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> Even with u2f, if the browser lies to u2f device or to you, all bets are off. With WebAuthn / U2F if the browser lies it can result in you authenticating to
by tialaramex 6y ago
> Even with u2f, if the browser lies to u2f device or to you, all bets are off.
With WebAuthn / U2F if the browser lies it can result in you authenticating to a different system or under different circumstances than you expected, but nothing else, which seems pretty far from "all bets are off".
In particular a compromised browser could tell you that you're signing into Facebook, when the actual authentication performed is for GitHub, for example.
But because the User Presence detection happens in the physical authenticator it can't fake that, it does need you to press the button, tap the sensor or whatever.
And the credentials obtained this way are inherently one-use, when you take your Security Key away, bad guys can't get any further credentials from the compromised system you stopped using. As we see in this Google example that might not stop them, but that's an application security design issue not an inherent flaw in U2F / WebAuthn.
- Thorrez 6y ago>But because the User Presence detection happens in the physical authenticator it can't fake that, it does need you to press the button, tap the sensor or whatever. Sure, there's a user present. That doesn't stop the account being compromised. Users tap that thing all day when prompted. You prompt, they tap, easy as pie. If you're really advanced you could build a little mechanical arm that would reach out of the computer and tap the key itself. >And the credentials obtained this way are inherently one-use That "one-use" could be to add a new 2FA device that's under the attacker's permanent control.