4 ms·
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:de https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:de This shows 1,648 relays potentially having th
by Forbo 6y ago
https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:de https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html#search/country:de
This shows 1,648 relays potentially having their traffic monitored under this law. Out of 6,432 relays, that makes up more than 25% of all Tor relays.
Unfortunately, Tor's design doesn't really go far enough in protecting against adversaries with large swaths of visibility. Perhaps it's time for people to begin shifting to I2P, or some other overlay network with more resilience against these types of adversaries.
Edit: This page gives you a nice visual representation of how much that consists of. Germany is the big one. https://metrics.torproject.org/bubbles.html#country https://metrics.torproject.org/bubbles.html#country
- hkt 6y agoTor might not protect anonymity effectively in that case, but in the case given it would still offer protection because of the way the relay circuits are designed.
- Forbo 6y agoUnless it's an exit node. 251 of 1,249 exit nodes reside in Germany, or roughly 20%. Exit nodes aren't supposed to modify traffic, so if the compromise is happening upon leaving the exit node en route to whatever destination, that would still trickle back through all the hops.
- hkt 6y agoTrue. I was thinking about recent initiatives like https://blog.torproject.org/more-onions-porfavor https://blog.torproject.org/more-onions-porfavor where security is enhanced by having people put their sites on tor. This is more the i2p model though.
- tenebrisalietum 6y agoThis is why you still use TLS/HTTPS with tor.