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Gordon H. Clark: "If [...] a thought is a physical or chemical motion inside the brain, it can be illustrated by a pitched ball in Yankee Stadium. The stadium
by shawndumas 16y ago
Gordon H. Clark:
"If [...] a thought is a physical or chemical motion inside the brain, it can be illustrated by a pitched ball in Yankee Stadium. The stadium represents the brain or body; the pitched ball is the thought. Suppose the first pitch of the game is an inside curve. Now, since the pitch is a dated event, it cannot have happened previously to this game, nor can it be repeated in a later inning. Of course, a pitch in the third inning may also be an inside curve; but it cannot be identical to the first. The inside curve in the third inning comes fifteen minutes later; its speed is not precisely the same; and it breaks about a half-inch higher. That means that I can never have the same thought twice. If I think thought X at 2:21 P.M., I cannot have that thought again at 3:12 or ever after. Behaviorism makes memory impossible.
The most obvious answer to this is that these two pitches resemble each other so closely that one cannot tell the difference between them. Hence, though we can never have the exact same thought, we can nonetheless have a similar thought. But this reply complicates the situation. The thought that the curve in the third inning is similar to the curve in the first inning has to be a newly pitched ball (e.g. the knuckle ball in the fourth inning). Similarity is itself a chemical motion inside the brain. It is as much a dated pitch as the other two. It came five or ten minutes after the pitch in the third inning. How then can a chemical motion ten minutes after the second curve connect two motions that no longer exist? Behaviorism therefore cannot discover that any two chemical motion are similar.
There is a further complication. It is all the more obvious that none of these pitches, nor any other in the Yankee Stadium, can be the motion of a different ball in San Diego. The San Diego diamond is a different mind. Two minds can never have the same pitch. That is why no one else can have the least idea of what Skinner and Ryle mean. Nor can they themselves have any idea of what they wrote, now that the inning is over."
- JoeAltmaier 16y agoGoofy thinking. Just because two things are demonstrably different instances of something, doesn't mean they can't be in all meaningful ways congruent. The pitched-ball metaphor doesn't begin to touch memory, learning and association, which we use to compare ideas.
- shawndumas 16y agoYou are connecting the two different instances by use of a third thing -- what is that third thing? That's the question... The way in which they connect is (in my thinking) a Form and Forms are immaterial. . This link[1] might aid discussion. ---- [1]: http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/platform.htm http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/platform.htm