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> A technical solution could be to add a strict CSP policy but in general the problem is broader and applies to a lot of banks. The Web is broken, and CORS/CSP
by baybal2 6y ago
> A technical solution could be to add a strict CSP policy but in general the problem is broader and applies to a lot of banks.
The Web is broken, and CORS/CSP headers will only be able to fix only some individual cases, of a bigger, currently unfixable design problem.
The tons of random JS APIs brought into the browser without a any real critical review are making the initial design of scripts on the web being inherently secure, to them not being so.
The state of things needs to be brought back to the point where arbitrary JS simply cannot mess up your browser by design, and when you can load resources from everywhere safely regardless of tricky settings of now 10+ CSP related headers.
Or alternatively, there needs to be a solution to completely shut down those APIs, any "advanced" functionality to load 3rd party resources, reinforced by cryptohashes, and signature checks to verify loaded resources.
- secondcoming 6y agoWASM needs to be killed with fire before it's too late.
- baybal2 6y agoFully agreed!
- jfengel 6y agoWhy? I don't know much about WASM, but surely it is better than the cobbled together monstrosity that is JavaScript.
- bioipbiop 6y agoAll the insecurity of js, but with the opaqueness of assembly.
- yellowapple 6y agoHard disagree. WASM is as good an opportunity as any to enforce better security habits, and indeed seems to be designed specifically with browser security/sandboxing in mind. "Killing" WASM does precisely nothing to fix the status quo around JS insecurity.
- secondcoming 6y agoYes, so were Java and applets. And we all know what happened there.
- nightowl_games 6y agoHard disagree. WebASM and emscripten is the way away from JavaScript, into a better future where code is more cross platform and more performant.
- kevin_thibedeau 6y agoNo bank should ever use third party resources. Problem solved.
- baybal2 6y agoImagine a situation where somebody manages to inject own script into bank's page not through employee's negligence, but through some exploit. You would still have an issue where there is simply no functionality to killswitch all those novel APIs of arguable safety, and tell the browser to shut down any script not explicitly listed as allowed on the site.
- simonw 6y ago"tell the browser to shut down any script not explicitly listed as allowed on the site" Isn't that what CSP headers are for?
- baybal2 6y agoCSP has been an inconsistent, ever growing standard, with a history of implementation breakages. I think only CSP 3.0, and a long WIP safe types standard have approached the level of being actually useful. I saw websites with a screen long CSP header to work around standard's inconsistencies like frame-src/child-src, and form redirects. I think it's only a matter of time when somebody will find a chink in that weak armour. The lack of sane by-default policy makes you vulnerable the moment attacker finds a way to redirect a browser to a non-CSP protected page on your domain. Mitigations exist, but... many buts. Reflection attacks, when attacker injects your own hashed scripts, and data exfiltrating css on pages where they shouldn't be are still possible in various scenarios unless you inline all scripts, and set CSP per every URL. Other data exfiltration sources, and injection sinks keep being found few times a year. CSP is a paint over rust.
- jefftk 6y ago> The state of things needs to be brought back to the point where arbitrary JS simply cannot mess up your browser by design What do you imagine your more restricted JavaScript being permitted to do, where it is safe to run on a banking website?
- bostik 6y agoThe same thing the language was originally intended for? Namely, the <marquee> content.