4 ms·
The ransomeware makers can counter that by making their ransomware divide the victim’s data into a very large number of separately encrypted sections each using
by tzs 6y ago
The ransomeware makers can counter that by making their ransomware divide the victim’s data into a very large number of separately encrypted sections each using a different key. Then instead of trying to sell the victim one key for a million dollars they would offer say 100000 keys at $10 each.
Now it only costs the victim $10 to pick a random section and buy its key. If that works they can pick another and buy it’s key, and so one until they are confident the seller can be trusted and they can then buy the remaining keys.
- TwoBit 6y agoPerhaps, but fakers can do that too. Also I expect that the actual effective cost of the individual keys - especially the first - would be more than $10.
- D2187645 6y agoLet them unlock until they hit half point, but leave the rest unlockable.
- londons_explore 6y agoPractically, this is how all these ransomwares work in big organisations... It's usually ~$1000 per machine. Sometimes more for machines with big disks or depending on which active directory groups they're in. That tells you that UCSF paid for data recovery on 1000+ machines probably...
- ForHackernews 6y agoIs there a volume discount for Enterprise customers?
- kinleyd 6y agoYes. It was $1M after the volume discount.
- renewiltord 6y agoOh, that's a clever counter. Is it possible to think of a way to circumvent that? Perhaps it is sufficient to simply ransomware the data in the first place and then refuse to give it back. Any measure that makes the victim immune to that will make them immune to the true ransomware folks as well.