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I think that's probably the case. Nonetheless, I would claim "lesser evilism" would be greatly reduced due to RCV (and Approval) being better at capturing prefe

I think that's probably the case. Nonetheless, I would claim "lesser evilism" would be greatly reduced due to RCV (and Approval) being better at capturing preferences: you get to vote for your favorite option, and against your least favorite option. I think there's a strong argument that RCV/Approval would shift the incentives and game-theoretic landscape away from polarization and turnout, and towards big-tent coalition building, to appeal to the greatest quantity of left, right, center, and independent. That does mean compromise, and likely policy concessions; but i think that would be a huge improvement over (a) taking turns at obstructionism, and (b) a de-facto one-party system regarding corporate interests, the military-industrial complex, etc.

dllthomas 6y ago
Yeah, my comment was intended narrowly - in no way was I endorsing FPTP. :)
JoshTriplett 6y ago
> would be greatly reduced due to RCV (and Approval) being better at capturing preferences The problem is that IRV/RCV doesn't capture your preferences, because it ignores all your preferences except your top choice, until your top choice is eliminated. IRV is reasonably good at making sure that third-parties can't prevent first-parties from being elected, but very bad at actually allowing third parties to actually be elected even if they have widespread approval. Approval is a good compromise, and fully ranked systems (e.g. Condorcet) would be even better but much harder to enact. I would happily support universal adoption of Approval.
- NineStarPoint 6y ago
  While I’d take approval voting over FPTP, to me it exacerbates the issue of voting being highly tactical. Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popular than my favorite candidate lowers the chance my favorite candidate wins. If there’s someone I believe to be an existential threat to the country on the ballot, my best choice might be to check everyone other than them even if that means checking the box of someone I dislike. Essentially, you again have to choose how much you care about voting for your favorite option vs voting against your least favorite option. If I truly did check the box for anyone I was okay with being President then approval voting would be okay, but that would never be the right way to vote on the ballot given my preferences. In this way I prefer IRV, despite it’s shortcomings. That all said, full ranking systems are definitely the superior option, and I’d certainly take approval over our current state.
  - ClayShentrup 6y ago
    > it exacerbates the issue of voting being highly tactical. No. Approval voting has been extensively studied by game theory experts like NYU political science professor Steven Brams, and found to be one of the most resistant to tactical voting. Computer simulations show it performing exceptionally well even with highly strategic voters. https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7 https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7 There's even a mathematical theorem (proof) that, given plausible strategic behavior by voters, approval voting always elects a beats-all "Condorcet winner" when one exists. This is mild (some would say GOOD) reaction to strategy. https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW > Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popular than my favorite candidate lowers the chance my favorite candidate wins. Yes, this is beneficial not harmful. The alternative is that the voting method must ignore all preference data about the relative support of X vs. Y as long as the voter prefers X to Y. That causes big problems. https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 It is precisely why ranked voting methods like Instant Runoff Voting are so vulnerable to tactics. If I prefer the Green, my general best strategy is to tactically rank the Democrat in 1st place, thus "burying" the Green and making the mere appearance of un-electability a self-fulfilling prophecy. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD The major moral of voting theory is to AVOID RANKED VOTING METHODS, favoring RATED voting methods like score voting, STAR voting, and approval voting. Here's a presentation I gave in 2015 to the Colorado League of Women Voters explaining more. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488 I would also recommend the 2008 book "Gaming the Vote". Full disclosure: I'm in it.
- ClayShentrup 6y ago
  Here's a good example of ignoring preferences. scorevoting.net/IrvIgnoreExample.html I would disagree about Condorcet. Score voting and variants, such as STAR voting and approval voting, are vastly simpler than any ranked method, and perform better in voter satisfaction efficiency calculations, and plausibly make better Condorcet methods than real Condorcet methods. https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW The biggest moral of social choice theory is: avoid ranked voting methods.
jcranmer 6y ago
> I think there's a strong argument that RCV/Approval would shift the incentives and game-theoretic landscape away from polarization and turnout, and towards big-tent coalition building, to appeal to the greatest quantity of left, right, center, and independent. I think most people wildly overestimate the popular appeal for compromise. Only about 20% of the population would support an opposite-side moderate over a near-side extremist. A true centrist party is doomed to lose in any system that knocks out unviable candidates, since it's the first choice of almost nobody.
- IggleSniggle 6y ago
  It's almost as if you didn't even imagine what a "no 'opposite side' per se" would even look like. I think there's a LOT more room for nuance than "this" or "that" even among the ignorant and/or unengaged. Just look at sports-team divides in the US for evidence.
  - SenoraRaton 6y ago
    Except there ARE two sides. Capital controlled means of production, and worker owned means of production. These two systems are diametrically opposed to each other. This just comes across as enlightened centrism. I am vehemently opposed to the economic system of capitalism, and I think that it stands in opposition to the very concept of democracy. How am I supposed to see the capitalist as "the same side"?
    - tptacek 6y ago
      Workers owning the means of production is not in fact one of the major factions in US politics, regardless of how much Twitter leftists and Republicans would like you to believe that.

dllthomas 6y ago

Yeah, my comment was intended narrowly - in no way was I endorsing FPTP. :)

JoshTriplett 6y ago

> would be greatly reduced due to RCV (and Approval) being better at capturing preferences The problem is that IRV/RCV doesn't capture your preferences, because it ignores all your preferences except your top choice, until your top choice is eliminated. IRV is reasonably good at making sure that third-parties can't prevent first-parties from being elected, but very bad at actually allowing third parties to actually be elected even if they have widespread approval. Approval is a good compromise, and fully ranked systems (e.g. Condorcet) would be even better but much harder to enact. I would happily support universal adoption of Approval.

NineStarPoint 6y ago
While I’d take approval voting over FPTP, to me it exacerbates the issue of voting being highly tactical. Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popular than my favorite candidate lowers the chance my favorite candidate wins. If there’s someone I believe to be an existential threat to the country on the ballot, my best choice might be to check everyone other than them even if that means checking the box of someone I dislike. Essentially, you again have to choose how much you care about voting for your favorite option vs voting against your least favorite option. If I truly did check the box for anyone I was okay with being President then approval voting would be okay, but that would never be the right way to vote on the ballot given my preferences. In this way I prefer IRV, despite it’s shortcomings. That all said, full ranking systems are definitely the superior option, and I’d certainly take approval over our current state.
- ClayShentrup 6y ago
  > it exacerbates the issue of voting being highly tactical. No. Approval voting has been extensively studied by game theory experts like NYU political science professor Steven Brams, and found to be one of the most resistant to tactical voting. Computer simulations show it performing exceptionally well even with highly strategic voters. https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html https://www.rangevoting.org/BayRegsFig.html https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7 https://rpubs.com/Jameson-Quinn/vse7 There's even a mathematical theorem (proof) that, given plausible strategic behavior by voters, approval voting always elects a beats-all "Condorcet winner" when one exists. This is mild (some would say GOOD) reaction to strategy. https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW > Checking approve on someone I believe to be more popular than my favorite candidate lowers the chance my favorite candidate wins. Yes, this is beneficial not harmful. The alternative is that the voting method must ignore all preference data about the relative support of X vs. Y as long as the voter prefers X to Y. That causes big problems. https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 https://medium.com/@ClayShentrup/later-no-harm-72c44e145510 It is precisely why ranked voting methods like Instant Runoff Voting are so vulnerable to tactics. If I prefer the Green, my general best strategy is to tactically rank the Democrat in 1st place, thus "burying" the Green and making the mere appearance of un-electability a self-fulfilling prophecy. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JtKAScORevQ https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD https://www.rangevoting.org/NESD The major moral of voting theory is to AVOID RANKED VOTING METHODS, favoring RATED voting methods like score voting, STAR voting, and approval voting. Here's a presentation I gave in 2015 to the Colorado League of Women Voters explaining more. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HyBm_Hcu4DI&t=488 I would also recommend the 2008 book "Gaming the Vote". Full disclosure: I'm in it.
ClayShentrup 6y ago
Here's a good example of ignoring preferences. scorevoting.net/IrvIgnoreExample.html I would disagree about Condorcet. Score voting and variants, such as STAR voting and approval voting, are vastly simpler than any ranked method, and perform better in voter satisfaction efficiency calculations, and plausibly make better Condorcet methods than real Condorcet methods. https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW https://www.rangevoting.org/AppCW The biggest moral of social choice theory is: avoid ranked voting methods.

jcranmer 6y ago

> I think there's a strong argument that RCV/Approval would shift the incentives and game-theoretic landscape away from polarization and turnout, and towards big-tent coalition building, to appeal to the greatest quantity of left, right, center, and independent. I think most people wildly overestimate the popular appeal for compromise. Only about 20% of the population would support an opposite-side moderate over a near-side extremist. A true centrist party is doomed to lose in any system that knocks out unviable candidates, since it's the first choice of almost nobody.

IggleSniggle 6y ago
It's almost as if you didn't even imagine what a "no 'opposite side' per se" would even look like. I think there's a LOT more room for nuance than "this" or "that" even among the ignorant and/or unengaged. Just look at sports-team divides in the US for evidence.
- SenoraRaton 6y ago
  Except there ARE two sides. Capital controlled means of production, and worker owned means of production. These two systems are diametrically opposed to each other. This just comes across as enlightened centrism. I am vehemently opposed to the economic system of capitalism, and I think that it stands in opposition to the very concept of democracy. How am I supposed to see the capitalist as "the same side"?
  - tptacek 6y ago
    Workers owning the means of production is not in fact one of the major factions in US politics, regardless of how much Twitter leftists and Republicans would like you to believe that.