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Disabling Google 2FA doesn't need 2FA if you're already logged in. The author's core issue is that once a machine has logged in, it is considered trusted for a
by Wowfunhappy 6y ago
Disabling Google 2FA doesn't need 2FA if you're already logged in.
The author's core issue is that once a machine has logged in, it is considered trusted for a period of time. Google should probably make this configurable for particularly security-conscious users (assuming it isn't already), but it strikes me as a perfectly reasonable default.
- pat2man 6y agoAlso Google requires you to re-enter your password. The fact that his browser was set up to auto enter passwords without any prompt (not the default) and the fact that his machine was open to the internet means that Google probably had enough security here.
- ryanianian 6y ago> Google requires you to re-enter your password And it does it at unpredictable and often inconvenient times. The periodic check is undeniably good for security. But google's impl doesn't give the user any indication of when it will happen, and it doesn't allow the user to preemptively re-auth to restart the clock. This means that I always end up having to re-auth right in the middle of sharing my screen or right when I'm trying to quickly find a thing and in a state of flow. On good days 1pw is already unlocked and can autofill the login. On bad days I have to manually unlock 1pw and/or hunt for the pw and hope my colleagues don't see my other saved sites and then hope that I don't accidentally paste my password in a doc or something - let alone worry about destroying what was on the clipboard before google decides to do this. Security and convenience are always at odds, but that doesn't mean you need to give a middle finger to basic UX in the name of security.
- andrewxdiamond 6y agoWhy cant you just log out and back in to preemptively trigger the login?
- ryanianian 6y agoThat screws up your default account order if you have multiple google accounts for work vs personal
- kelnos 6y agoAlso IIRC you can't just log out of one account; signing out signs you out of all accounts. That makes it even less likely that I'd ever want to do that.
- aspenmayer 6y agoYou can run multiple browser profiles, or use something like Firefox Containers to sidestep this pain point. I use my own profile on a hot seat shop PC, and every user has their own desktop shortcut, which directly opens the appropriate profile in the browser. I can be signed in to multiple different Google accounts simultaneously in this way. Signing out signs out for every Google account in that browser profile; adjacent browser profiles' sign-in state is not affected by signing out on first profile. Hope this helps.
- kccqzy 6y agoIt might be a recent change but I think you can log out of individual accounts now.
- EE84M3i 6y ago>it doesn't allow the user to preemptively re-auth to restart the clock. AFAICT there are separate clocks for separate high-privileged actions, and some actions require re-authentication every time. As an example, accessing a saved password on passwords.google.com requires re-authentication for each item you want to access.
- occamrazor 6y agoIIRC it has a very short reauth delay, but not zero (i.e. I can look at two or three passwords in a row, but not more)
- EE84M3i 6y agoI tried it on my laptop in chrome (via the web interface) before posting that and was prompted before looking at the second password. It's possible the interface in the chrome native settings or the passwords.google.com interface via chrome on android (which somehow uses native lock screen auth??) are slightly different.
- lordlimecat 6y agoYou're saying they "probably had enough security" in an article where a reused token was sufficient to fully compromise the account and disable 2fa.
- quicklime 6y agoI’m not going to say whether this is good or bad for security, but it did save me a few years ago when I accidentally dropped my phone and broke it.
- cavanasm 6y agoYeah, I lost my phone for the first time last year, and was very very glad for this default, because I was able to remove 2FA on my now lost phone from my computer that remained logged into google services, and log into google on the replacement phone, and reset 2FA to that new device.
- SketchySeaBeast 6y agoMy paranoia about my devices stability and its 2FA software (LG G4 bootloop victim) means that I keep two phones with 2FA verification and applications enabled - one stays safe at all times so that in case I lose or drop my new one I can use the backup.
- Klathmon 6y agoMost services that use standard TOTP codes have backup codes that you can print out and store in a safe, and the ones that don't you can save the QR code that enrolls the 2FA app and use it again to re-enroll a new device if needed. Obviously the backup codes are preferred as you're not storing a master key to all future codes, but it's a lot easier to manage than a second device (at least for me).
- jacobsenscott 6y agoI've lost my phone and been able to re-connect to every 2FA service I use without any need for human interaction. For google I was saved because my laptop was still logged in and I could turn google's 2fa off. Basically everyone else has an "I lost my device" thing and a fallback to SMS codes or email links. This certainly weakens 2FA in general, but strict 2FA is unusable in practice.
- 6y ago
- ecesena 6y agoAlso, this seems to be the case for all major sites, not just for Google.
- dang 6y agoI've added that last bit to the title above. Thanks!
- dathinab 6y ago2FA is meant to prevent your account from being stolen even if you log in on a compromised system. As you must assume such a system runs a key logger and will get you password this is a problem. But not a supper big one. Except if it's a dev-account, because then a lot of things of high importance are linked to it. I think it's a sane default setup for the causal user. But it and a fiew other defaults should be changed by telling google that this account needs to be secure or similar.
- drivebycomment 6y ago> 2FA is meant to prevent your account from being stolen even if you log in on a compromised system. No. No 2FA system is designed to protect you from using a compromised system, as there's no such system possible. No 2FA or any system can protect your account and data from a compromised system. It can make it slightly more difficult, but can not prevent the account take-over. Even with u2f, if the browser lies to u2f device or to you, all bets are off. If you value your account, you should not sign into a system you don't have trust.
- dathinab 6y agoNo, if you have 2FA peopel can steal you data on a compromised system but not your whole account. With googles 2FA implementation they can steal your whole account. If the compromised system has no way to get your second factor it can't disable/change the second factor methods and can't independently log in. EDIT: Sure there are probably many other ways to then trick the user into giving 2FA permission to e.g. change 2FA auth. But this is harder and not always viable in all situations.
- Thorrez 6y ago>But this is harder I don't think it's unreasonable to expect the attacker to be able to build a little bit of browser automation. >not always viable in all situations. Like what?
- tialaramex 6y ago> Even with u2f, if the browser lies to u2f device or to you, all bets are off. With WebAuthn / U2F if the browser lies it can result in you authenticating to a different system or under different circumstances than you expected, but nothing else, which seems pretty far from "all bets are off". In particular a compromised browser could tell you that you're signing into Facebook, when the actual authentication performed is for GitHub, for example. But because the User Presence detection happens in the physical authenticator it can't fake that, it does need you to press the button, tap the sensor or whatever. And the credentials obtained this way are inherently one-use, when you take your Security Key away, bad guys can't get any further credentials from the compromised system you stopped using. As we see in this Google example that might not stop them, but that's an application security design issue not an inherent flaw in U2F / WebAuthn.
- modeless 6y agoFor particularly security-conscious users Google offers this: https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/ https://landing.google.com/advancedprotection/
- Wowfunhappy 6y agoI think this still has a grace period for trusted devices? Some of the FAQs at the bottom make it sound like you don't need to use the physical key every time you log in. Which, again, is probably reasonable for 99% of cases, but might be undesirable if you're doing investigative journalism on powerful state actors or some such.
- xfitm3 6y agoFrom the FAQ: > What happens if I lose all of my security keys? > If you still have access to a computer that is signed into your account, you can visit account.google.com and register replacement keys in place of the lost keys.
- staticassertion 6y agoI believe APP Suffers from the exact same issue, though APP is something I recently enabled anyway. I don't know of a way, even with full gsuite enterprise policy access, to prevent an attack where the attacker has an active session and your password. Some things you could do, but would not be full mitigations and likely just annoy an attacker in many cases (though that's often enough): * via GSuite, enforce 2FA * Enforce 2FA via hardware tokens/ APP * Context Aware Access that validates that the login is coming from a specific verified device that is provisioned via your GSuite / conforms to policy, that way the attacker can't just steal the session/password and log in from another device? Maybe? Really, the attack described requires like 3 different things to go wrong. I agree that there should be changes made to the system to improve this, but it's a rough model to protect a user when the attacker is sitting on the box they're logged into.
- DangitBobby 6y agoSeems like a reasonable default would ask for your second factor if you attempted to remove it or add another, as these are potentially account compromising events. And since these changes should very rarely happen, it's not exactly an onerous requirement for everyday users.
- sgk284 6y agoI suspect there is a common use case where someone’s phone gets stolen so they lose the 2nd factor and have to disable it or add a new device because they don’t have the backup codes either. As with all things security, there are trade offs.
- DennisP 6y agoAnd they actually do have an extra high security option, with warnings that if you're not careful you could lose access permanently.
- staticassertion 6y agoI actually think their existing policy is not so bad at all, but it should notify you. So: 1. Changing recovery emails should require 2FA 2. Changing any 2FA policy should email your recovery email It does, after all, still require a password. We're really talking about a very, very specific use case where the attacker has a lot of access to an existing session. I myself have had a phone break and rushed to a computer with a valid session so I could easily reset. It's really a huge UX win, and probably massively reduces 2FA burden/ support burden.
- coronadisaster 6y agoA reasonable default in a password-only case would be to ask you for you new and old password, so of course they should ask for your 2FA if you want to remove it, unless you think 2FA is useless.
- beshrkayali 6y agoNo. It's not. It's possible for people to forget themselves logged in on others machines, happens to the best of us. Requiring the user to reenter their password when changing it but not requiring 2FA when removing 2FA is silly.
- lordlimecat 6y agoLiterally no other online service (or their security engineers) have arrived at this conclusion. Changing password has always required knowledge of the password, and disabling 2fa has always required a 2fa check precisely to defeat token attacks.
- anon91 6y agoIt's even worse on iOS. You can reset your Apple account password using the 6 digits code of your iPhone even if 2FA is enabled.