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While I’d take approval voting over FPTP, to me it exacerbates the issue of voting being highly tactical. Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popul

While I’d take approval voting over FPTP, to me it exacerbates the issue of voting being highly tactical. Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popular than my favorite candidate lowers the chance my favorite candidate wins. If there’s someone I believe to be an existential threat to the country on the ballot, my best choice might be to check everyone other than them even if that means checking the box of someone I dislike. Essentially, you again have to choose how much you care about voting for your favorite option vs voting against your least favorite option. If I truly did check the box for anyone I was okay with being President then approval voting would be okay, but that would never be the right way to vote on the ballot given my preferences. In this way I prefer IRV, despite it’s shortcomings. That all said, full ranking systems are definitely the superior option, and I’d certainly take approval over our current state.

ClayShentrup 6y ago
> it exacerbates the issue of voting being highly tactical. No. Approval voting has been extensively studied by game theory experts like NYU political science professor Steven Brams, and found to be one of the most resistant to tactical voting. Computer simulations show it performing exceptionally well even with highly strategic voters. https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7 https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7 There's even a mathematical theorem (proof) that, given plausible strategic behavior by voters, approval voting always elects a beats-all "Condorcet winner" when one exists. This is mild (some would say GOOD) reaction to strategy. https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW > Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popular than my favorite candidate lowers the chance my favorite candidate wins. Yes, this is beneficial not harmful. The alternative is that the voting method must ignore all preference data about the relative support of X vs. Y as long as the voter prefers X to Y. That causes big problems. https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 It is precisely why ranked voting methods like Instant Runoff Voting are so vulnerable to tactics. If I prefer the Green, my general best strategy is to tactically rank the Democrat in 1st place, thus "burying" the Green and making the mere appearance of un-electability a self-fulfilling prophecy. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD The major moral of voting theory is to AVOID RANKED VOTING METHODS, favoring RATED voting methods like score voting, STAR voting, and approval voting. Here's a presentation I gave in 2015 to the Colorado League of Women Voters explaining more. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488 I would also recommend the 2008 book "Gaming the Vote". Full disclosure: I'm in it.

ClayShentrup 6y ago

> it exacerbates the issue of voting being highly tactical. No. Approval voting has been extensively studied by game theory experts like NYU political science professor Steven Brams, and found to be one of the most resistant to tactical voting. Computer simulations show it performing exceptionally well even with highly strategic voters. https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7 https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7 There's even a mathematical theorem (proof) that, given plausible strategic behavior by voters, approval voting always elects a beats-all "Condorcet winner" when one exists. This is mild (some would say GOOD) reaction to strategy. https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW > Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popular than my favorite candidate lowers the chance my favorite candidate wins. Yes, this is beneficial not harmful. The alternative is that the voting method must ignore all preference data about the relative support of X vs. Y as long as the voter prefers X to Y. That causes big problems. https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 It is precisely why ranked voting methods like Instant Runoff Voting are so vulnerable to tactics. If I prefer the Green, my general best strategy is to tactically rank the Democrat in 1st place, thus "burying" the Green and making the mere appearance of un-electability a self-fulfilling prophecy. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD The major moral of voting theory is to AVOID RANKED VOTING METHODS, favoring RATED voting methods like score voting, STAR voting, and approval voting. Here's a presentation I gave in 2015 to the Colorado League of Women Voters explaining more. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488 I would also recommend the 2008 book "Gaming the Vote". Full disclosure: I'm in it.