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I think I see legitimacy as being inextricably tied to the monopoly on violence. That is to say, the monopoly on violence is not only sufficient for legitimacy,

I think I see legitimacy as being inextricably tied to the monopoly on violence. That is to say, the monopoly on violence is not only sufficient for legitimacy, it is necessary.

smogcutter 6y ago
They are linked, but not inextricably, and the relationship is more complex than something like “the state is defined by a monopoly on power” may lead us to believe. After all, the modern state (ie one that has a monopoly on violence) is a fairly recent development: in the west, somewhere around the 1600s. And yet governments existed before then, so there has to be something more going on. We hear something like “the state is a monopoly on violence” very frequently, but without the idea’s original limited context as part of the definition of the modern state. It helps it go unexamined that our personal experience is only with modern states, so it seems intuitively fundamental. We take it to mean that the legitimacy of the state derives from the power of the army (and police, etc). It feels like hard-eyed realism, seeing through the masks to the coercion beneath. But the real situation is reversed, and historically governments without a strong enough story of legitimacy are unable to create or sustain a monopoly on violence. (Note that violence may be an important part of that story, as with the American revolution). To go back to Rome as an example of how this kind of “realism” can fail us, power in the republic being reduced to who could muster the most swords or the biggest mob wasn’t the true nature of government revealed, it was the end of the republic. I’ve written way more than I intended, but I really enjoy talking about this stuff. I’m not saying that the monopoly on violence line is wrong exactly, but that taken too simply it can be misleading. (I’m aware that the Rome example is fraught—after all it isn’t a modern state so we shouldn’t apply Weber’s terms. But for this purpose I think it works: it’s arguably the closest thing to a modern state in the pre-modern western world, and goes to my point about how power and authority are more complex than a “realistic” view that reduces it to violence.

I think I see legitimacy as being inextricably tied to the monopoly on violence. That is to say, the monopoly on violence is not only sufficient for legitimacy, it is necessary.

smogcutter 6y ago

They are linked, but not inextricably, and the relationship is more complex than something like “the state is defined by a monopoly on power” may lead us to believe. After all, the modern state (ie one that has a monopoly on violence) is a fairly recent development: in the west, somewhere around the 1600s. And yet governments existed before then, so there has to be something more going on. We hear something like “the state is a monopoly on violence” very frequently, but without the idea’s original limited context as part of the definition of the modern state. It helps it go unexamined that our personal experience is only with modern states, so it seems intuitively fundamental. We take it to mean that the legitimacy of the state derives from the power of the army (and police, etc). It feels like hard-eyed realism, seeing through the masks to the coercion beneath. But the real situation is reversed, and historically governments without a strong enough story of legitimacy are unable to create or sustain a monopoly on violence. (Note that violence may be an important part of that story, as with the American revolution). To go back to Rome as an example of how this kind of “realism” can fail us, power in the republic being reduced to who could muster the most swords or the biggest mob wasn’t the true nature of government revealed, it was the end of the republic. I’ve written way more than I intended, but I really enjoy talking about this stuff. I’m not saying that the monopoly on violence line is wrong exactly, but that taken too simply it can be misleading. (I’m aware that the Rome example is fraught—after all it isn’t a modern state so we shouldn’t apply Weber’s terms. But for this purpose I think it works: it’s arguably the closest thing to a modern state in the pre-modern western world, and goes to my point about how power and authority are more complex than a “realistic” view that reduces it to violence.