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The Internet is too unsafe: We need more hackers
- monanjunk 6y agohahahaha cool how can one be a good hacker?
- yakkomajuri 6y agoI'm not qualified to answer that question as I'm not a hacker myself. But apparently Hacker101 is a great resource (https://www.hackerone.com/hacker101 https://www.hackerone.com/hacker101). I myself have gone through some CTF there and can recommend.
- emerged 6y agoI think generally being a hacker is a mindset. Being able to answer a question like "how can one be a good hacker" is fundamental to that mindset. I dont mean that in a dismissive way, I mean that to hack you are tinkering and figuring things out with your own mind rather than asking others.
- OldTechSucks 6y agoAnd being a doctor is a mindset too? To find a vaccine for corona virus which mindset do you need? Maybe we don't have it
- needAnAltHN 6y agoRead/education I think I could hack. I've been hacked, I've read about how people hack, and I have a pretty good understanding how attempts are made. Basically you learn the exploits that historically happen. Worst case if you need to do something, you can Phish.
- deleted 6y ago[deleted]
- Kednicma 6y agoWe need better protection for whitehats. Every government is anti-hacker at some level.
- selectodude 6y agoOn its face, hacking, even the white hat kind, is no different than saying we should allow trying to steal from stores to check if their loss prevention functions are working. As far as the government is concerned, people shouldn’t be trying to steal or hack to begin with. Obviously, if a company hires somebody to try and steal to check their LP, or if a company hires somebody to break into their network, it’s different (and I know there have been issues with one part of a company trying to prosecute somebody that another part tried to hire, but that’s just stupid corporate governance).
- yakkomajuri 6y agoHm, yes and no. Ethical hacking is bounded by "scope". Organizations specify exactly what is allowed and what isn't. Also, the general guideline is that you must stop once you reach data. An ethical hacker will find out your door is open and warn you without going inside. If they go in and steal, they're not a white hat hacker. And if you have an open door with something interesting inside, a black hat hacker will eventually find it anyway.
- wizzwizz4 6y agoAn ethical cracker might take a CD box with one of those radio tags and wave it at the bleepy scanner thing to check if the scanner's working, but they wouldn't walk out the door with a fridge under their coat.
- lr4444lr 6y agoWhat a white hat hacker does in many (not all, maybe not even a majority) of instances is the equivalent of trying new lock picks in the door, watching them swing open, and then reporting dutifully on it. "Not going inside" and "not stealing" aren't sufficient defenses in the eyes of the law for this behavior any more than attempted burglary.
- xwdv 6y agoUnfortunately it doesn’t pay well to be a hacker, you’re better off being a software engineer. So yea, I guess the internet can rot until there’s a way to do white hat hacking at scale. I’ve looked into this, in order to transition from software engineering into a cybersecurity niche it requires a drastic pay cut. Sure if you’re the self-employment type you could try doing bug bounties, but the top 1% make like 35k a year on average, and everyone else makes peanuts or zero. That is still better than starting a startup, but you're also better off being a day trader where 10% of people make a better living with only 2 hours of trading a weekday and two hours of analysis and strategizing in the morning, maybe then you could find time to hack systems just for fun. The other thing you could do is become some kind of consultant and make better money consulting companies and running pen tests for them, but if you can do that you could just as easily make more money building out and consulting on custom software solutions... And if you don’t care about the money fine, but eventually someone that does care about money will come along and do it better than you anyway and eat your lunch. Now, to leave this post on a positive note and not become a target for downvote gangs, I’ll propose this: the way to have more hackers at scale is to grow every software engineer to be a security conscious engineer by default, such that they are constantly looking for vulnerabilities throughout development and deployments to production. It works well because I’d say engineers spend maybe 4 hours a day actually working and the rest is thinking about problems, which can happen in parallel with hacking quite nicely.
- yakkomajuri 6y agoGreat points indeed. As for your proposition - I agree. A simple way to do this would be to have, for example, a day a month where the organization's engineers try to break into their own system. It's common to write tests and follow best practices here and there, but developers often won't actually dedicate some serious time to actively try to break into their own system as an attacker. I think this could be fun and beneficial for all involved.
- scaryclam 6y agoI worked at a company where we did this. It was indeed fun, and we learned some things about our system that showed up some security issues. It also made everyone think more about what a curious attacker could do in a short amount of time.
- wcerfgba 6y agoThe Internet is too paywalled: We need more archive links https://archive.is/dn6fN https://archive.is/dn6fN
- rini17 6y agoReally, how many hackers are needed for everyone to stop saving passwords in plaintext?
- diamondo25 6y agoIf they are using plaintext passwords, I wouldnt be suprised their next step would be using MD5 or SHA1 or self made crypto...
- Avamander 6y agoThis is exactly the place where good defaults and good tutorials are incredibly important. PHP is notorious for this mistake.
- enriquto 6y agoOr better, to stop using passwords altogether!
- StupidPeople 6y agoUnless the framework automatically does this, this will never stop. So many tech companies are really a guy who did a Udemy course or read a Dummies book. I interned at a company that did 10 million a year with a website built with nothing but the w3schools tutorials. You could print the database from the login form as it was started by a guy who just read those tutorials. We weren't allowed to fix it either as the owner didn't want a system he didn't understand.
- UncleMeat 6y agoIt’s not just dumb people. All systems need good defaults to prevent security errors. The world’a most skilled c++ programmers collapse as soon as a fuzzer is thrown at them.
- StupidPeople 6y agoFor all you hacker types out there. I'm a software engineer who knows very little about security. Any good resources to learn it? Currently my company just assumed that Spring handles all those issues for us.
- typicalrunt 6y agoSecurity is mutli-faceted, so it's hard to know where to start. I like to help people begin by getting them to learn the fundamentals. A lot of security training is changing your mindset (perspective) on situations. Two books I like to start this process: * Threat modeling by Adam Shostack * CISSP all in one handbook by Shon Harris You don't need to get a CISSP cert, but the resources and education are generally applicable in most situations.
- banads 6y agoIf you're looking for something more practically related to securing the code you write, the OWASP Top 10 (and OWASP in general) is probably the best place to start. Many modern frameworks like Spring have lots of nice security features baked in, but I've still seen plenty of low hanging Top 10 vulnerabilities in Spring apps -- most often caused by simply failing to use allowlist (formerly known as whitelist) validation on key inputs. It is astonishing how often people neglect basic programming best practices (input validation, error handling, logging, access control) which in turn leads to security vulnerabilities. My theory is this is caused moreso by Agile Management forcing developers to cut corners, rather than just developers being ignorant/lazy. https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/OWASP_Top_Ten_2017/Top_10-2017_Top_10.html https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/OWASP_Top_Ten_2017/Top... Threat modeling can be a good practice to learn, because it gets you into the habit of thinking about how you could hack each new thing you're developing. I dont think the CISSP is a good recommendation for this person's case, unless they plan on becoming a cyber security manager.
- typicalrunt 6y agoThat's not my point suggesting CISSP. The book I recommended takes the reader through the different OSI layers for networking and security, a basic intro to threat modeling, and other stuff that is fundamental to security. One can always skip the managerial stuff, but it doesn't mean the CISSP book is not a good recommendation. Also, having a developer understand the value and need for code security from the perspective of a security person is important to the overall success of an infosec program. Otherwise both engineering and infosec are going to be grating on each other.
- motohagiography 6y agoI've been coming to a similar conclusion. In recent consulting memory, I have seen enterprises with thousands of EoL Windows 2008 servers and vulnerabilities that won't get patched until a catastrophic event forces the businesses to replace them. There is a trope about suppressing forest fires that has come around in a few different areas, where by suppressing forest fires with controlled burns of scrub the only fires that do occur are the ones that consume the fuel-intensive old growth forests creating super infernos. Nassim Taleb talks about it in the context of "suppressed volatility," where most attempts to reduce volatility in complex systems just cause risk to bottle up, as though there were a law of "conservation of risk," at play. We don't have "more hackers," right now because the incentives just aren't worth it. Oddly, enforcement of hacking laws and high profile busts of worm/malware writers have had the effect of discouraging the low level hacking that would clear the scrub out of corporate networks - leaving a lot of super vulnerable and unmaintained infrastructure tucked away behind forgotten firewalls. I have been trying to figure out how to get positioned product wise for this next extreme event, which I think will be caused by all these crappy security controls that removed the low hanging fruit while letting massive data risks age into a super fuel for a tail risk event. Gaming out the scenario of what companies will need when all that old infrastructure in-effect goes up in flames mainly yields migration tools for legacy code into containers that can be moved into cloud environments in a forced move, un-sticking vendor lock-in, BYOCredentials, some kind of liability mitigation for all the PII it will compromise and customer alternatives to locked in dependencies, etc. From a product perspective, I have a contrarian view where I'm less interested right now in what people in companies say they want, and more in how to be positioned for the Forcing Function event that their risk exposure has them set up for. Enterprise demand is a synthetic effect of political positioning and leverage, and not user desire that startups and consumer products respond to. Forest Fires: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-15961-y https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-020-15961-y Taleb riffing on a similar theme via FSBlog: https://fs.blog/2012/11/learning-to-love-volatility/ https://fs.blog/2012/11/learning-to-love-volatility/
- bamboozled 6y agoI think being a hacker, phreaker or cracker became so illegal it really scared people off experimenting and learning about computer security the practical way. Now there are obviously great security people around, but the path one needs to take to become a professional in the field seems to be more theoretical and rubber stamped. For me this is why I focused more on just software engineering with less focus on network security. I get paid to hack without worrying about the police knocking on my door for experimenting and exploring.
- tptacek 6y agoThe opposite is true; it is much easier today to engage with computer security legally than it was in the 1990s. And the consequences for crossing the line are generally smaller. It's easier for lots of reasons, many of them banal, like the fact that you can get a modern Unix system on your laptop in minutes for free, and tear it down and bring it back up on demand with virtualization, or the fact that everyone has Internet access and nobody has to bounce through an X.25 Internet gateway or an outdial to get to IRC. It's also easier because huge amounts of vulnerability research have been published since the 1990s. The cutting edge of vulnerability research in the 1990s is almost unbelievably primitive compared to what's available in open school curricula now, let alone refereed vulnerability research venues. In the 1990s, basic details about things like stack overflows or even temp file races were permanently embargoed and made available only to large-company system operators. Most of what's disclosed today by vendors would have been decried as unethical by the security community in 1995. People that want to do active vulnerability research today can participate in thousands of bug bounty programs, none of which existed in the 1990s. And, despite what the prevailing sentiment on HN would indicate, I think it's actually a bit rarer for people to be prosecuted for undirected, non-monetized hacking than it was in the '90s.
- bamboozled 6y agoYeah I was comparing the situation to circa 2000 onwards. Not around the time when Linux came out. I think th is sentiment regarding bug bounties programs kind of solidifies my point. Corporate America and the government has made only the type of hacking they benefit from legal, while experimentation is off the table. I’m not so much advocating for a free for all by the way. I think there is difference between curiosity and malicious intent.
- aSplash0fDerp 6y agoThe current state of "safety" online was actually a masterclass in growth, trends and thresholds of open platforms. Each interation could only bear so much. In the dialup and early broadband phase, looking "under the hood" and learning about everything that was there was common practice. It was a 10 course meal daily for the life-long learners. Up until 2000'ish, there were only "certain types" of people online, with trust and integrity being self-regulated and intact. Between 2000'ish and 2007'ish, we saw substantial growth of broadband and wifi, expanding the userbase further, while attention was starting to be paid to internal security. Enter the ad explosion of popups, the occasional virus exploit and post-dotcom wisdom (/s) of the economists, and the self-regulating model erodes practically overnight. The smartphone bubble is where "all types" had access to the vast trove of resources that we used to call an information superhighway. Fast-forward to the present and when you open the hood, theres now several yellow warning stickers (idiot alerts) and all of the doors internally are starting to be locked as common practice. It looks like the modern crux of safety is the mix of three types (there are more) of fundamental operations of open platforms; (almost) full trust backends/platforms, self-regulating models and software packages (the bulk of OSS, linux, etc) and the current full lockdown approaches to research, exploration and security. I guess we can officially say "the more the Internet changes, the more unrecognizable it becomes", but data is still the most valuable asset and will most likely migrate to "safest path routing", rather than using the "three billy goats gruff" model that the Internet has become.
- dsalzman 6y agoHackers are/should be the short sellers of the Internet.
- OldTechSucks 6y ago"To keep reading this story, create a free account." that's the message after opening it. No thanks edit: click-bait say no more!
- karmakaze 6y agoIs there somewhere a list of insecure patterns in versions of popular frameworks? This is how I'd organize results. Instead of treating each implementation separately, work on finding insecurities of sites that do have white-hat-friendly policies. Any findings can be reported, patched, and documented against the software/version that was mis/used. Every implementor then only has to review/subscribe to the versions of the software they use. Any custom software would still have to be handled differently but I presume that patterns of use of frameworks and libraries either makes up a larger portion, or will trend in this direction.