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I am not an expert but as far as I understand it's harder to do correlation attacks when you're able to monitor network traffic when communication stays inside
by t0astbread 6y ago
I am not an expert but as far as I understand it's harder to do correlation attacks when you're able to monitor network traffic when communication stays inside the Tor network. Additionally, you're replacing (or extending) CAs with Tor's public key cryptography for authentication and encryption.
Computerphile did an interesting video series on this!
- moonchild 6y ago> replacing (or extending) CAs with Tor's public key cryptography Which is good because CAs are useless; they're complete overhead. Back when EV certificates meant something, they were marginally useful, but at this point, we might as well just switch to a TXT record that validates domain ownership. (Obviously, that doesn't protect against DNS MITM attacks, but that's a separate issue.)
- t0astbread 6y agoOh you mean storing some data to cryptographically verify that a particular server is associated with a domain? If I'm not mistaken, that's what .onion addresses are. I wonder if anyone has tried putting .onion addresses into DNS and have clients treat them like address records...