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> There is no requirement to "know a truth" to address the issue of free will. How can I believe this to be true if you haven't proven to me that a mind can kn

> There is no requirement to "know a truth" to address the issue of free will. How can I believe this to be true if you haven't proven to me that a mind can know a truth yet? > The starting point would be: Come up with a definition that does not devolve into infinite regression ("god did it", which just moves the question "up one plane" and so does not provide a solution) or smoke and mirrors (and illusion over determinism). How can I believe that it moves the question "up one plane" when you haven't proven to me that a mind can know a truth yet? Etc. Most philosophers will cede to this line of reasoning and at best call it boring ala Russell and then continue from there. But they're doing the same thing that people that believe in free will do. They're either denying the battlefield or they're moving the goal posts or they're not coming up with a cohesive definition of a mind or a truth or what have you. My point is that you can mock the free will folks all you want, but coming down on the other side of the argument is just as rooted in belief sans evidence. There is no proof or hope of a proof that a mind can know a truth that is not circularly reasoned so any firm belief that there is no such thing as free will is a delusion, short of maybe divine intercession.

vidarh 6y ago
"Coming down on the other side of the argument" is to acknowledge that until someone has provided a definition of free will, there is no argument to come down on. Talking about free will without first defining it is as meaningless as just waving your arms in the air. That is why "knowing a truth" is not relevant to this question yet. Without even a hypothesis from "the other side" to address, whether or not we can "know a truth" makes no difference.
- 3pt14159 6y ago
  In my original comment I defined free will from my perspective. > For me, the definition of free will is action outside of the constraint of fate. Either every action of an individual is predetermined or it isn't. I'm not talking about the causal mechanisms of non-predetermined action (i.e., I'm not saying quantum probability / wave form collapse means someone has free will) I'm simply giving a definition that I think suffices for me. Though even if this definition seems nonsensical to you, I still wouldn't budge from my core argument because it's impossible to resolve any philosophical debate without first resolving epistemological gaps.

vidarh 6y ago

"Coming down on the other side of the argument" is to acknowledge that until someone has provided a definition of free will, there is no argument to come down on. Talking about free will without first defining it is as meaningless as just waving your arms in the air. That is why "knowing a truth" is not relevant to this question yet. Without even a hypothesis from "the other side" to address, whether or not we can "know a truth" makes no difference.

3pt14159 6y ago
In my original comment I defined free will from my perspective. > For me, the definition of free will is action outside of the constraint of fate. Either every action of an individual is predetermined or it isn't. I'm not talking about the causal mechanisms of non-predetermined action (i.e., I'm not saying quantum probability / wave form collapse means someone has free will) I'm simply giving a definition that I think suffices for me. Though even if this definition seems nonsensical to you, I still wouldn't budge from my core argument because it's impossible to resolve any philosophical debate without first resolving epistemological gaps.