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I know the theory. I'm asking for pointers to experimental evidence that it is true. There are competing theories. One of them, which is backed by some empiric

by dhs 18y ago

I know the theory. I'm asking for pointers to experimental evidence that it is true. There are competing theories. One of them, which is backed by some empirical evidence, is "Continuity of Mind" by Michael Spivey http://www.amazon.com/Continuity-Mind-Oxford-Psychology/dp/0195170784 http://www.amazon.com/Continuity-Mind-Oxford-Psychology/dp/0... Short summary by Spivey: http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/Proceedings/2003/pdfs/32.pdf http://www.cogsci.rpi.edu/CSJarchive/Proceedings/2003/pdfs/3... Another approach, also relying heavily on experiments, is the "Grounded Cognition" thesis, of which Lawrence Barsalou gives a good summary: http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Barsalou_ARP_2008_grounded_cognition.pdf http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/barsalou/papers/Ba... From the abstract: "Grounded cognition rejects traditional views that cognition is computation on amodal symbols in a modular system, independent of the brain’s modal systems for perception, action, and introspection. Instead, grounded cognition proposes that modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action underlie cognition." EDIT: I forgot a very interesting one involving a computational experiment: Selmer Bringsjord, "A New Gödelian Argument for Hypercomputing Minds Based on the Busy Beaver Problem" http://www.osl.iu.edu/~kyross/pub/new-godelian.pdf http://www.osl.iu.edu/~kyross/pub/new-godelian.pdf Now I'm looking for evidence which supports your theory - that brains = minds = computers. Affirming that a theory exists without providing evidence that it is true is not enough.

deleted 18y ago
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mojuba 18y ago
As an example, modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action - which of these are not computation?
- dhs 18y ago
  Yeah, the candidates are not all alike, even though Barsalou cites Spivey, who is really in the analogue camp. In contrast, the "Grounded Cognition" idea revolves around simulation - which may or be not work in an analogue manner -, and only denies the existence of amodal symbols in brains, as opposed to, say, Jeff Hawkins (who didn't do any experiments, either, AFAIK). Bringsjord is still another case; he's an Ex-GOFAI guy who, together with David Ferrucci, built the storytelling system BRUTUS. http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~sousa/BRUTUS_rev.html http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~sousa/BRUTUS_rev.html Bringsjord makes another relevant contribution to the debate in "BRUTUS and the Narrational Case Against Church's Thesis", which used to be available from citeseer, but that site is down ATM, so I cannot provide a link. But since you're asking a question of your own instead of answering mine, I take it that you don't know of any evidence, either.
  - xlnt 18y ago
    One cannot present evidence to differentiate between two theories unless they are both coherent and make clear and different predictions. Arguments against theories is a valid way to deal with them; so is asking questions to clarify what they are saying.
    - dhs 18y ago
      I don't understand you there. Spivey can make experiments which lead him to conclude that there may not be any fixed representations of anything in the brain. Bringsjord can manually solve the Busy Beaver for 6-state Turing Machines, while the machines themselves can't. These are examples of what I have; what I'm now looking for are examples of experiments from the results of which the opposite can be concluded.
      - xlnt 18y ago
        How is it relevant whether there are any fixed representations in the brain? self-modifying code could achieve that. there is no reason to believe that bringsjord can solve that problem and a computer can't. divide his method of solving it into very small steps. then answer which step did he do which a computer can't do?
        dhs 18y ago
        The Busy Beaver is a classic example of a function which is not computable by a Turing Machine.
        xlnt 18y ago
        You haven't said which step he took to compute it which a turing machine can't do.
        dhs 18y ago
        There are many steps. You have a set of different Turing Machines with alphabet {0,1}, each of which has, say, 4 states. You want to know which of these is the one that, starting from a tape filled with 0's, can write the largest number of consecutive 1's onto the tape, before it halts. If it halts - you don't know that in the beginning. A human can find out, by manually simulating the sequence and counting the steps. It's a lot of work - there are 61.519 possible 4-state machines -, but Bringsjord (or more likely, a group of undergrads available to him) has/have done it. A computer can't do it. For details, please read the paper.

by dhs 18y ago

deleted 18y ago

[deleted]

mojuba 18y ago

As an example, modal simulations, bodily states, and situated action - which of these are not computation?

dhs 18y ago
Yeah, the candidates are not all alike, even though Barsalou cites Spivey, who is really in the analogue camp. In contrast, the "Grounded Cognition" idea revolves around simulation - which may or be not work in an analogue manner -, and only denies the existence of amodal symbols in brains, as opposed to, say, Jeff Hawkins (who didn't do any experiments, either, AFAIK). Bringsjord is still another case; he's an Ex-GOFAI guy who, together with David Ferrucci, built the storytelling system BRUTUS. http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~sousa/BRUTUS_rev.html http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~sousa/BRUTUS_rev.html Bringsjord makes another relevant contribution to the debate in "BRUTUS and the Narrational Case Against Church's Thesis", which used to be available from citeseer, but that site is down ATM, so I cannot provide a link. But since you're asking a question of your own instead of answering mine, I take it that you don't know of any evidence, either.
- xlnt 18y ago
  One cannot present evidence to differentiate between two theories unless they are both coherent and make clear and different predictions. Arguments against theories is a valid way to deal with them; so is asking questions to clarify what they are saying.
  - dhs 18y ago
    I don't understand you there. Spivey can make experiments which lead him to conclude that there may not be any fixed representations of anything in the brain. Bringsjord can manually solve the Busy Beaver for 6-state Turing Machines, while the machines themselves can't. These are examples of what I have; what I'm now looking for are examples of experiments from the results of which the opposite can be concluded.
    - xlnt 18y ago
      How is it relevant whether there are any fixed representations in the brain? self-modifying code could achieve that. there is no reason to believe that bringsjord can solve that problem and a computer can't. divide his method of solving it into very small steps. then answer which step did he do which a computer can't do?
      - dhs 18y ago
        The Busy Beaver is a classic example of a function which is not computable by a Turing Machine.
        xlnt 18y ago
        You haven't said which step he took to compute it which a turing machine can't do.
        dhs 18y ago
        There are many steps. You have a set of different Turing Machines with alphabet {0,1}, each of which has, say, 4 states. You want to know which of these is the one that, starting from a tape filled with 0's, can write the largest number of consecutive 1's onto the tape, before it halts. If it halts - you don't know that in the beginning. A human can find out, by manually simulating the sequence and counting the steps. It's a lot of work - there are 61.519 possible 4-state machines -, but Bringsjord (or more likely, a group of undergrads available to him) has/have done it. A computer can't do it. For details, please read the paper.