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I've said this before on similar posts, but I think most clipboard "snooping" is not nefarious, it's boneheaded. Developers get a requirement like "if the user
by kevsim 6y ago
I've said this before on similar posts, but I think most clipboard "snooping" is not nefarious, it's boneheaded. Developers get a requirement like "if the user has a URL in their clip board, give them an option to share it with a single click". Then they do a poor job actually implementing this code by sticking it in some delegate the fires way more often than they think and all of a sudden they're "snooping". Not saying there aren't bad actors, just saying we're maybe blowing it out of proportion.
And kudos to Apple for making this stuff more obvious in iOS 14.
- asplake 6y agoAnd I’ll again ask a question that was misunderstood (my fault): is there a missing API for something common, useful, non-boneheaded and clearly better from a privacy perspective?
- bluesign 6y agoFor example you can check if clipboard has an URL, and if exists you can use it. Checking part would not trigger privacy alert. Actually it is documented way of doing this.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- georgespencer 6y agoOP here! I believe Apple is badly letting its users down. The interaction and security paradigms on iOS being better and different to macOS is something Apple invests heavily in marketing. I'm a technically proficient user, but I didn't know that my iOS clipboard was an open book for each app. Basically: I believe that the average user has an increased expectation of privacy on iOS, and Apple does a lot to cultivate that expectation. My intuitive belief in how it worked (which turned out to be wrong) is probably close to the system I now advocate for Apple to reform to: 0. Apps cannot access clipboard contents by default, 1. UIPasteboard should be pollable for whether the clipboard has contents on it or not, 2. UIPasteboard should be able to return the type of object on the clipboard so that apps don't incorrectly show e.g. an active "Paste" button when the user has a text input field selected and an image is stored on the clipboard, 3. Apps should only be allowed to access the contents of the clipboard when a user invokes a specific action to paste. 4. Apps which wish to prefetch URLs or other predictable strings (e.g. feed-readers and podcast apps) should present a regex-type pattern for the type of string they expect to be on the clipboard, and then Apple should display the URL in the system keyboard (where the predictive text field / SMS code fetch goes atm). It's crazy to me that Apple is being applauded for sending privacy alerts for a behaviour they have the power to stop.
- jshier 6y ago1. It does. numberOfItems will tell you how many items are on the pasteboard. 2. It does. contains(pasteboardTypes: [String]) will tell you whether the pasteboard contains items of particular types. 3. Okay, but that's a huge shift from the status quo and breaks quite a few app workflows, especially conveniences the user expects. 4. Yes, this would be the biggest improvement to fix the disruption caused by 3. Edit: But even with 4, automatic access would still trigger the new iOS 14 warning, unless Apple turns that off if you've queried for a particular pattern. I don't see that happening. I'm guessing devs will just provide their own approval for this feature so the users aren't surprised when they see the pasteboard access warning.
- georgespencer 6y agoSorry if I wasn't clear: this should be the ONLY way clipboard contents can be accessed. Saying "it does" work like this tells half the story: developers can do these sensible things to check out the clipboard in a privacy-conscious way, but if apps can choose to access it without doing those things, it's not working as a user might expect it to. Can you think of any conveniences which are broken by step 3? It's probably just my basic workflows, but I _never_ see any prefetching of clipboard contents with the exception of URLs.
- GeekyBear 6y agoEvery OS that I am aware of gives the foreground app unfettered access to the clipboard. Is anyone aware of any counter example? Given that Android has even allowed background applications to constantly monitor the contents of the clipboard, I don't feel particularly let down by Apple giving me a way to see which apps are accessing the contents of the clipboard without any user interaction on my part.
- georgespencer 6y ago> Every OS that I am aware of gives the foreground app unfettered access to the clipboard. The point is not whether or not other OSes do this. The point is: 1. At least some iPhone users would be surprised that Apple allows this on iOS given the emphasis Apple places on privacy. 2. Apple has been aware that apps are abusing this privilege for some time -- at least as long as it took them to develop the new alert to apps abusing the privilege, maybe longer. 3. Apple has seemingly continued to approve apps which are spying on users. 4. I don't believe Apple can make any promises that bad actors have not been able to clandestinely transmit the contents of users' clipboards to their own servers. Many users, including me, outsource their infosec to Apple because they champion privacy, end-to-end encryption, and things like notifications for apps which are monitoring location. But there is no good reason for an app like TikTok or LinkedIn to be constantly making a copy of the contents of your clipboard, and Apple is aware that they have been doing it. I don't dispute that unfettered access to the clipboard is an attractive feature on many devices (not to mention hard to police on macOS given the prevalence of non-App Store apps), but on iOS expectations and messaging are very significantly different. The second paragraph on Apple's app store review webpage: > We take responsibility for ensuring that apps are held to a high standard for privacy, security, and content because nothing is more important than maintaining the trust of our users. Do you consider their actions here -- knowingly approving apps to the store which could, without permission, transmit your clipboard contents anywhere they want -- to be in keeping with that promise?