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In hindsight, while it was made in good faith, this was the wrong decision. We should have informed web users more quickly about the threat and the potential mi
by trotsky 16y ago
In hindsight, while it was made in good faith, this was the wrong decision. We should have informed web users more quickly about the threat and the potential mitigations as well as their side-effects.
If you've been following the story closely, that's the most significant portion of the blog post. There has been substantial criticism of the browser vendors acting to protect CAs instead of users, and this is an admission by Mozilla that they agree, at least to some extent.
If you read through the entry given a title of "Comodo Certificate Issue – Follow Up" it would be pretty easy to miss, as it is rather buried. Much of the rest of it is a rehash of previously available information.
- chamakits 16y agoI agree. Though they do go into more detail, the most important part of this article to most people is both that Firefox mishandled the issue, and that they are acknowledging it.
- bad_user 16y agoI don't think Mozilla tried to protect the CA. I think Mozilla tried to protect their own browser, by tacitly releasing updates for blacklisting those certificates, with the rationale being that this way Mozilla updates wouldn't also get blocked. As the article says, those certificates have value in a tightly controlled network, because otherwise the browser would get a revocation status for that certificate using the OCSP protocol. In such a network it would also be feasible to also block Mozilla updates, and making the issue public wouldn't have helped (from this perspective). Not saying that what they did was OK, but the issue is not so cut and dry.
- trotsky 16y agoAccording to the Mozilla ticket on the issue, Mozilla did not disclose because Comodo asked them not to. While the stated motivation of a coordinated disclosure sounds decent enough, it's hard to believe it was really in either Mozilla's or their user's best interests. Microsoft was the last to patch, and I think if you're dealing with an attacker that would shut off microsoft.com (even selectively) or WU you're probably well beyond an RA compromise. https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=643056#c20 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=643056#c20 It seems to me that there is a bit of a question (at least in a few people's minds) if there was going to be any kind of disclosure if Jacob didn't come along.