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This is why direct taxation (16th Amendment) was a mistake. It allows the federal government to take away the citizens' money first, and then give it back to th

This is why direct taxation (16th Amendment) was a mistake. It allows the federal government to take away the citizens' money first, and then give it back to the states, with conditions. If the federal government had to collect from the states, then there would be more oversight and power for states to say "wait a minute, why are we giving you money and then begging to get it back". In theory, the result could be the same. Congress could still pass spending bills and give the money over with conditions. But in practice I think states would be in a more powerful negotiating position.

AnthonyMouse 6y ago
The real mistake was to make Senators elected rather than appointed by the states as they originally were. Representation of the general population is the purpose of the House, the Senate was meant to represent the states in the federal government.
- vkou 6y ago
  I am completely incapable of understanding this argument. The only interests states have are the interests of their constituents. States don't need representation, their people do - because states don't have interests, people who live in them have interests. It should be noted that the original ideal, at the time the national framework was drafted, was for the Senate to represent the interests of oligarchs, couched in the language of it serving as a representative of the interests of the states. In that respect, it's still doing a rather swell job.
  - AnthonyMouse 6y ago
    > The only interests states have are the interests of their constituents. So then it shouldn't matter, right? The constituents elect the state legislatures who represent their interests, one of those interests is having US Senators who represent their interests, so their elected representatives appoint those US Senators. If your theory is correct then this should have the exact same result as directly elected Senators, because the states don't have interests separate from those of their constituents. But it isn't, because elected officials do have their own interests. So then the question is, which process produces Senators that represent their constituents better? US Senators have a personal conflict of interest in expanding the scope of the federal government in excess of what's in the interest of their constituents, because the federal government is subject to their control, and they personally want to control more stuff. State legislatures have the opposite conflict -- they want more state control, for the same reasons. If you have directly elected Senators, there is no check on that conflict of interest and federal scope expands without bound. If you have Senators appointed by the state legislatures, these conflicts more or less cancel out. The US Senator still has the personal incentive to increase the scope of the federal government, but now they're directly accountable to the state legislatures with the opposite interest, and the result is closer to the true interest of the constituents. Meanwhile the House is still directly elected, which is a countervailing check on the power of "oligarchs" or what have you, because a federal law has to pass both.
    - vkou 6y ago
      Thank you for explaining this point. I disagree with it, but I see your motivation for it. > The US Senator still has the personal incentive to increase the scope of the federal government, but now they're directly accountable to the state legislatures with the opposite interest State legislatures are only interested in a decreased scope of federal government when the federal government is not giving them what they want, much like how the States Rights party only cares about states rights when those rights concern themselves with what their base wants. So, I don't think you're going to get that kind of check and balance. What you're probably going to get is similar to my original thesis - that it shouldn't matter... Except that it does. If you have the state legislatures appoint a truly terrible senator, there's no personal blowback against any of the members of the legislature - because responsibility is diffused. The office would become: 1. A perfect reward for connected party insiders, who, compared to the status quo, don't even have to win an election. 2. That would not be accountable to the public. 3. And where the people the public can hold accountable (The people making the appointments) are two steps removed from their behaviour. Consider, for the sake of argument, supreme court appointments. Consider that a man who turned out, after the fact, to be an absolute monster was appointed. Then consider, what kind of blowback would the senators who made the appointment be subjected to? They wouldn't be any. Just like how there's currently no blowback against Senate Republicans for the crazy train ride that Mitch McConnell takes them on. Everyone can shrug their shoulders, shirk responsibility, and blame the rest of the collective (preferably the guys holding safe seats) for the disastrous appointment. Consider, also, all the bellyaching that people on this forum have about overreach by appointed bureaucrats running federal agencies? You'd have this exact problem, except it would be even more difficult to hold them to task, and they'd have even more collective power than executive bureaucrats currently do - where they couldn't even be overruled by the legislature - because they are the legislature. That idea is frankly, terrifying.
      - AnthonyMouse 6y ago
        > State legislatures are only interested in a decreased scope of federal government when the federal government is not giving them what they want. Which is to say that they are interested in it at all other times, which is more than there is otherwise. Meanwhile, what is it that you expect them to want from them? The federal government taxes their citizens (which they can do themselves) and then sends the money back with strings attached. What value to the state of the strings? > If you have the state legislatures appoint a truly terrible senator, there's no personal blowback against any of the members of the legislature - because responsibility is diffused. The vote should be public so there would be blowback against everyone voting in favor of it. > Consider, for the sake of argument, supreme court appointments. Consider that a man who turned out, after the fact, to be an absolute monster was appointed. Then consider, how will the careers of the senators that approved the appointment would be impacted by such an appointment? This is exactly the sort of thing that hasn't happened to the Supreme Court in practice. > You've surely heard all the bellyaching that people on this forum have about overreach by appointed bureaucrats running federal agencies? You'd have this exact problem, except it would be even more difficult to hold them to task, and they'd have even more collective power, and you won't even have anyone to task for their behaviour. They would be held in check by the House which would have to sign onto every law they want to pass unlike appointed bureaucrats in the executive (which by itself solves nearly the entire problem), and if they're really so bad then most state legislatures are elected every two years rather than every four for the POTUS so the backlash comes quicker, and the problems you're describing don't even sound that serious or different from ordinary politics: > 1. A perfect reward for connected party inspiders. Sounds a lot like getting to be the party's candidate in a safe district, and doesn't inherently imply anything good or bad about what kind of Senator they'll be. > 2. That would not be accountable to the public This is a feature. It gives a veto to a body that isn't directly subject to populist fervor. > 3. And where the people the public can hold accountable are a step removed from that behaviour. In other words they are still ultimately accountable to the public.
  - jeffdavis 6y ago
    "Democracy" and "the will of the people" are abstractions, and pretty crude ones, at that. I'm not saying that we shouldn't have democracy, but we should acknowledge that it is far from perfect. As Churchill said, "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others." Democracy is also not a scale-free process. Very different dynamics play out in a democracy the size of a city versus a state versus the size of a nation. It's hard to explain briefly, but basically all of these separations of powers are designed to avoid some of the worst aspects of democracy. They happen to look less "fair" in an abstract sense, but it's more important to have some practical safeguards than abstract fairness. A lot of our most heated political battles are playing out at the federal level (and have been for a long time), and I think that's a consequence of the 16th and 17th Amendments. If some of these battles were playing out in the states, I think our society would be a lot less polarized.
- rayiner 6y ago
  I’m glad on HN people have opinions like “the direct election of senators was a mistake.” I mean, I agree, but I’m usually the only one in the room.
  - jeffdavis 6y ago
    The biggest flaw when reasoning about government is overestimating how well democracy works as a method of solving problems. If everyone agrees about the major stuff, and you just need to finally make a decision on what color to paint the bike shed, democracy is great. A decision gets made, enough people are happy, and you move on. But when you have real differences, you need a way to protect minorities against large coalitions of voters. Even if you aren't in a minority today, shifting politics (and divide-and-conquer politicians) will ensure that you are in a minority soon enough. And it's even worse when society is polarized, because the coalitions form too quickly and too strongly. But limiting the power of the majority is hard. The Constituion is genius because they recognized that and divded the power so many different ways. The protection of political minorities is much more important than the small amount of additional abstract fairness you get with direct elections.
    - joshuamorton 6y ago
      Have y'all forgotten the entire reason the 16th amendment was passed? It wasn't because of fairness, it was because the state legislatures couldn't agree on people to elect. And when they could there were concerns about corruption and seats being sold.
      - AnthonyMouse 6y ago
        So let the seats be empty. That will make the constituents mad and they'll vote out the incumbents and replace them with somebody who will appoint Senators. Or they won't. People get the government they deserve. And if there are "concerns about corruption" then investigate the corruption and put the perpetrators (if any) in prison.
        6y ago
- squiggleblaz 6y ago
  I think that was the inevitable consequence of terms for Senators. It is clear that a person appointed by a red governor cannot represent the blue governor who administers the purple state for several years starting six months later. State-appointed senators with fixed terms have little natural legitimacy; it is not a sustainable model. If you want the senate to represent the states, you need the German system - there, the Bundesrat (Federal Council) has as its members the premier of the state (and, depending on the state's size, some number of ministers). Its members and balance can change whenever there is a state election (which are not tied, US style, to federal elections). Now, while they will represent the interests of the state governments quite well, be aware of this - the premier has an interest in transferring power from the state governments since their power as a member of the federal upper house is greater than their power as a member of the state lower house. They can use their federal role to create an obligation for themselves as state ministers, and then tell state parliament "Oh, we have no choice; the federal government has said so. Please fall in line with this policy that I want and you do not want." The paliamentary system is repugnant to the American sense of the separation of powers. But since American separation of powers prefers to give legislative power to the executive, it's less obvious that making governors members of the Senate is repugnant. This would multiply the problems above. Perhaps having a recallable delegate who is effectively a member of the state cabinet without portfolio would be palatable; but still, such a delegate would be entirely at the mercy of the state governor (or it would work), and we then would still see the benefits to the state governor of creating legislative obligations that state congress still has to fulfil. To me, it seems that the Australian senate does a good job of representing the people of each State. Since the interests of States can be said to be the interests of the people of each State (rather than the interests of the State governments) it therefore discharges its responsibilities adequately. The key here is in having many five or members per state elected at once using a proportional method like STV optimised for small electorate magnitudes. Since the majority of any state will be made up of a roughly equal number of blues and reds it encourages them to work together at the expense of the small number of extremists or against each other with centrists and sometimes fringe members. Constantly changing coalitions (per bill) mean negotiation skills become important. But how adaptable it is to a federation of 50 states - I don't know.
  - 6y ago
- dragonwriter 6y ago
  > The real mistake was to make Senators elected rather than appointed by the states as they originally were. This sentence can be corrected by deleting every word after “Senators”.
- 8note 6y ago
  The only case where elections aren't accurate for this is if the state government is non democratic. The state is just a bunch of people -- representation of the state is covered by how many representatives are sent per state. To my knowledge, the general population of the colonies and so on don't get representation in the Senate, only people that live in states
adrianN 6y ago
If you didn't have a fairly strong federal government, the US would become like the EU, basically unable to enact change in any even slightly controversial topic.
- icelancer 6y ago
  This was one of the original anti-federalist arguments that has somehow hundreds of years later become adopted by leftists in the United States.
  - adrianN 6y ago
    I didn't know that. I live in the EU and frequently get upset because some country or other vetoes important change.
  - squiggleblaz 6y ago
    I'm pretty sure you missed the unwritten /s in the previous post.
    - icelancer 6y ago
      Apparently not, OP followed up.
somethingwitty1 6y ago
Though I'm not necessarily disagreeing, eliminating direct taxation is more complex than just giving oversight to states. If a state can say, "no, not giving you money unless we get it back", it becomes a lot harder for the country to function. Money from Connecticut helps pay for numerous programs in other states. At a high-level, we like to say that states would make the right decisions, but would they? Or would Connecticut say they'd rather have the money to sustain their state better? Of course, is the federal government making the right decisions?
- squiggleblaz 6y ago
  I don't think the alternative is voluntary donations by states to the federal government vs direct taxation of individuals, but compulsory contributions from the states to the federal government. The reason it would have a different outcome is because in a debate between 51 people, the chair doesn't have that much more power than the individuals. The federal government might be agree to set contributions according to fixed dollar values that the states can watch inflate down to a more palatable value, or they might agree to ignore certain sources of wealth in their calculations. Discussions and disagreements will take on a very different flavor compared to the discussions and disagreements between a third of a billion players. It is not apparent to me why this should result in an end to regulation of drugs as this subthread seems to imply it should. States can be just as interested in preventing drug use as the federal government - even more interested.
  - fragmede 6y ago
    The drug regulation question isn't theoretical. There's currently a difference of opinion between more than half of the states, compared to the Federal government, on whether or not to consider cannabis a illicit substance with no legitimate use. I don't know that an end to regulation of all drugs is in order, but if a majority of states (which make up the Federal government) believe cannabis has legitimate use, why then, is it still Federally illegal?
  - 8note 6y ago
    Is there actually a difference between asking politely for money from the states and "requiring" it? When a state doesn't pay up, what's the union government going to do?

AnthonyMouse 6y ago

The real mistake was to make Senators elected rather than appointed by the states as they originally were. Representation of the general population is the purpose of the House, the Senate was meant to represent the states in the federal government.

vkou 6y ago
I am completely incapable of understanding this argument. The only interests states have are the interests of their constituents. States don't need representation, their people do - because states don't have interests, people who live in them have interests. It should be noted that the original ideal, at the time the national framework was drafted, was for the Senate to represent the interests of oligarchs, couched in the language of it serving as a representative of the interests of the states. In that respect, it's still doing a rather swell job.
- AnthonyMouse 6y ago
  > The only interests states have are the interests of their constituents. So then it shouldn't matter, right? The constituents elect the state legislatures who represent their interests, one of those interests is having US Senators who represent their interests, so their elected representatives appoint those US Senators. If your theory is correct then this should have the exact same result as directly elected Senators, because the states don't have interests separate from those of their constituents. But it isn't, because elected officials do have their own interests. So then the question is, which process produces Senators that represent their constituents better? US Senators have a personal conflict of interest in expanding the scope of the federal government in excess of what's in the interest of their constituents, because the federal government is subject to their control, and they personally want to control more stuff. State legislatures have the opposite conflict -- they want more state control, for the same reasons. If you have directly elected Senators, there is no check on that conflict of interest and federal scope expands without bound. If you have Senators appointed by the state legislatures, these conflicts more or less cancel out. The US Senator still has the personal incentive to increase the scope of the federal government, but now they're directly accountable to the state legislatures with the opposite interest, and the result is closer to the true interest of the constituents. Meanwhile the House is still directly elected, which is a countervailing check on the power of "oligarchs" or what have you, because a federal law has to pass both.
  - vkou 6y ago
    Thank you for explaining this point. I disagree with it, but I see your motivation for it. > The US Senator still has the personal incentive to increase the scope of the federal government, but now they're directly accountable to the state legislatures with the opposite interest State legislatures are only interested in a decreased scope of federal government when the federal government is not giving them what they want, much like how the States Rights party only cares about states rights when those rights concern themselves with what their base wants. So, I don't think you're going to get that kind of check and balance. What you're probably going to get is similar to my original thesis - that it shouldn't matter... Except that it does. If you have the state legislatures appoint a truly terrible senator, there's no personal blowback against any of the members of the legislature - because responsibility is diffused. The office would become: 1. A perfect reward for connected party insiders, who, compared to the status quo, don't even have to win an election. 2. That would not be accountable to the public. 3. And where the people the public can hold accountable (The people making the appointments) are two steps removed from their behaviour. Consider, for the sake of argument, supreme court appointments. Consider that a man who turned out, after the fact, to be an absolute monster was appointed. Then consider, what kind of blowback would the senators who made the appointment be subjected to? They wouldn't be any. Just like how there's currently no blowback against Senate Republicans for the crazy train ride that Mitch McConnell takes them on. Everyone can shrug their shoulders, shirk responsibility, and blame the rest of the collective (preferably the guys holding safe seats) for the disastrous appointment. Consider, also, all the bellyaching that people on this forum have about overreach by appointed bureaucrats running federal agencies? You'd have this exact problem, except it would be even more difficult to hold them to task, and they'd have even more collective power than executive bureaucrats currently do - where they couldn't even be overruled by the legislature - because they are the legislature. That idea is frankly, terrifying.
    - AnthonyMouse 6y ago
      > State legislatures are only interested in a decreased scope of federal government when the federal government is not giving them what they want. Which is to say that they are interested in it at all other times, which is more than there is otherwise. Meanwhile, what is it that you expect them to want from them? The federal government taxes their citizens (which they can do themselves) and then sends the money back with strings attached. What value to the state of the strings? > If you have the state legislatures appoint a truly terrible senator, there's no personal blowback against any of the members of the legislature - because responsibility is diffused. The vote should be public so there would be blowback against everyone voting in favor of it. > Consider, for the sake of argument, supreme court appointments. Consider that a man who turned out, after the fact, to be an absolute monster was appointed. Then consider, how will the careers of the senators that approved the appointment would be impacted by such an appointment? This is exactly the sort of thing that hasn't happened to the Supreme Court in practice. > You've surely heard all the bellyaching that people on this forum have about overreach by appointed bureaucrats running federal agencies? You'd have this exact problem, except it would be even more difficult to hold them to task, and they'd have even more collective power, and you won't even have anyone to task for their behaviour. They would be held in check by the House which would have to sign onto every law they want to pass unlike appointed bureaucrats in the executive (which by itself solves nearly the entire problem), and if they're really so bad then most state legislatures are elected every two years rather than every four for the POTUS so the backlash comes quicker, and the problems you're describing don't even sound that serious or different from ordinary politics: > 1. A perfect reward for connected party inspiders. Sounds a lot like getting to be the party's candidate in a safe district, and doesn't inherently imply anything good or bad about what kind of Senator they'll be. > 2. That would not be accountable to the public This is a feature. It gives a veto to a body that isn't directly subject to populist fervor. > 3. And where the people the public can hold accountable are a step removed from that behaviour. In other words they are still ultimately accountable to the public.
- jeffdavis 6y ago
  "Democracy" and "the will of the people" are abstractions, and pretty crude ones, at that. I'm not saying that we shouldn't have democracy, but we should acknowledge that it is far from perfect. As Churchill said, "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others." Democracy is also not a scale-free process. Very different dynamics play out in a democracy the size of a city versus a state versus the size of a nation. It's hard to explain briefly, but basically all of these separations of powers are designed to avoid some of the worst aspects of democracy. They happen to look less "fair" in an abstract sense, but it's more important to have some practical safeguards than abstract fairness. A lot of our most heated political battles are playing out at the federal level (and have been for a long time), and I think that's a consequence of the 16th and 17th Amendments. If some of these battles were playing out in the states, I think our society would be a lot less polarized.
rayiner 6y ago
I’m glad on HN people have opinions like “the direct election of senators was a mistake.” I mean, I agree, but I’m usually the only one in the room.
- jeffdavis 6y ago
  The biggest flaw when reasoning about government is overestimating how well democracy works as a method of solving problems. If everyone agrees about the major stuff, and you just need to finally make a decision on what color to paint the bike shed, democracy is great. A decision gets made, enough people are happy, and you move on. But when you have real differences, you need a way to protect minorities against large coalitions of voters. Even if you aren't in a minority today, shifting politics (and divide-and-conquer politicians) will ensure that you are in a minority soon enough. And it's even worse when society is polarized, because the coalitions form too quickly and too strongly. But limiting the power of the majority is hard. The Constituion is genius because they recognized that and divded the power so many different ways. The protection of political minorities is much more important than the small amount of additional abstract fairness you get with direct elections.
  - joshuamorton 6y ago
    Have y'all forgotten the entire reason the 16th amendment was passed? It wasn't because of fairness, it was because the state legislatures couldn't agree on people to elect. And when they could there were concerns about corruption and seats being sold.
    - AnthonyMouse 6y ago
      So let the seats be empty. That will make the constituents mad and they'll vote out the incumbents and replace them with somebody who will appoint Senators. Or they won't. People get the government they deserve. And if there are "concerns about corruption" then investigate the corruption and put the perpetrators (if any) in prison.
      - 6y ago
squiggleblaz 6y ago
I think that was the inevitable consequence of terms for Senators. It is clear that a person appointed by a red governor cannot represent the blue governor who administers the purple state for several years starting six months later. State-appointed senators with fixed terms have little natural legitimacy; it is not a sustainable model. If you want the senate to represent the states, you need the German system - there, the Bundesrat (Federal Council) has as its members the premier of the state (and, depending on the state's size, some number of ministers). Its members and balance can change whenever there is a state election (which are not tied, US style, to federal elections). Now, while they will represent the interests of the state governments quite well, be aware of this - the premier has an interest in transferring power from the state governments since their power as a member of the federal upper house is greater than their power as a member of the state lower house. They can use their federal role to create an obligation for themselves as state ministers, and then tell state parliament "Oh, we have no choice; the federal government has said so. Please fall in line with this policy that I want and you do not want." The paliamentary system is repugnant to the American sense of the separation of powers. But since American separation of powers prefers to give legislative power to the executive, it's less obvious that making governors members of the Senate is repugnant. This would multiply the problems above. Perhaps having a recallable delegate who is effectively a member of the state cabinet without portfolio would be palatable; but still, such a delegate would be entirely at the mercy of the state governor (or it would work), and we then would still see the benefits to the state governor of creating legislative obligations that state congress still has to fulfil. To me, it seems that the Australian senate does a good job of representing the people of each State. Since the interests of States can be said to be the interests of the people of each State (rather than the interests of the State governments) it therefore discharges its responsibilities adequately. The key here is in having many five or members per state elected at once using a proportional method like STV optimised for small electorate magnitudes. Since the majority of any state will be made up of a roughly equal number of blues and reds it encourages them to work together at the expense of the small number of extremists or against each other with centrists and sometimes fringe members. Constantly changing coalitions (per bill) mean negotiation skills become important. But how adaptable it is to a federation of 50 states - I don't know.
- 6y ago
dragonwriter 6y ago
> The real mistake was to make Senators elected rather than appointed by the states as they originally were. This sentence can be corrected by deleting every word after “Senators”.
8note 6y ago
The only case where elections aren't accurate for this is if the state government is non democratic. The state is just a bunch of people -- representation of the state is covered by how many representatives are sent per state. To my knowledge, the general population of the colonies and so on don't get representation in the Senate, only people that live in states

adrianN 6y ago

If you didn't have a fairly strong federal government, the US would become like the EU, basically unable to enact change in any even slightly controversial topic.

icelancer 6y ago
This was one of the original anti-federalist arguments that has somehow hundreds of years later become adopted by leftists in the United States.
- adrianN 6y ago
  I didn't know that. I live in the EU and frequently get upset because some country or other vetoes important change.
- squiggleblaz 6y ago
  I'm pretty sure you missed the unwritten /s in the previous post.
  - icelancer 6y ago
    Apparently not, OP followed up.

somethingwitty1 6y ago

Though I'm not necessarily disagreeing, eliminating direct taxation is more complex than just giving oversight to states. If a state can say, "no, not giving you money unless we get it back", it becomes a lot harder for the country to function. Money from Connecticut helps pay for numerous programs in other states. At a high-level, we like to say that states would make the right decisions, but would they? Or would Connecticut say they'd rather have the money to sustain their state better? Of course, is the federal government making the right decisions?

squiggleblaz 6y ago
I don't think the alternative is voluntary donations by states to the federal government vs direct taxation of individuals, but compulsory contributions from the states to the federal government. The reason it would have a different outcome is because in a debate between 51 people, the chair doesn't have that much more power than the individuals. The federal government might be agree to set contributions according to fixed dollar values that the states can watch inflate down to a more palatable value, or they might agree to ignore certain sources of wealth in their calculations. Discussions and disagreements will take on a very different flavor compared to the discussions and disagreements between a third of a billion players. It is not apparent to me why this should result in an end to regulation of drugs as this subthread seems to imply it should. States can be just as interested in preventing drug use as the federal government - even more interested.
- fragmede 6y ago
  The drug regulation question isn't theoretical. There's currently a difference of opinion between more than half of the states, compared to the Federal government, on whether or not to consider cannabis a illicit substance with no legitimate use. I don't know that an end to regulation of all drugs is in order, but if a majority of states (which make up the Federal government) believe cannabis has legitimate use, why then, is it still Federally illegal?
- 8note 6y ago
  Is there actually a difference between asking politely for money from the states and "requiring" it? When a state doesn't pay up, what's the union government going to do?