I like the ideas presented in here. Summary of what I think the main points are: - certificate authorities are not trustworthy currently. It is deceptive and

I like the ideas presented in here. Summary of what I think the main points are: - certificate authorities are not trustworthy currently. It is deceptive and potentially dangerous to pretend that they are. - the solution is actually a shift in what we think security is: rather than saying "this site is trustworthy" or "this site is not", we consider multiple factors to decide whether it is likely to be trustworthy or not. My thoughts: I think the second point is an excellent idea, and I would take it farther by presenting that information to the user. It would be great if there were a little meter in my URL bar that was more full (or changed color, or whatever) when a site used more secure practices. It would be even better if I could click on that meter and get a list of things the site did, with a note by each one saying "a trustworthy site would do this" or "a trustworthy site would probably not do that". This would have the benefit of making the security model transparent to the user, which would let them make better decisions. It would also allow for experimentation with new security ideas, if we allow many possible factors and not expect each site to use all of them. You could easily add a factor for sneakernet key-signing, for instance - if you happen to have a cert directly from the company (i.e. your bank gave you a USB key), your browser could take that into account. Edit: it would also allow for a gradual transition from the old model. You could make having a CA-signed key a factor. It just wouldn't be the only factor.