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Yeah, and my personal data never left Equifax's servers either. You can't change your biometrics when they are inevitably hacked. If you even find out.

orf 6y ago
I quite rightly trust Apple more than I trust Equifax.
monocasa 6y ago
For all Apple's faults, they're pretty open about how their Secure Enclave works. I think they consider privacy to be a key differentiator, particularly when compared to Android and Windows. you can see this in how they didn't open a phone even given an FBI request.
- kohtatsu 6y ago
  They didn't develop the capability to backdoor phones at the FBI's request. They are generally happy to hand over iCloud backups, which they did in that case and the FBI "lost" them IIRC. It was also an iPhone 5c, the last iPhone without a Secure Enclave, I believe they were able to get in with GrayKey.
  - monocasa 6y ago
    > They are generally happy to hand over iCloud backups That one they legally have to do when given a subpoena.
    - Dahoon 6y ago
      They could encrypt everything and not have the keys. So not really.
      - monocasa 6y ago
        The whole point of the backup is that you'll be able to access it even if you your device and it's keystore are destroyed.
        modeless 6y ago
        And end-to-end encryption doesn't have to break that: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-have-your-back-by.html https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
        monocasa 6y ago
        That's not end to end encryption, the key is stored in a HSM in Google's data center in that case. They can be subpoenaed for it.
        modeless 6y ago
        I don't think you understand what the HSM does. By design, the HSM's secret keys cannot be extracted. Not by the physical possessor of the HSM, nor the manufacturer, nor designer. That is the whole point of using an HSM for this. A subpoena cannot compel the impossible.
        monocasa 6y ago
        Nearly all HSMs that store an arbitrary number of keys can be compelled to dump those keys via a special firmware update from the manufacturer of the HSM, or at very least remove checks to allow it to be used as a decryption oracle. Apple was able to say no, because they weren't in physical possession of the HSM, which meant that they couldn't be subpoenaed for information that wasn't actually in their possession, but a judge wouldn't look as highly on google's case.
        modeless 6y ago
        The firmware on these chips erases the keys before applying firmware updates. I encourage you to read the detailed information available rather than just making assumptions about it, or even just the short blog post I linked which states this explicitly. In the San Bernadino case the FBI had physical possession of the HSM, so Apple could have attacked it physically. That's not related to the reasons why the FBI gave up on that case.
- mtgp1000 6y ago
  This personally identifying data is forever one forced update away from abuse. The fact that it's "normal" to take such a risk for such a minor convenience does not mean that it's a good idea. But I recognize that not everyone is so paranoid. Though in the current political climate, where corporations are clearly choosing sides, you probably should be.
acdha 6y ago
Watch the video where he shows the JavaScript APIs being called: the website sees a standard public-key process using WebAuthn. You can use anything which can perform that protocol with zero change to the system — if someone steals your phone, you don't need to change your face since the new phone will generate a new key and the biometric data is only used to unlock that key.
ThePowerOfFuet 6y ago
PDF page 8: https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/app...

orf 6y ago

I quite rightly trust Apple more than I trust Equifax.

monocasa 6y ago

For all Apple's faults, they're pretty open about how their Secure Enclave works. I think they consider privacy to be a key differentiator, particularly when compared to Android and Windows. you can see this in how they didn't open a phone even given an FBI request.

kohtatsu 6y ago
They didn't develop the capability to backdoor phones at the FBI's request. They are generally happy to hand over iCloud backups, which they did in that case and the FBI "lost" them IIRC. It was also an iPhone 5c, the last iPhone without a Secure Enclave, I believe they were able to get in with GrayKey.
- monocasa 6y ago
  > They are generally happy to hand over iCloud backups That one they legally have to do when given a subpoena.
  - Dahoon 6y ago
    They could encrypt everything and not have the keys. So not really.
    - monocasa 6y ago
      The whole point of the backup is that you'll be able to access it even if you your device and it's keystore are destroyed.
      - modeless 6y ago
        And end-to-end encryption doesn't have to break that: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-have-your-back-by.html https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/google-and-android-h...
        monocasa 6y ago
        That's not end to end encryption, the key is stored in a HSM in Google's data center in that case. They can be subpoenaed for it.
        modeless 6y ago
        I don't think you understand what the HSM does. By design, the HSM's secret keys cannot be extracted. Not by the physical possessor of the HSM, nor the manufacturer, nor designer. That is the whole point of using an HSM for this. A subpoena cannot compel the impossible.
        monocasa 6y ago
        Nearly all HSMs that store an arbitrary number of keys can be compelled to dump those keys via a special firmware update from the manufacturer of the HSM, or at very least remove checks to allow it to be used as a decryption oracle. Apple was able to say no, because they weren't in physical possession of the HSM, which meant that they couldn't be subpoenaed for information that wasn't actually in their possession, but a judge wouldn't look as highly on google's case.
        modeless 6y ago
        The firmware on these chips erases the keys before applying firmware updates. I encourage you to read the detailed information available rather than just making assumptions about it, or even just the short blog post I linked which states this explicitly. In the San Bernadino case the FBI had physical possession of the HSM, so Apple could have attacked it physically. That's not related to the reasons why the FBI gave up on that case.
mtgp1000 6y ago
This personally identifying data is forever one forced update away from abuse. The fact that it's "normal" to take such a risk for such a minor convenience does not mean that it's a good idea. But I recognize that not everyone is so paranoid. Though in the current political climate, where corporations are clearly choosing sides, you probably should be.

acdha 6y ago

Watch the video where he shows the JavaScript APIs being called: the website sees a standard public-key process using WebAuthn. You can use anything which can perform that protocol with zero change to the system — if someone steals your phone, you don't need to change your face since the new phone will generate a new key and the biometric data is only used to unlock that key.

ThePowerOfFuet 6y ago

PDF page 8: https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/apple-platform-security-guide.pdf https://manuals.info.apple.com/MANUALS/1000/MA1902/en_US/app...