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It always mystifies me that philosophical debates can even get that far when it's impossible to prove that a mind can know a truth because it begs the question.

It always mystifies me that philosophical debates can even get that far when it's impossible to prove that a mind can know a truth because it begs the question. It's hard to even follow that previous sentence with my own view because it presupposes its own conclusion: Some things you just have to take on faith. For me, the definition of free will is action outside of the constraint of fate. And I'm not sure if it's a fantasy or not, but if fate does not exist, I'd be much more likely to take it on faith that free will does exist. But again, the whole playing field of this discussion is denied because it presupposes that a mind can know a truth, and I've yet to see any reasoning that that can be proven, let alone an actual proof.

vidarh 6y ago
There is no requirement to "know a truth" to address the issue of free will. The starting point would be: Come up with a definition that does not devolve into infinite regression ("god did it", which just moves the question "up one plane" and so does not provide a solution) or smoke and mirrors (and illusion over determinism). If someone were to be able to form a cohesive definition that does not fall down one of those two holes, it'd be possible to at least try to determine whether or not the definition has holes. But without even such an attempt at a definition, any argument in favour of free will falls on its face from the start.
- 3pt14159 6y ago
  > There is no requirement to "know a truth" to address the issue of free will. How can I believe this to be true if you haven't proven to me that a mind can know a truth yet? > The starting point would be: Come up with a definition that does not devolve into infinite regression ("god did it", which just moves the question "up one plane" and so does not provide a solution) or smoke and mirrors (and illusion over determinism). How can I believe that it moves the question "up one plane" when you haven't proven to me that a mind can know a truth yet? Etc. Most philosophers will cede to this line of reasoning and at best call it boring ala Russell and then continue from there. But they're doing the same thing that people that believe in free will do. They're either denying the battlefield or they're moving the goal posts or they're not coming up with a cohesive definition of a mind or a truth or what have you. My point is that you can mock the free will folks all you want, but coming down on the other side of the argument is just as rooted in belief sans evidence. There is no proof or hope of a proof that a mind can know a truth that is not circularly reasoned so any firm belief that there is no such thing as free will is a delusion, short of maybe divine intercession.
  - vidarh 6y ago
    "Coming down on the other side of the argument" is to acknowledge that until someone has provided a definition of free will, there is no argument to come down on. Talking about free will without first defining it is as meaningless as just waving your arms in the air. That is why "knowing a truth" is not relevant to this question yet. Without even a hypothesis from "the other side" to address, whether or not we can "know a truth" makes no difference.
    - 3pt14159 6y ago
      In my original comment I defined free will from my perspective. > For me, the definition of free will is action outside of the constraint of fate. Either every action of an individual is predetermined or it isn't. I'm not talking about the causal mechanisms of non-predetermined action (i.e., I'm not saying quantum probability / wave form collapse means someone has free will) I'm simply giving a definition that I think suffices for me. Though even if this definition seems nonsensical to you, I still wouldn't budge from my core argument because it's impossible to resolve any philosophical debate without first resolving epistemological gaps.

vidarh 6y ago

There is no requirement to "know a truth" to address the issue of free will. The starting point would be: Come up with a definition that does not devolve into infinite regression ("god did it", which just moves the question "up one plane" and so does not provide a solution) or smoke and mirrors (and illusion over determinism). If someone were to be able to form a cohesive definition that does not fall down one of those two holes, it'd be possible to at least try to determine whether or not the definition has holes. But without even such an attempt at a definition, any argument in favour of free will falls on its face from the start.

3pt14159 6y ago
> There is no requirement to "know a truth" to address the issue of free will. How can I believe this to be true if you haven't proven to me that a mind can know a truth yet? > The starting point would be: Come up with a definition that does not devolve into infinite regression ("god did it", which just moves the question "up one plane" and so does not provide a solution) or smoke and mirrors (and illusion over determinism). How can I believe that it moves the question "up one plane" when you haven't proven to me that a mind can know a truth yet? Etc. Most philosophers will cede to this line of reasoning and at best call it boring ala Russell and then continue from there. But they're doing the same thing that people that believe in free will do. They're either denying the battlefield or they're moving the goal posts or they're not coming up with a cohesive definition of a mind or a truth or what have you. My point is that you can mock the free will folks all you want, but coming down on the other side of the argument is just as rooted in belief sans evidence. There is no proof or hope of a proof that a mind can know a truth that is not circularly reasoned so any firm belief that there is no such thing as free will is a delusion, short of maybe divine intercession.
- vidarh 6y ago
  "Coming down on the other side of the argument" is to acknowledge that until someone has provided a definition of free will, there is no argument to come down on. Talking about free will without first defining it is as meaningless as just waving your arms in the air. That is why "knowing a truth" is not relevant to this question yet. Without even a hypothesis from "the other side" to address, whether or not we can "know a truth" makes no difference.
  - 3pt14159 6y ago
    In my original comment I defined free will from my perspective. > For me, the definition of free will is action outside of the constraint of fate. Either every action of an individual is predetermined or it isn't. I'm not talking about the causal mechanisms of non-predetermined action (i.e., I'm not saying quantum probability / wave form collapse means someone has free will) I'm simply giving a definition that I think suffices for me. Though even if this definition seems nonsensical to you, I still wouldn't budge from my core argument because it's impossible to resolve any philosophical debate without first resolving epistemological gaps.