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Yes, the same as any unrecorded conversation is inaccessible by warrant after it happens. Law enforcement doesn't need omniscience, but we do need freedom to as

Yes, the same as any unrecorded conversation is inaccessible by warrant after it happens. Law enforcement doesn't need omniscience, but we do need freedom to associate and privacy in a democracy.

fastball 6y ago
I didn't say they do. Encryption is still a different idea from warrantless searches though.
- giancarlostoro 6y ago
  But the beauty of E2E is that indeed it forces law enforcement to cough up a warrant.
  - fastball 6y ago
    With strong E2EE, a warrant won't do much.
    - giancarlostoro 6y ago
      A law abiding citizen might comply at the advise of their lawyer. My point is, E2E will at least ensure that warrants are used and not warrantless tactics, which seems to be an ever growing issue.
happythomist 6y ago
But encrypted conversations, by definition, are recorded. With a warrant, law enforcement is permitted to search a safe containing written records of a conversation; why shouldn't they be allowed to search an encrypted consumer electronic device containing the same?
- RussianCow 6y ago
  The difference is that a safe can be "brute forced"; you don't need to know the combination in order to be able to get in, with enough resources (i.e. a large enough drill). The same cannot be said about encrypted data, which is (as far as we know) literally impossible to break into no matter how much money you throw at the problem. If the same were true of safes—if they were physically impossible to get into without the key—then this same conversation would apply. Do you think, in that scenario, that safe manufacturers should be required to make a master key and distribute it to law enforcement? IANAL, but as far as I know, if the police can't physically break into your safe, there is nothing saying that they have any legal recourse to compel you to open it. Why should encrypted data be any different? Any why should it be the responsibility of the manufacturer/service provider to supply law enforcement with a key? The government can always pass a law allowing law enforcement to legally require you to unlock your device, but that is not what they are doing.
  - happythomist 6y ago
    > Do you think, in that scenario, that safe manufacturers should be required to make a master key and distribute it to law enforcement? I'm not sure, to be honest, but I think it's certainly a reasonable position to take. > IANAL, but as far as I know, if the police can't physically break into your safe, there is nothing saying that they have any legal recourse to compel you to open it. If it can be established that the safe is yours and that you possess the key or know the combination, I believe a court can indeed order you to open it or to produce the contents, punishable by contempt of court. > Any why should it be the responsibility of the manufacturer/service provider to supply law enforcement with a key? Because the state has a compelling public interest in ensuring that law enforcement can successfully execute lawful search warrants. The existence of indestructible safes would constitute a significant impediment to achieving that goal, so manufacturers of such safes have the responsibility of ensuring that law enforcement can access them. I don't necessarily agree with that argument, but I don't think it's unreasonable.
    - RussianCow 6y ago
      > If it can be established that the safe is yours and that you possess the key or know the combination, I believe a court can indeed order you to open it or to produce the contents, punishable by contempt of court. I got curious about this, so I did some quick research. Again, IANAL, but my understanding is that, in the US, the court can order you to give up the physical key (if it is determined that you have it) but not the combination. The latter is protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, in the same way as sharing knowledge verbally. So then the question becomes, is an encryption key (or passcode, etc) more like a physical key, or a combination? If the former, then you would be legally compelled to decrypt it if law enforcement asked you to do so. If the latter, however, then there is no legal way for law enforcement to force you to decrypt the device. The legal framework for deciding how to handle encrypted data already exists, it's just ambiguous. Instead of passing a law that completely changes the scope and usefulness of encryption, doesn't it make much more sense to simply disambiguate and update existing laws accordingly? I don't know the full repercussions of that, but it seems that there exist less drastic solutions to the problem. > I don't necessarily agree with that argument, but I don't think it's unreasonable. I think it is unreasonable because it's asking companies to willfully violate their user's privacy and trust, and to severely undermine encryption as a whole. There is zero chance that this does not get abused.

Yes, the same as any unrecorded conversation is inaccessible by warrant after it happens. Law enforcement doesn't need omniscience, but we do need freedom to associate and privacy in a democracy.

fastball 6y ago

I didn't say they do. Encryption is still a different idea from warrantless searches though.

giancarlostoro 6y ago
But the beauty of E2E is that indeed it forces law enforcement to cough up a warrant.
- fastball 6y ago
  With strong E2EE, a warrant won't do much.
  - giancarlostoro 6y ago
    A law abiding citizen might comply at the advise of their lawyer. My point is, E2E will at least ensure that warrants are used and not warrantless tactics, which seems to be an ever growing issue.

happythomist 6y ago

But encrypted conversations, by definition, are recorded. With a warrant, law enforcement is permitted to search a safe containing written records of a conversation; why shouldn't they be allowed to search an encrypted consumer electronic device containing the same?

RussianCow 6y ago
The difference is that a safe can be "brute forced"; you don't need to know the combination in order to be able to get in, with enough resources (i.e. a large enough drill). The same cannot be said about encrypted data, which is (as far as we know) literally impossible to break into no matter how much money you throw at the problem. If the same were true of safes—if they were physically impossible to get into without the key—then this same conversation would apply. Do you think, in that scenario, that safe manufacturers should be required to make a master key and distribute it to law enforcement? IANAL, but as far as I know, if the police can't physically break into your safe, there is nothing saying that they have any legal recourse to compel you to open it. Why should encrypted data be any different? Any why should it be the responsibility of the manufacturer/service provider to supply law enforcement with a key? The government can always pass a law allowing law enforcement to legally require you to unlock your device, but that is not what they are doing.
- happythomist 6y ago
  > Do you think, in that scenario, that safe manufacturers should be required to make a master key and distribute it to law enforcement? I'm not sure, to be honest, but I think it's certainly a reasonable position to take. > IANAL, but as far as I know, if the police can't physically break into your safe, there is nothing saying that they have any legal recourse to compel you to open it. If it can be established that the safe is yours and that you possess the key or know the combination, I believe a court can indeed order you to open it or to produce the contents, punishable by contempt of court. > Any why should it be the responsibility of the manufacturer/service provider to supply law enforcement with a key? Because the state has a compelling public interest in ensuring that law enforcement can successfully execute lawful search warrants. The existence of indestructible safes would constitute a significant impediment to achieving that goal, so manufacturers of such safes have the responsibility of ensuring that law enforcement can access them. I don't necessarily agree with that argument, but I don't think it's unreasonable.
  - RussianCow 6y ago
    > If it can be established that the safe is yours and that you possess the key or know the combination, I believe a court can indeed order you to open it or to produce the contents, punishable by contempt of court. I got curious about this, so I did some quick research. Again, IANAL, but my understanding is that, in the US, the court can order you to give up the physical key (if it is determined that you have it) but not the combination. The latter is protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, in the same way as sharing knowledge verbally. So then the question becomes, is an encryption key (or passcode, etc) more like a physical key, or a combination? If the former, then you would be legally compelled to decrypt it if law enforcement asked you to do so. If the latter, however, then there is no legal way for law enforcement to force you to decrypt the device. The legal framework for deciding how to handle encrypted data already exists, it's just ambiguous. Instead of passing a law that completely changes the scope and usefulness of encryption, doesn't it make much more sense to simply disambiguate and update existing laws accordingly? I don't know the full repercussions of that, but it seems that there exist less drastic solutions to the problem. > I don't necessarily agree with that argument, but I don't think it's unreasonable. I think it is unreasonable because it's asking companies to willfully violate their user's privacy and trust, and to severely undermine encryption as a whole. There is zero chance that this does not get abused.