after morality. And the diagreement therefore lies in "what we owe to each other", eg., here, you assert the non-aggression principle.
        _0ffh 6y ago