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It's all too interesting what is happening in the region. Some say he's going back Ottoman empire with his entire navy and claiming pieces of Cyprus to the disl

It's all too interesting what is happening in the region. Some say he's going back Ottoman empire with his entire navy and claiming pieces of Cyprus to the disliking of Cyprus and Greece. While also performing enormous military exercises under the guise of Mavi Vatan, which also bears symbolic reference to their history. Meanwhile Erdogan is set on keeping the steady flow of immigrants coming for as long as he's the gate holder, the EU will bow to many of Erdogans demands. Concurrently Russia is said be rerunning the USSR book and is desperate in acquiring more territory. For as long as I've lived I can recall the USA being somewhat the voice of reason in these situations but USA is too occupied with their own stuff currently. I think theirs trouble on the horizon as Erdogan and Puttins position become more and more unsustainable with the citizens of said countries being more and more unhappy with them.

GregarianChild 6y ago
I do not see how contemporary Russia is "desperate in acquiring more territory". My interpretation is as following -- please correct me if I'm wrong. Note: I am not endorsing (nor criticising) Russian policies here, just trying to understand and learn. In order to learn, I try and give as clearcut an explanation as possible of my current understanding, so as to make it as easy as possible for others with more expertise to point to where I am wrong (if indeed I am wrong). My take is this: contemporary Russian policy is a variation on "spheres of influence" [1], and Russia treats its neighbours as being in its "sphere of influence", and does not accept them becoming part of NATO. I think the implicit deal with "sphere of influence" neighbours is: as long as you don't join NATO, you can do whatever you like but as soon as you try to join NATO we will stop this, including with force. Currently, Russia has borders with the following NATO countries: Norway, Estonia and Latvia. The latter two joined NATO in 2004, when Russia felt too weak to do anything about it, especially since they are not land-locked, so could be easily be defended by western Navies. A clear example of this was the Russian-Georgian War in 2008. Russia withdrew after a couple of days (but left some "Frozen Conflicts" [2] in place that it can 'turn on' at will, as a power-lever: South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Who would have defended Georgia if Russia had decided to stay, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey? Probably not. Likewise, Russia could easily invade an keep the 'stans. Take land-locked Kazakhstan: huge, rich in resources, nearly empty, and, thanks to Stalin's policy of mixing ethnic groups, about 1/4 of the population is ethic Russian anyway (in 1989 it was nearly 40%). Who would defend Kazakhstan? Mongolia, Uzbekistan , Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan? Probably not. Ukraine is an interesting special case, and the annexation of Crimea can be interpreted in this way: Ukraine came too close to NATO, and Crimea is important for the ability of the Russian navy to project power in the Mediterranean Sea. Crimea is > 2/3 Russian from the POV of ethnic groups and Russia has a higher standard of living than Ukraine, so the majority of the Crimean population would probably have been ok with the policy anyway. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frozen_conflict https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frozen_conflict
nickik 6y ago
I don't think Russia is 'desperate in acquiring more territory'. If anything its desperate to not lose more of them. The Cold War was ended in negotiations with the Soviet Union that stipulated that no NATO expansion towards Russia would happen. But then it did, and again, and again. Not to mention that the US basically broke all the missile treaties as well. Belarus is staring to realize this and look West, so did Georgia and the Ukraine. Russia is desperate not to lose all influence over these. They were desperate to keep the Crimea. But to be fair Crimea wasn't even part of Ukraine until 1960 when Khrushchev wanted to increase is own power base. Not really Ukrainians who live there and the region was never much for Ukrainian nationalism. Russia is desperate not to get parceled up by China, Europe and the US. Russia is declining power, its population is collapsing, it has major brain drain, half of the Russian life outside of Russia. Putin is good at seeming strong but the long term battle is basically lost already. > USA being somewhat the voice of reason You mean the voice with the most financial and military power that told others what do? Are you rally so naive to think that 'reasonableness' is what made these things happen? In the 90s the Russian were sticking mad as hell about this stuff, they just didn't have the power to do anything about it. In the last 15 years the have learn that they can, so they do.
- mantas 6y ago
  > The Cold War was ended in negotiations with the Soviet Union that stipulated that no NATO expansion towards Russia would happen There was no such negotiations with binding promises made public aside from interwebs rumors, frequently reposted on RT/Sputnik/etc. The end of Cold War was USSR unilaterally dissolving by agreement between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Furthermore, Yeltsin publicly said that eastern europe can join NATO if they wish. The only request was that there would be no nuclear weapon moved to new NATO members. And there were talks about limiting conventional weapons. That's why current NATO forces in Baltic states and Poland are "rotational" rather than permanent. https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/18/world/yeltsin-now-seems-ready-to-accept-nato-at-his-borders.html https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/18/world/yeltsin-now-seems-r... > In the 90s the Russian were sticking mad as hell about this stuff, they just didn't have the power to do anything about it. In the last 15 years the have learn that they can, so they do. As an ex-USSR citizen, Russia was damn friendly in early 90s. Russian SSR (separate from USSR) supported Baltic states during January events of 1991. Russian army was rather swiftly removed. Separation was rather smooth thanks to mutual understanding. Things started to change in late 90s though. Not sure where the braking point was.

GregarianChild 6y ago

I do not see how contemporary Russia is "desperate in acquiring more territory". My interpretation is as following -- please correct me if I'm wrong. Note: I am not endorsing (nor criticising) Russian policies here, just trying to understand and learn. In order to learn, I try and give as clearcut an explanation as possible of my current understanding, so as to make it as easy as possible for others with more expertise to point to where I am wrong (if indeed I am wrong). My take is this: contemporary Russian policy is a variation on "spheres of influence" [1], and Russia treats its neighbours as being in its "sphere of influence", and does not accept them becoming part of NATO. I think the implicit deal with "sphere of influence" neighbours is: as long as you don't join NATO, you can do whatever you like but as soon as you try to join NATO we will stop this, including with force. Currently, Russia has borders with the following NATO countries: Norway, Estonia and Latvia. The latter two joined NATO in 2004, when Russia felt too weak to do anything about it, especially since they are not land-locked, so could be easily be defended by western Navies. A clear example of this was the Russian-Georgian War in 2008. Russia withdrew after a couple of days (but left some "Frozen Conflicts" [2] in place that it can 'turn on' at will, as a power-lever: South Ossetia and Abkhazia). Who would have defended Georgia if Russia had decided to stay, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey? Probably not. Likewise, Russia could easily invade an keep the 'stans. Take land-locked Kazakhstan: huge, rich in resources, nearly empty, and, thanks to Stalin's policy of mixing ethnic groups, about 1/4 of the population is ethic Russian anyway (in 1989 it was nearly 40%). Who would defend Kazakhstan? Mongolia, Uzbekistan , Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan? Probably not. Ukraine is an interesting special case, and the annexation of Crimea can be interpreted in this way: Ukraine came too close to NATO, and Crimea is important for the ability of the Russian navy to project power in the Mediterranean Sea. Crimea is > 2/3 Russian from the POV of ethnic groups and Russia has a higher standard of living than Ukraine, so the majority of the Crimean population would probably have been ok with the policy anyway. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sphere_of_influence [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frozen_conflict https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frozen_conflict

nickik 6y ago

I don't think Russia is 'desperate in acquiring more territory'. If anything its desperate to not lose more of them. The Cold War was ended in negotiations with the Soviet Union that stipulated that no NATO expansion towards Russia would happen. But then it did, and again, and again. Not to mention that the US basically broke all the missile treaties as well. Belarus is staring to realize this and look West, so did Georgia and the Ukraine. Russia is desperate not to lose all influence over these. They were desperate to keep the Crimea. But to be fair Crimea wasn't even part of Ukraine until 1960 when Khrushchev wanted to increase is own power base. Not really Ukrainians who live there and the region was never much for Ukrainian nationalism. Russia is desperate not to get parceled up by China, Europe and the US. Russia is declining power, its population is collapsing, it has major brain drain, half of the Russian life outside of Russia. Putin is good at seeming strong but the long term battle is basically lost already. > USA being somewhat the voice of reason You mean the voice with the most financial and military power that told others what do? Are you rally so naive to think that 'reasonableness' is what made these things happen? In the 90s the Russian were sticking mad as hell about this stuff, they just didn't have the power to do anything about it. In the last 15 years the have learn that they can, so they do.

mantas 6y ago
> The Cold War was ended in negotiations with the Soviet Union that stipulated that no NATO expansion towards Russia would happen There was no such negotiations with binding promises made public aside from interwebs rumors, frequently reposted on RT/Sputnik/etc. The end of Cold War was USSR unilaterally dissolving by agreement between Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Furthermore, Yeltsin publicly said that eastern europe can join NATO if they wish. The only request was that there would be no nuclear weapon moved to new NATO members. And there were talks about limiting conventional weapons. That's why current NATO forces in Baltic states and Poland are "rotational" rather than permanent. https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/18/world/yeltsin-now-seems-ready-to-accept-nato-at-his-borders.html https://www.nytimes.com/1997/04/18/world/yeltsin-now-seems-r... > In the 90s the Russian were sticking mad as hell about this stuff, they just didn't have the power to do anything about it. In the last 15 years the have learn that they can, so they do. As an ex-USSR citizen, Russia was damn friendly in early 90s. Russian SSR (separate from USSR) supported Baltic states during January events of 1991. Russian army was rather swiftly removed. Separation was rather smooth thanks to mutual understanding. Things started to change in late 90s though. Not sure where the braking point was.